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OF CONCERN TO PAINESVILLE-OR ONLY TO THE STATE:
HOME RULE IN THE CONTEXT OF UTILITIES REGULATION
GEORGE D. VAUBEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the continuing and oftentimes uneasy relationship between state
and municipal government, problems seldom remain settled and new ones
can be expected to arise.' At times, the basic structure of this relationship
may be drawn into question. And for those who would be farsighted,
problems only yet on the horizon, may still be discernible.
Into this dynamic field of law comes the 1968 Ohio Supreme Court
decision of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Painesville.2 The im-
mediate concern of the case was the relationship between the state and its
municipal corporations with respect to the reasonable regulation of inter-
city high voltage electric transmission lines. In its broader significance,
the decision questions the continuing validity of the "general laws" con-
cept as the determiner of state authority to overturn municipal exercises
of the police power. Even the scope of the municipal police power be-
comes a matter for renewed interest since the case also focuses attention
on the struggle to determine which are matters of "local" and which are
matters of "statewide" concern.
Underlying these concerns is the basic question of whether or not the
state can clear up a portion of the police power field of all regulation-a
problem that until now has been resolved in the negative and has been re-
cently described by two authorities as Ohio "abhors a vacuum."3 It is in re-
gard to this question that the no longer remote problems of state, municipal
corporation and metropolitan area relations can be brought most sharply
into focus. Should the state's admittedly broad police powers be further ex-
panded to permit it to deal with area problems on a comprehensive basis
freed from the direct application of municipal regulations within corpo-
ration limits or their indirect effects in surrounding territory?
Whether the decision in Painesville is destined to be treated as an an-
swer to all of these concerns awaits, of course, the future. It is, nonethe-
less, the purpose of this article to hazard some assessment of the impor-
tance of the decision, both as to its immediate consequences and as to the
light it sheds on the validity of permitting the judicial process to meet,
Member of the Ohio Bar, Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University.
'For a resum6 of the shifts in the area of law as of 1960, see Blume, Afuicipal Home Rule
in Ohio: The New Look, 11 W. RES. L REV. 538 (1960).
2 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
3 F. MIcEuiAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNmENT IN URBAN AREAs 374
(1970).
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without resort to constitutional amendment, the need to reconcile past
constitutional theories to present problems of local government.4
II. OUTLINE OF RELEVANT HOME RULE CONCEPTS
A redistribution of power between the state and municipal govern-
ments took place in Ohio with the acceptance of municipal Home Rule
through the adoption in 1912 of article XVIII of the state constitution.
Traditionally municipal governments had been treated as creatures of the
state, possessing no inherent authority, but subject to the state both for
their existence and for their powers." By Home Rule all municipal corpo-
rations became nearly independent of the General Assembly in the acquisi-
tion of power7 and, to varying degrees, in its use.8 This constitutionally
granted power was considered to be self-executing," that is, no intervening
legislation was necessary before it could be used; and after an interval of
10 years, it was also found that the power could be exercised directly by
ordinance without the need for a popularly adopted municipal charter"
Home Rule consists of all powers of "local self-government" and "lo-
cal police regulations."
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws. 1
This provision is thought to include all power for governing a munici-
pality that the state could exercise within the territory of the municipal
4 A role, when it reaches constitution making, that the court early disclaimed any intention
of assuming, State ex rel. Toledo v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St. 86, 91, 119 N.E. 253, 254 (1917).
5 Orno CONST. art. XVIII, § 3, power of "local self-government" and power to make "local
police regulations;" § 4, power to acquire and operate a public utility or contract for its services;
§ 6, power to dispose of surplus service of a municipally owned utility; § 7, power to frame a
charter for its government; § 10, power to make excessive condemnation for public use; § 11,
power to access benefitted property for the cost of a public improvement; and, § 12, power to
issue mortgage bonds for the acquisition, construction, or extension of a public utility.
0 State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912); Ravenna v. Penna.
Co., 45 Ohio St. 118, 12 N.E. 445 (1887). The opinion of Judge Wanamaker expressed in
Youngstown v. First Nat'l Bank of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 563, 140 N.E. 176 (1922), Fed-
eral Gas & Fuel Co. v. Columbus, 96 Ohio St. 530, 118 N.E. 103 (1917) and in State cx rel,
Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 125-131, 102 N.E. 670, 681-683 (1913) (dissenting opinion),
that municipalities predated the state constitution and that they possessed inherent power did not
represent the settled law of the state. This condition of dependency often led to state abuse.
Duffey, Non-Charter Municipalities: Local Self-Government, 21 01110 ST. L.J. 304, 305 (1960).
7Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
8 Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918) (as to "local police
regulation" power); State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960)
(as to "local self-government" power of non-charter municipalities).
9 State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913).
10Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923) (disapproving a con-
trary view expressed in State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913)).
1 Omo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
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corporation subject to the stated limitation and other constitutional provi-
sions." Evolving from early divergent views of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 3 the interpretation was established that local self-government and
local police regulations are two separate grants of power. Broadly speak-
ing, local self-government means power over matters which "by their na-
ture and the field of their operation, are local and municipal in character,""
such as controlling the structure of government, 3 its operation,'" the dis-
tribution of power,' 7 and the selection'8 or election'9 of officials, as well
as the exercise of such other basic powers as taxation, -!° contracting, -' and
eminent domain." The power to make local police regulations, on the
other hand, broadly approximates the state's police power exercised on
the local level.3 A recent decision combined the two grants of power into
the single one of "local self-government," but without any discernible ef-
fect on the former scope of either.24 Traditionally, Home Rule has been
limited to the territorial boundaries of the municipality.2
1 Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918); State ex rcl.
Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
13 In the early cases of Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918)
(dissenting opinion), Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913) (concur-
ring opinion), and State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913) (dis-
senting opinion) Judge Wanamaker expressed the view that "local self-government" included
all power to conduct municipal affairs, including a municipal police power, and that "local
police regulations" added, subject to limitation, the authority to exercise the states police
power within the limits of a municipality.
-
4 State ex rfe Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 97, 102 N.E. 670, 673 (1913); a:cord,
Mansfield v. Endly, 38 Ohio App. 528, 176 N.. 462, aff'd, 124 Ohio St. 652, 181 N.E. 886
(1931).
15 -ile v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St 144, 141 N.E. 35 (1923), appeal disnissed, 266 U.S.
582 (1924); Switzer v. State ex rel. Silvey, 103 Ohio St. 306, 133 N.E. 552 (1921).
16 State ex rel. Cist v. Cincinnati, 101 Ohio St. 354, 129 N.E. 595 (1920).
17 Harsney v. Allen, 160 Ohio Sr. 36, 113 N.E.2d 86 (1953).
18 State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958), noted in
20 Omo ST. .J. 152 (1959); State ex rel. Lentz v. Edwards, 90 Ohio Sr. 305, 107 N.E. 768
(1914).
19 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio S. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
2 0 State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919). But see OHIO
CONsT. art. XIII, § 6 and art. XVIII, § 13; State ex rel. Toledo v. Cooper, 97 Ohio Sr. 86, 119
N.E. 253 (1917).
2 1Babin v. Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953); Hugger v. Ironton, 83
Ohio App. 21, 82 N.E.2d 118, appeal dismisscd, 148 Ohio St. 670, 76 N.E.2d 397 (1947).
approved in State ex rel. Leach v. Redick, 168 Ohio St. 543, 157 N.E.2d 106 (1959). See also
State exrel. Cronin v. Wald, 26 Ohio St. 2d 22,268 N.E.2d 581 (1971).
2 2 State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
23 Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918); Fitzgerald v.
Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913); Note, Municipal Rctdalon of Business
in Ohio, 15 W. RFS. L. REV. 195 (1963). It includes, after some confusion, the power to
prohibit, Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), cert. dcnicd, 357
U.S. 904 (1958).
2 4 Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), cert. doeid, 357
U.S. 904 (1958).
2 5 Expressly as to police regulations, OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3, "and enforce Utikin
their limits such local police ... regulations... (emphasis added); Kigler v. Elyria, 2 Ohio
1972]
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The limiting phrase, "as are not in conflict with general laws," has
been interpreted to apply only to the power to make local police regula.
'tions,-0 leaving the local self-government power free from this limited
type of state supervision. But in 1960 the supreme court held that an
ordinance enacted under local self-government authority could not be sus-
tainedF7 if it was at "variance" with a general state law governing munci-
palities enacted under authority of Section 2 of Article XVIII of the Ohio
,Constitution28 unless the ordinance was authorized by a charter adopted by
the municipal corporation under Section 7 of that same article. A charter
thus became a prerequisite to the full exercise of these powers of municipal
self-government.
There being no judicial indication to the contrary, "conflict" as to local
police regulations and "variance" as to local self-government seem to be
synonymous.29 In a long series of cases "conflict" has in general been
interpreted to mean a "head-on collision" between ordinance and statute, 0
that is, one permits what the other forbids or vice versa. But if each for-
bids, whether less or more than the other,"' or whether one imposes a
lesser32 or greater penalty than the other,3 3 then there is "no conflict."
Other approaches to the definition of a "conflict" have been limited in
application and are not entirely consistent with this basic formula. For
instance, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized "conflict by implica-
tion," which arises when a prohibition is thought to permit that which is
not forbidden.34  The court has also recognized a conflict when the state
App. 2d 181,207 N.E.2d 389 (1965), State ex rel. Hanna v. Spidler, 47 Ohio App. 114, 190 N.E.
584 (1933), and impliedly as to local self-government, Cincinnati v. Rost, 92 Ohio App. 8,
109 N.E.2d 290 (1952), appeal disrmissed sub nom. Reitz v. Morr, 158 Ohio St. 180, 107
N.E.2d 113 (1952). Contra, McDonald v. Columbus, 12 Ohio App. 2d 150, 231 N.E.2d 319
(1967).
26Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913); Benjamin v. Colum-
bus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 904 (1958).
27 State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 NE.2d 574 (1960), see gcncrally
Duffey, supra note 6.
28 "General laws shall be passed to provide for the incorporation and government of cities
and villages...." OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 2; see Fordham and Asher, Home Rale Pouers
in Theory and Practice, 9 OIo ST. L.J. 18, 21 (1948).
29 See Leavers v. Canton, 1 Ohio St. 2d 33,203 N.E.2d 354 (1964).
30 This rule was first announced in Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519
(1923); see generally Vaubel, Municipal Corporations and the 'olice Power in Ohio, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1968); Hitchcock, Ohio Ordinances in Conflict with General Lams, 16 U.
CIN. .REv. 1 (1942).
31 Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
32 Lorain v. Petralia, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 159 (Lorain County Mun. Ct. 1929).
33Matthews v. Russell, 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E.2d 696 (1949); 13 OHIO ST. LJ. 111
(1952).
34 Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944); Schneider-
man v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929); Note, Municipal Control of Liquor
in Ohio, 12 W. REs. L REv. 377 (1961).
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makes a crime a felony and the municipal corporation makes the same
crime a misdemeanor 5
The "no conflict" approach, however, rules out any implied 8 or e.xpress
denial 7 of municipal power by the General Assembly. Thus, the su-
preme court has rejected preemption, the creation of an exclusive area of
regulation by state occupation of the field, as a basis for foreclosing mu-
nicipal regulation. In addition, the evident illogic in allowing the General
Assembly to deny expressly power granted to municipalities by article
XVIII, § 3 has led the supreme court to repulse legislative attempts to do
so.38 This has taken the form of rulings defining the "general laws" with
which a municipality cannot conflict under article XVIII, § 3 as being
only those laws enacted by the General Assembly or those administrative
orders adopted by a state board or commission, which regulate the conduct
of citizens and not those which regulate a municipality in the exercise of
the police power3 9 Excepted from this limitation, however, are those
state laws, effective in absence of a municipal charter,4 D which are author-
ized by Section 2 of article XVIII for the establishment of rules for govern-
ing municipalities.
The constitutional scope of municipal police power has been held to
be as great as that of the state,41 but subject to the same limitations against
unreasonableness2 and arbitrary discrimination.43 The courts, however,
have classified certain subjects to be of "statewide concern." This was
done first in an early case in order to stress that state sovereignty over
sanitary matters was not limited by the Home Rule amendments and that
35 Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958); Note, The Staus of Polke
Power of Ohio Municipalities to Enact Criminal Ordinances, 14 W. REs. L REV. 786 (1963).
36 Cleveland v. Rafia, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 235 N.E.2d 138 (1968); Columbus v. GISscock,
117 Ohio App. 63, 189 N.E.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 9, 185 N .. 2d 437 (1962);
Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E.2d 279 (1939).
3 TWest Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965); Greenburg
v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918) (dictum).
38 Cleveland v. Raffa, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 235 N.E.2d 138 (1968); Akron v. Scaler-, 135
Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E-2d 279 (1939); Columbus v. Glascock, 117 Ohio App. 63, 189 N.E.2d
889, appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 9, 185 N.E.2d 437 (1962).
39 West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.-2d 382 (1965); Youngstown
v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929) (dictum); Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio
St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918) (dictum); Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114
(1917) (dictum); Note, Validity of Municipal Ordinances Prescribing Penalties Greater Tkhn
State Laws, 20 U. GIN. L REV. 400,403 (1951).
40 West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965); State ex rcL.
Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
4 1 Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), ccrt. denied, 357
U.S. 904 (1958); Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918); 3 J. FAR-
RELL, FARREL.-ELLIS OIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.3 (11th ed. 1962).
42 Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70 (1941); Froelich
v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
43 Frecker v. Dayton, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851 (1950); Myers v. Defiance, 67 Ohio
App. 159, 36 N._.2d 162 (1940).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[
municipalities were thus not exempt from complying with state sanitary
regulations. 44  Subsequently courts have used this designation as a recog-
nition of the fact that certain matters were of particular interest to the
state.45  At times it would appear that the courts meant the "statewide
concern" designation to identify areas of exclusive state jurisdiction,"
while on other occasions it is more reasonable to believe that they were
considering a matter to be one over which the state had supremacy in the
traditional "no conflict" police regulation sense;47 and on other occasions,
such as in cases involving health regulations, more of a middle position
has been adopted.48
Control of municipal streets has been handled in a different fashion.
Broad authority was early found to support the notion that their location,
establishment and maintenance is a matter of "local self-government,4 '
while the regulation of their use has fitted more conveniently within the
scope of "local police regulation"50 where municipal power is not exclusive.
The power over municipal streets has been used to justify the municipal
regulation of public utilities in their use of these streets, but not to the
point of permitting conflict with state Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
regulations. 5 This rationale was at first used to support municipal author-
ity to fix rates charged by public utilities which were not in conflict with
state Public Utilities Commission determinations. 2 On the other hand,
municipal constitutional power to own or acquire public utilities or to con-
tract for their services5 3 was found not to authorize municipal rate-fixing
by regulation.5 4 However, that power was held to exempt from PUC
44 Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
45 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941), ovcrruled, State ex rel.
Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958) (rolice and fire departments);
State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940) (health); Lakewood
v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960) (relocation of state highway); Beach-
wood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 NXE.2d 921 (1958) (detachment of terri-
tory). On the other hand, no difficulty has arisen in recognizing the local interest aspects re-
lating to peace and order. Perillo, Peace-and-Order Power of an Ohio Municipal Corporation,
3 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 45 (1954).
46 Beachwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958); State av ret,
Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929).
47 State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138 Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941), overruld, State
exrel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191,151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
48 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940).
49 Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919), rcalI'd in Union Sand &
Supply Corp. v. Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961), noted in 23 OHIo ST. LJ.
557 (1962); Billings v. Cleveland Ry., 92 Ohio St. 478, 111 N.E. 155 (1915) (grant of fran-
chise for location of utility lines).
50 Niles v. Dean, 25 Ohio St. 2d 284, 268 N.E.2d 275 (1971); Schneiderman v. Sesanstein,
121 Ohio Sr. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
5' Lorain Street R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68, 148 N.E. 577 (1925).
52 Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918).
53 OHIo CONST. art. XVIII, § 4. See Comment, Public Utiltlies Under Homo Rule, 9
Orno ST. L.J. 141 (1948).
54 Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918).
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jurisdiction a rate agreed to by contract between a municipality and a util-
ityY
With this brief overview of the development of relevant Home Rule
concepts in Ohio to serve as points of reference, the specifics of the Cleve-
land Electric Illuminating Co. v. Painesville0 decision and the issues it
raises may now be treated.
IIl. THE PAINESVILLE CASE5
The suit was instituted by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Com-
pany (CEI) in the Common Pleas Court of Lake County for a judgment
to declare whether the consent of the city of Painesville was needed for
the construction through the city of three electric transmission lines of
345kV, 138kV and 33kV voltage levels for servicing the company's cus-
tomers in a number of municipal corporations excluding Painesville. Con-
sent of the city of Painesville had been sought but had been refused and
during the pendency of this suit the city imposed an underground construc-
tion requirement. It passed Ordinance No. 18-65 forbidding the issuance
of a permit for an electric line carrying over 33kV upon or across any
street or public property within the city unless the city's plans called for such
construction. CEI filed a supplemental petition seeking a declaration of
the invalidity of this ordinance. The common pleas court found that the
consent of the city was not necessary; that the construction of the lines
was needed for CEI's intercity and interstate service; that the conditions
of § 4905.65 of the Ohio Revised Code, 5 had been met; and that the cost
of construction of the lines underground would be prohibitive.r" The
court of appeals affirmed these findings."0
The supreme court stated the primary issues of the case to be: whether
a municipality could refuse permission for the construction of high voltage
electric lines through the city for service of other municipal corporations
and whether a municipality could regulate construction should it consent."'
5 5 Interurban Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 98 Ohio St. 287, 120 N.E. 831
(1918).
58 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
5 7 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
5 8 Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page Supp. 1970).
59 Cleveland Ele. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, No. 42887 (Lake County C.P.), Brief for
Appellant at 11-12, 12a, 13a, 15a, 16a, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 126, 239 N.E.2d 75, 76 (1968).
60 Cleveland Ele. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 10 Ohio App. 2d 85, 226 N..2d 145
(1967). The decision was based primarily on the conclusions that provisions of OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page Supp. 1970), (1) serve as a limitation upon other power granting
statutes, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 723.01, 715.27, 4933.14, 4933.16 (Page 1953); (2) did
not deal with matters of local self-government, but with matters of statewide concern; (3)
constituted a general law with which a city ordinance could not conflict; and (4) were violated by
the Painesville ordinance since the latter unreasonably required more than the standard of
reasonableness of the statute.
61 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 127, 239 N.E.2d 75,
76-77 (1968).
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The court first considered the claim that municipal Home Rule power 2
was violated by the provisions of § 4905.65 of the Revised Code, adopted
in 1963, which exclude political subdivision control of intercity high volt-
age electric transmission lines of 22kV or more that are constructed accord-
ing to accepted safety standards and do not unreasonably affect the wel-
fare of the general public.3 In event of a finding of the validity of §
4905.65, the court suggested that it would need to determine the effect of
this statute upon the municipal consent provision of § 4933.16,04 and its
own 1959 decision, State ex rel. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
v. Euclid,"' in which it had held that an ordinance similar to that passed
62 OHIO CONSr. art. XVIII, § 3. The claim that the municipal power to contract for pub.
lic utility services conferred in OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 4 was violated, was objected to in Brief
for Defendant of 4, in the later similar case of Walton Hills v. Cleveland Ek1c. Illuminating Co.,
No. 884,475 (Cuyahoga County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), afl'd, No. .30,869 (Ct, App. 1971), ap-
peal dismissed, No. 71-621, Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. Oct. 18, 1971), on the basis of Akron v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 149 Ohio St. 347, 78 N.E.2d 890 (1948) which held that such a municipal
contract is still subject to the exercise of the police power of the state.
03 (A) As used in this section:
(1) 'Public utility' means any electric light company, as the same is defined in
sections 4905.02 and 4905.03 of the Revised Code.
(2) 'Public utility facility' means any electric line having a voltage of twenty-
two thousand or more volts used or to be used by an electric light company and sup-
porting structures, fixtures, and appurtenances connected to, used in direct connection
with, or necessary for the operation or safety of such electric lines.
(3) 'Local regulation' means any legislative or administrative action of a polit-
ical subdivision of this state, or of an agency of a political subdivision of this state,
having the effect of restricting or prohibiting the use of an existing public utility facil-
ity or facilities or the proposed location, construction, or use of a planned public utility
facility or facilities.
(B) To the extent permitted by existing law a local regulation may reasonably
restrict the construction, location, or use of a public utility facility, unless the public
utility facility:
(1) Is necessary for the service, convenience, or welfare of the public served by
the public utility in one or more political subdivisions other than the political sub,
division adopting the local regulation; and
(2) Is to be constructed in accordance with generally accepted safety standards;
and
(3) Does not unreasonably affect the welfare of the general public.
Nothing in this section prohibits a political subdivision from exercising any power
which it may have to require, under reasonable regulations not inconsistent with this
section, a permit for any construction or location of a public utility facility proposed
by a public utility in such political subdivision.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page Supp. 1970), noted ib Public Utlites - Dc-
creased Municipal Power to Regulate, 15 W. RES. L. REV. 812 (1964).
" No person or company shall place, string, construct, or maintain a line, wire, fix-
ture, or appliance of any kind to conduct electricity for lighting, heating, or power
purposes through a street, alley, lane, square, place, or land of a municipal corpora-
tion without the consent of such municipal corporation.
This prohibition extends to all levels above or below the surface of such public ways,
grounds, or places, as well as along their surfaces, but not to rights received through
and exercised under proceedings of a probate court prior to February 26, 1910.
The penalty provided by section 4933.99 of the Revised Code for a violation of this
section is cumulative to other means of enforcing this section open to the municipal
corporation, by way of injunction or otherwise, and is not exclusive. OHIO REV. CODII
ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953).
05 169 Ohio St. 476, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959), appeal dismissed, 362 U.S. 457 (1960).
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by the City of Painesville was not "an unreasonable regulation unrelated
to the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality.""c
In disposing of the Home Rule question first, the court concluded on
the authority of Beachwood v. Board of Education,67 which involved de-
.tachment of municipal territory, that if the effect of a municipal regula-
tion, even of a matter of local concern, reaches the "general public of the
state as a whole more than it does the local inhabitants the matter passes
from what was a matter for local government to a matter of general state
interest.""" The court noted, citing State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron,c' that
matters can with changing times cease to be local and become statewide
concerns and that the increase of intercity, as distinguished from intra-
city, transmission of electric current fits this pattern." The court saw a
need for the passage of general laws to prevent statewide matters from
being "impeded by local regulation."71  Finally, it held that § 4905.65
was a "law of general application" which was not invalidly in conflict
with municipal Home Rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution because
its provisions remove from "absolute local control" matters which relate to
intercity transmission of high voltage electricity 2
With the establishment of the validity of § 4905.65 the court next
turned to a consideration of the effect of this section on Euclid,73 previously
referred to,74 and on § 4933.16,7 which requires the obtaining of munici-
pal consent as a precondition to the location of electric transmission lines
within a municipal corporation. The court held that both were modified
and not abrogated or repealed."0 Section 4905.65, said the court does
not make unreasonable what had previously been held to be reasonable.
66 Id. syllabus para. 2. The court found municipal corporations to be specfically empowered
to impose reasonable regulations with respect to the construction of electric power company
lines by Oino REv. CODE ANN. §§ 715.27, 4933.13, 4933.16 (Page 1953). In reaching its
finding of reasonableness over three dissents, the court applied the traditional test stated in
Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919), and took judicial notice of the
dangers stretching high-voltage wires over public streets presents. The dissenters emphasized
the fact that electricity can be transmitted safely and that the record for accidents involving high
voltage lines in the area indicated that they were infrequent, non-fatal, and the result of highly
exceptional circumstances.
67 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
68 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 129, 239 N.E.2d
75, 78 (1968).
69 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962), appcal dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962).
70 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 129, 239 N.E.2d
75, 78 (1968).
71Id. at 130, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
72 Id.
73 State ex fre. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Eudid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 159 N.E.2d
756 (1959).
74 Id.
75 Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953), set forth supra note 64.
76 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio Sr. 2d 125, 130, 239 N...2d 75,
78 (1968).
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Nor does it remove the power of a city to reasonably condition its consent
to line location. Rather that section "excludes from the control of such
subdivisions intercity lines"77 meeting safety standards and not unreason-
ably affecting the welfare of the general public. But it "places control
over such lines within the power of the municipality" 78 if they do not
conform to statutory requirements.
Adopting the finding of the common pleas court,19 acquiesced in by
the city,80 that the welfare of the general public would not be unreasonably
affected in this case, the court held the Painesville ordinance inapplicable
to CEI's line construction."' It did, however, note specifically that munici-
pal planning commission approval might still be required in order that
conformity with the city's overall plan be achieved.82
The only concurring opinion was by the late Chief Justice Taft. 3 In
stating his point of difference from the majority, the Chief Justice con-
cluded that the city had not claimed that § 4905.65 actually conflicted
with municipal Home Rule and that the court's treatment of the issue
"seem[s] to me to be inconsistent with our holdings . . .. "84 Turning to
his point of agreement, Chief Justice Taft noted that CEI had planned
to construct its lines on its own land, except for the crossing of municipal
streets and a park, and that as an electric public utility it had been granted
the power of eminent domain and permission to construct lines by stat-
ute. 5 He suggested that § 4933.16 of the Revised Code,"" which requires
municipal consent to line location, was a subsequent qualification to the
original authority of electric public utilities to install lines and that, as
decided by the majority, § 4933.16 was itself modified by § 4905.65.87
77 Id. at 131, 239 N.E.2d at 79.
78 Id.
79 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, No. 42887 (Lake County C.P.), Brief for
Appellant at 13a, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 126, 131, 239 NE.2d 75, 76, 79 (1968).
80 Brief for Appellant at 23a, 24a, Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio
St. 2d 125, 131, 239 N.E.2d 75, 79 (1968).
81 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 131, 239 N.E,2d 75,
79 (1968).
82Id. at 132, 239 N.E.2d at 79. The court did not discuss interstate commerce and equal
protection issues raised by CEI. Brief for Appellee at 35-37.
83 Id.
84Id. Justice Taft cited West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N,3.2d 382
(1965); Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961);
Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919); Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St.
468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
85 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St, 2d 125, 133, 239 N.E,2d
75, 80 (1968). OHMo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4931.01, 4933.14 (Page 1953), 4933.15 (Page
Supp. 1970).
8 6OH o REv. CODE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953), supra note 64.
87 Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 133, 239 N.E.2d 75,
80 (1968). The Painesville case has been followed in Walton Hills v. Cleveland Elee. Illumi-
nating Co., No. 884,875 (Cuyahoga County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), al'd, No. 30,869 (Ct. App.
1971), appeal dismissed, No. 71-621, Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. Oct. 18, 1971). The village passcd
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The net effect of Painesville is less power for Ohio municipal corpo-
rations; and the setting for this result was most compelling-extra-city in-
terest and qualified statutory limitations. Involved are both intercity lines
carrying a constant flow of electricity and a statute which uses reasonable
safe construction standards and the lack of an adverse effect on the general
welfare of inhabitants as the basis for its "exclusion" of municipal power.
But despite the apparent appeal these aspects give to a curtailment of
municipal power, the opinion does raise several serious questions with re-
spect to state-municipal relations in Ohio. These questions can be sum-
marized as: (1) To what extent does a municipality depend on the Gen-
eral Assembly of the state as the source of power to regulate a public
utility? (2) Although not considered by the court, to what extent does
state regulation of utilities serve as a limit on municipal regulation? (3)
Is an "exclusion" of municipal power a "general law" within the meaning
of Home Rule provisions? (4) To what extent does the concept "state-
wide concern" serve as a limit on municipal power? (5) \Mlat effect
does this apparent increase of state power have upon the solution of metro-
politan area, as distinguished from municipal, problems.
But before considering these questions by embarking upon a detailed
examination of the legal significance of the Painesville decision, attention
should be focused upon the practical results of the decision and upon the
possibility that an alternative approach to that adopted by the court was
available-an approach which would have avoided serious Home Rule
effects.
IV. REASONABLENESS OF MUNICIPAL REGULATION
A. Reasonableness in General
The court in Painesville may have reached a conclusion which resulted
in curtailed municipal power in order to avoid upholding what it may have
considered to be ill-advised municipal actions. If so, the court might in-
stead have tested those actions for reasonableness, since municipal actions
a zoning ordinance limiting future construction of high voltage lines to two additional lines
unless present supporting structures were used or installation was underground. CEI, a supplier
of electricity to both the village and other municipalities, planned a third and fourth line after
the passage of the ordinance using existing right-of-ways but new supports. One line would craoss
village streets. Faced with the claim that § 4905.65 violated municipal Home Rule, the court
followed Painesville in sustaining the statute and finding the ordinance valid as to local con-
cerns but inapplicable insofar as the provisions of § 4905.65 were met. The court found the
previous lines had not adversely affected village property values and that the general welfare of
the inhabitants would not be adversely affected "to a greater degree than such lines would affect
the general welfare of persons similarly situated," (at 7), while the cost of underground instal-
lation would be $3,234,800 compared with $348,720 for overhead installation. The court
noted a municipal constitutional power over streets but it found municipal authority to regu-
late construction of intercity transmission lines was not part of Home Rule but rather, both it
and the utility's right to make use of municipal streets granted by Orno REv. CODE ANN.§
4933.13 (Page 1953) were dependent upon statute. Finally it found that § 4905.65 was a
statute of general concern which took precedence over local regulations.
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are subject to the restraint of reasonableness both as an outer limit of Home
Rule power and supplemental statutory power and as a consequence of the
due process provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the federal con-
stitution. 8
A test for reasonableness in this context was provided in an early, often
cited case:
The means adopted must be suitable to the end in view, must be impartial
in operation and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, must have a real
and substantial relation to their purpose, and must not interfere with pri-
vate rights beyond the necessities of the situation.89
This test had been applied to regulations claimed to be justified for their
promotion of safety in State ex rel. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v.
Euclid0 and was found to have been met. The ordinance there provided
for the underground installation of high voltage electric lines through and
into the municipality as a precondition to municipal consent to installa-
tion." In upholding the ordinance as applied to a proposed 132 kV line,
the court found over a vigorous dissent that high voltage lines, although
common, still pose a great danger through possible failure of equipment
or collapse of towers.9 2 This conclusion was disputed by the three dis-
senters on the grounds that electricity is regularly transmitted safely above
ground for light, heat and power purposes, that the line in question in-
cluded automatic safety devices to cut the flow of electricity in case of
damage, and that the incidence of loss of life and property through the
years from such lines has been quite low.93
The court in Painesville refused to overturn the reasoning of the Eu.
clid 4 majority. Perhaps it should have done so, rather than find as it did
that § 4905.65 of the Revised Code modified the power of a municipality
to withhold consent fqr the construction of such lines. 5 If it had retreated
from Euclid, the court, while limiting municipal regulation, would have
avoided, as shall be seen, all the difficulties attending scrutiny and even.
tual upholding of § 4905.65.9r
88E. B. STAsON & P. KAUPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORA'TIONS 124, n.4 (3rd ed. 1959).
89 Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, syllabus para. 3, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
90 169 Ohio St. 476, 480, 159 N.B.2d 756, 760 (1959), appeal dismisicd, 362 U.S. 457
(1960).
91 Id. at 477, 479, 159 N.E.2d at 758, 759; OHIO REV. CODIJ ANN. §§ 4933.13, 4933.16
(Page 1953).
92Id. at 480, 159 N.E.2d at 760.
93 Id. at 483-86, 159 N.E.2d at 762-63.
94 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 130, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (1968).
95 Id.
90 Counsel for appellant urged an alternative ground to the on adopted by the court which
sought to avoid both the issue of retreating from Euclid and the one of overturning § 4905.65,
Brief for Appellant at 6-8. They reasoned that because the provisions of § 4905.65 do not try to




From an engineering standpoint underground installation of electric
lines must be divided into two categories, low voltage, usually local distri-
bution lines, and higher voltage, 69 kV and above, intercity transmission
lines. Underground installation of low voltage lines is relatively common
and presents few engineering or cost problems .7  Such installation of high
voltage lines is less common. Even though there are more than 1,600
miles of underground high voltage lines operational, this is less than one
percent of the total of high voltage lines in the country.'-
The technology for underground construction of high voltage lines
has lagged behind that of overhead." Among the problems created or
enhanced are difficulties in removing heat caused by conductor and dielec-
tric losses, lessening carrying capability as distance increases, and diffi-
culties in making the transition from underground to overhead transmis-
sion. °00 Still, the increasing need in both amount and concentration of
electricity and the economics of transmission impel use of constantly
higher voltage lines.11 In an industry-wide effort to keep pace with this
trend, assisted by the formation of a special council and the cooperative
interest of the federal government, a much needed acceleration of research
into all facets of the problem is taking place and more is being proposed. 2
reasonable regulations, Painesville's ordinance which was identical to Euclid's should be sus-
tained.
97 ADVISORY COMM. ON UNDERGROUND TRANsMussIoN, FPC 6 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as 1966 ADvisoRy REPORT].
981d. at 1, 33.
9 9 TNSMsIssION TECHNIcAL ADVISORY COMi., NAT'L POWER SURVEY, THE TRANS-
MISSION OF ELEcrnuc POWER (a report to the Federal Power Comm'n) 123 (1971) [herein-
after cited as 1971 ADVISORY REPORT].
100 1966 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 97, at 13-14, 23.
1o1 Id. at 4, 5.
102 The Electrical Research Council (ERC) made up of representatives of public utilities
and governmental agencies was formed in 1965 and in cooperation with the Department of
Interior has expended some $30 million in research into improving power-transfer capabilities of
state-of-the-art systems, cable splicing techniques, cooling systems, insulation for underground
transmission and into developing long-life cables. For long range goals ERC seeks to bring into
commercial use a system that has the potential of carrying four to ten times the load present
cables carry and to reduce installation costs. A major seminar with ERC as co-sponsor was re-
cently held at New England College, Henniker, N.H. to stimulate development of techniques
to further underground transmission. Although some misgivings over public pressure for rapid
expansion of the use of underground transmission were expressed by some industry spokesmen,
governmental interest in advancing its use was evident even at the presidential level and the
need for industry leadership was stressed. Detailed reports on the progress of research projects
were presented. These covered self-cooled systems up to 765 kV, more troublesome forced-
cooled systems of 400 and 500 kV; and more expensive and more problematical gas-filled
cryogenic systems of both resistive and superconducting types at 345 kV. FRIEDLANDER,
IS "POWER TO THE PEOPLE" GOING UNDERGROUND?, IEEE Spectrum 62-71 (Feb. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as POWER TO THE PEOPLE]. Research is also going forward to reduce costs
of installation, costs of "pothead" terminations for transition to overhead transmission, and to
develop thermal monitor systems to permit greater use of conducting capacities of present cables
without danger of failure due to degradation of the cable as a result of operation at abnor-
mally high temperatures. Id. at 70-71.
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Advances at the operational level have been made, particularly with respect
to cables up to 138 kv.10 3  Underground transmission from 69 kV to 138
kV voltage is said to be relatively common in Europe," 4 but the pace is
slow in the United States with less than one-half a percent of high voltage
lines constructed here, and none at the 345 kW level, going underground
in fiscal year 197005
Although a continuing engineering challenge to underground construc-
tion is created by the constant increase of voltage in overhead transmission
and, for the time being, while physical circumstances in specific situations
Further federal government interest is evidenced by the proposed Power Plant Siting Act
of 1971, S. 1684, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), which calls for coordinating plans for, and
governmental certification of, generating facility sites over 300,000 kW and transmission
lines of 230 kV and over to prevent undue impairment of environmental values in meeting
needs for electric power. Amendment 364 to this bill, introduced by Senator Magnuson (D.
Wash.), August 3, 1971, provides for the establishment of a Federal power research and de-
velopment trust fund, involving an estimated $300 million generated by a charge of .15 mills
per kilowatt hour of electricity used to be paid by consumers, and producers of one million or
more kilowatts for self-consumption. The fund is to be used to finance research into more ef-
ficient generation, transmission, distribution and consumption processes of electrical power, In-
cluding the improvement of technology available to electric utilities, but also to decrease ad-
verse environmental effects of both generation and transmission processes. Provisions for the
dissemination of information resulting from the research is also made. 117 CONG, REC,
12922 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1971).
Prior proposals calling for research into the effect on community planning, real estate
values, tax revenues and natural beauty of overhead construction of transmission lines and for
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to encourage the use of underground transmission of
electric power failed to pass. S-2507 and S-2508, 89th Cong.2d Sess. (1966).
103 Although a complex oil impregnated insulation, NELSON, SOLID DIELECTUC CABLII
FOR TRANsMIssIoN AND SUBTRANSMISSION OPERATION 8, is used nearly universally today
when high voltage lines are placed underground, 1966 ADviso.Y REPORT, stpra note 97, at
15, as it was in an 11-mi!e seven conductor 138 kV line beneath Long Island Sound, Gazzana.
Priaroggia, Pisioneri, Marolin, The Long Island Sound Submarine Cable Intcrconnoclion, IM11
Spectrum 64 (Oct. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Long Island]. A less complex extruded poly-
ethylene cable is proving useful up to 138 kV, POWER TO THE PEOPLE, supra note 102, at 66;
1971 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 99, at 126; 1966 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 97, at 15;
KENNY, A LOOK AT SOLID DIELECTRIC CABLES RATED OVER 69 KV 2 [hereinafter cited as
KENNY]. But it is claimed still to be experimental in SERVICE COMNI'N OF COUNCIL, ROCKY
RIVER, OHIO, A REPORT ON THE BURIAL OF HIGH VOLTAGE! ELECTRICAL TRANS ISSION
LINES IN ROcKY RIVER 8 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ROCKY RIVER]; Dep't of Public Utilities,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts findings on Petition of Boston Edison Co. 14-17, 23 (June 12,
1968), in the Sudbury Mass. controversy ultimately won by underground adherents. Efforts
to reduce costs through a lessening of time needed to splice this type of cable in the field are
being made, POWER TO THE PEOPLE, supra note 102, at 67. The first 345 kV underground
installation in the United States was made in New York City in 1964, 1971 ADVISORY REPORT,
supra note 99, at 124, and is planned for submarine and underground installation in the Hudson
Valley Storm King Mountain storage reservoir project, Consolidated Edison Co., Project 2338,33
F.P.C. 428, 438 (1965).
10 4 SUDBURY POWER AND LIGHT COMM., Do WE HAVE TO BE UGLY? [hereinafter cited
as UGLY]; KENNY, supra note 103, at 2. Although the transmission system of the United
Kingdom is not, unlike that of the United States, in immediate need of expansion, research
into thermal problems of underground transmission is being conducted and in specific instances
lines up to 400 kV are being installed underground. POWER TO THE PEOPLE, supra note
102, at 63, 66-67.
105 FED. POWER COMM'N, News Release (June 1, 1971). But 345 kV installation has
been made, and considered, LONG ISLAND, supra note 103, at 64. 230 kV installation was min-
imal in 1970, FED. POWER COzf'N, News Release, supra, and wa; conceded as not practical due
to a lack of technical research, SUDBURY POWER AND LIGHT COMM. 1970 Report
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may create serious problems, the greatest obstacle to raising the tempo
of underground construction is not so much a lack of technology as it is a
lack of a competitive technology, which could dose the wide gap in costs
between underground and overhead construction. Most objections to un-
derground construction requirements, 08 as was true in Painesville,10 T are
based on its high cost. The opportunity for cost reductions is substan-
tial.'08 Considerable improvement in transmission equipment within the
present state-of-the-art and the development of new materials as a result
of research programs are considered likely. 09  However, prospects for a
sizeable reduction in cost ratios will remain clouded until the high cost of
cable installation, including as it does a large proportion for expensive la-
bor, can be reduced through research into time-saving methods.110
C., Safety Considerations
With respect to structural safety the court would have been justified in
departing from Euclid, given the comprehensive code of safety standards
which has been adopted by the state Public Utilities Commission' 1' to
meet such problems and the concession on the part of the city of Paines-
ville that the lines in that case would meet safety standards.' On the
other hand, the possibility of accidents should also be considered. The
dissenters in Euclid dismissed the hazards of overhead lines, including
those of air transport, as unusual, 13 and the excavation hazards of under-
ground lines have been suggested as at least equally as dangerous, partic-
ularly in uncongested areas.114 Yet, with the frequent use of railroad right-
of-ways and to a lesser extent the paralleling of highways, the danger
106 E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 P.2d 603,
623 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1962); POWER To THE PEOPLE, supra note 102, at 62, 65;
ROCKY RIVER, supra note 103; UGLY, supra note 104.
107 Brief for Appellee at 5.
108 1966 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 97, at 32.
109 PowER To T E PEOPLE, supra note 102, at 71; 1971 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note
99, at 149.
110 1971 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 99, at 123; POWER TO THE PEOPLE, supra note 102,
at 62, 64. A possible means for reducing labor costs would be the development of a cab!e
designed to be "plowed in" rather than trenched. Id. at 70.
"'I Administrative Order No. 72 and Session Order No. 285, as amended (1966), incor-
porating "Safety Rules for Electric Supply and Communication Lines," Part 2 of National
Electric Safety Code (6th ed.), National Bureau of Standards Handbook H-81.
112 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 131, 239 N.E.2d 75, 79 (1968). A similar finding was made in an
analogous case, Walton Hills v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 884,475 (Cuyahoga
County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), aff'd, No. 30,869 (Ct. App. 1971), appeal dismissed, No. 71-621,
Ohio Bar 1275 (S. C. Oct. 18, 1971).
113 169 Ohio St. 476, 485, 159 N.E.2d 756, 762-63 (1959), appcal dismissed, 362 U.S. 457
(1960).
114 Hooley, Compulsory Undergroiund Wiring A Battl Rejoined in Publik Utility Law,
5 VILL. L. REv. 80,90 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hooley].
19721
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
from collapse of towers or poles caused by vehicular accidents 115 and the
increase of air traffic, particularly the use of small planes and helicopters,
including those used for highway congestion reporting,1 " suggest not in-
significant safety problems.
D. Competing Economic Considerations
1. Costs to the Utility
The disruptive effect of a regulation"17 is an element in the test for rea-
sonableness that went largely unexplored in the court's opinion in Euclid,
but which is often raised as it was in Painesville.18 CEI's contention
that the city's requirement amounted to a prohibition of construction in
light of the high cost of complying with the ordinance was accepted by
the trial court, unfortunately with only brief treatment of the feasibility
of an alternative route.119 The supreme court drew no conclusions based
on findings of costs.
Estimates of costs vary rather widely120 and may suffer from partisan
bias since they are usually assembled by the utility company involved in
the controversy. In 1966, however, an Advisory Committee to the Federal
Power Commission'" estimated that, although underground construction
might well be competitive with overhead in the inner city, it is on the aver-
age nine times more expensive in the suburbs for 138 kV lines per kilowatt
115 1966 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 97, at 25; ROCKY RIVER, supra note 103, at 4.
116 E.g., Chicago Tribune, Aug. 11, 1971, at 1, col. 1, recounts the story of the death the
day before of a pilot of a helicopter and a special police officer assigned to WGN radio sta-
tion to report traffic congestion when the aircraft developed trouble and hit a 70 foot pole
carrying a high voltage wire in the suburb of Bellwood, Ill.
117 '"The means .. .must not interfere with private rights beyond the necessities of the
situation." Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, syllabus para. 3, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
118 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 126, 239 N.E.2d 75, 76 (1968), in the summarization of the
trial court's finding.
119Id. Brief for Appellant at 15a. Costs would be increased nearly nine fold, by
$6,500,000, from $850,000 for overhead construction, to presumably $7,350,000 but the
court dismissed alternative route construction with the statement: "The evidence shows that
going around the city to the south would add substantially to the cost of the lines."
120 For 345kV the rate was estimated at approximately $4,500,000 per mile or about five
times overhead construction in the Hudson Valley project, Consolidated Edison Co., Project
23338, 33 F.P.C. 428, 444 (1965), (later estimated at 16 times, Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. F.P.C., 453 F.2d 463, 477 (2d Cir. 1971) ), and eight times overhead construction
for both a 345 kV line and a 132 kV one in Walton Hills v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
884,475 (Cuyahoga County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), afF'd, No. 30,869 (Ct. App. 1971), appeal dis.
aissed, No. 71-621, Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. Oct. 18, 1971), compared with $3,700,000 per mile
or nearly nine times overhead construction for three lines, 345 kV, 132 kV, and 33 kV in
Painesville, Brief for Appelle at 5, 6. Costs for lower voltage lines from 110 to 138 kV the
variations are similar: The Long Island Sound submarine oil filled 138 kV cable cost $900,000
per mile, Long Island, supra note 103, at 1, the utility's estimate in Sudbury, Mass. for under-
ground construction of a 110 kV line was $625,000 per mile or about 4.2 times as expensive
as overhead construction, Dep't of Public Util., Commonwealth of Mass., Petition of Boston
Edison Co., Ex. C. (Jan. 29, 1971). CEI estimated Rocky River, Ohio Construction at $1,200,000
per mile for 138 kV or six times as expensive, ROCKY RIVER, supre note 103, at 6-7.
121 1966 ADVISORY R.EPORT, supra note 97, at 28.
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transmitted and 16 times more expensive for a 345 kV line. In rural areas
overhead construction expense is an even smaller fraction of underground
costs. 2  The installation costs of underground lines are not likely to be
offset by maintenance savings,123 which are disputed = 4 and limited by
the fact that, although underground lines are less frequently affected by
natural disasters, in the event of an outage experience shows repairs are
more time consuming and more expensive than those to overhead lines.3-n
No breakthrough in cost reduction has yet been established2- and it is
claimed that the high proportion of labor costs in installation expenses
lessens the chance that one will be found.27  As a consequence, it is as-
serted that it is highly impractical to construct underground lines except
for short distances and that there is a great likelihood that overhead trans-
mission lines will predominate for some time to come, 28 particularly in
rural areas. But even if presently valid, these conclusions are not final.
Given the "encouraging" prospects for developing better transmission
capabilities' 29 and the breadth of the research being undertaken or proposed
into all aspects of underground transmission, there would appear to be no
real reason for pessimism. Moreover, even on the basis of present circum-
stances these views of impracticality only clarify and do not answer the
type of problem presented in Painesville.30
No doubt in this practical world costs are a vital factor. It can be
contended that the whole matter should be resolved on the basis of eco-
nomics.' 3' But for this to be true all "costs" must be included and some
things are not to be reduced to mere monetary evaluation. For one point,
it must be remembered that public safety, at least where appreciably af-
fected, is not to be traded off against monetary expense. 32  Moreover,
where a trade in costs is possible it should not be ignored. It has been
suggested that if the not quite one percent of high voltage transmission
lines now underground were increased to 100 percent, the electric bills of
122 Id.
12 3 ROCKY RIVER, supra note 103, at 5-6, 11.
124 1966 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 97, at 32; POWER TO THE PEOPLE, .supra note
102, at 62-64.
125 1966 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 97, at 25; UGLY, supra note 104. Improvement
of fault-locating equipment should help alleviate this situation. POWER To THE PEOPLX, 4Spra
note 102, at 70.
126 1971 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 99, at 30.
1.27 Id. at 123. A possible source of cost reduction including those arising from use of labor
could result from a careful planning of routes to avoid unfavorable soil conditions, congested
traffic conditions or interference with other underground utilities. POWER TO THE PEOPLE,
supra note 102, at 70.
128 Consolidated Edison Co., Project 23338,33 F.P.C. 428,446 (1965).
129 1971 ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 99, at 149.
l3o Painesville itself involved a comparatively short distance of two miles and a suburban
community, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 126,239 N.E.2d 75, 76 (1968).
13 1 ROCKY :RIvER, supra note 103, at 11.
32 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
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the consumer would be more than doubled; while if 10 percent and 20
percent were buried, an 11.8 percent or 21.5 percent increase in costs of elec-
'tricity would result.133 It has also been estimated that by 1980 more ef-
•ficient systems and lower fuel costs will reduce electric costs by 27 per-
cent.134 This means, subject to the inherent errors of prediction, that the
burial of many miles of suburban lines would be achieved on the aver-
age at no extra cost to the consumer-a prospect which must be termed
provocative.
Nor do installation costs tell the entire story. There are "costs" to
the community, both economic and environmental, which motivate munic-
ipal restraints. These costs must be evaluated in monetary terms or as
more preferred values as the case may be and, where appropriate, be bal-
anced against the more obvious charges incurred by the utilities.
2. Environmental Costs to the Community
Scarring the landscape of a community raises a number of environ-
mental costs, among which are the appearance of the supporting struc-
tres themselves, 35 the problems vacant land create in a municipality,'30
the decrease in property values adjacent to or near the right-of-way, and
the obstruction of scenic or historical views. Aesthetics, after hesitant
beginnings,' is becoming steadily more accepted within the cluster of
police power goals 3' and is probably the factor raised most frequently
by citizens protesting overhead transmission line construction.139 Aesthet-
ics has been held to be of sufficient importance to force a reconsideration
of the approval of the important Storm King Mountain power project in
133 1966 ADvisORY EPORT, supra note 97, at 33.
134Id. at 12. Currently caught up in rising costs, taxes, and anti-pollution devise ex-
penses, utilities are gaining disputably necessary rate increases. National Observer, Jan. 29,
1972, at 8, col. 1.
135 The need to redesign towers to meet as much as possible aesthetic considerations within
economic and safety limits is recognized by the industry, Anderson, Zaffanella, Juette, Kawai,
Stevenson, Ultrahigh-Voltage Power Transmission, 59 Proceedings of the IEEE 1548, 1556
(1971) (hereinafter cited Ultrahigh), as is exemplified in negotiations between CEI and subur-
ban communities southwest of Cleveland, The News Sun (Berea, Ohio), Dec. 22, 1971, at 1,
col. 1. Redesigning increases costs which narrows the overhead-underground installation costs
gap. POWER TO THE PEOPLE supra note 102, at 64. More careful planning in making route
selections for overhead lines is being suggested as a further aid in preserving the environment.
Id. at 66. Even underground installation route selections are of significance since above ground
transition facilities are involved at the terminals and intermediate cooling facilities may be. Id.
at 70.
'
3 OUse of some of such area as recreational parks was suggested by CEII in negotiations
with suburban communities southwest of Cleveland, The News Sun (Berea, Ohio), Dec. 22,
1971, at 1, col 1, at 8, col. 2.
'37 Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); 1 C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW § 7.25 (1968); 11 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 32.52 (3rd ed. rev. 1964).
138 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
139 E.g., UGLY, supra note 104; ROcKY RIVER, supra note 103; POWER TO THE PEOPLE,
supra note 102, at 62, 64.
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the Hudson Valley when, in the judgment of a federal court of appeals,
the Federal Power Commission had not given it sufficient weight in the
initial granting of a construction permit140
Of considerable economic importance, although of rather speculative
nature, is the loss of property values resulting from overhead construc-
tion. 4' A form of noise pollution of perhaps more than annoyance impor-
tance can also result from this construction. Television and radio recep-
tion is disrupted at times 4 2 and even audible noise is created, particularly
during wet weatherm  Planning and zoning as well-established con-
cers of municipal authorities for the improvement of the modem munic-
ipality are also important considerations. Certainly a new transmission
line right-of-way, or even a broadened one, or one involving tower rather
than pole construction to accommodate the higher voltage lines can well
be disruptive if not destructive of community goals.
3. Sharing of Environmental Costs
Should it be determined in a given case that these environmental and
economic costs to the community outweigh the expense of underground
construction, municipal requirements for such construction might still be
subjected to further scrutiny. Who should reasonably share in the cost of
preserving the environment? Increased costs will not be born by the util-
ity but will, absent some other plan, be carried by all its customers, the
consumers.'44 Is this base too narrow or too broad? To broaden it to
include area municipalities' taxpayers does not seem feasible.'4 5 On the
other hand, not all of the customers of a utility share equally in the bene-
fits to be derived from underground construction. Those people ulti-
mately served from such a line gain from the fact of transmission and not
necessarily from the method of line construction. But it may be noted in
140 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied sub now. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384
U.S. 941 (1966). Although granting a permit was approved upon the Commission's finding on
remand that in light of costs and functional disadvantages underground construction ought to
be ordered only where aesthetic detriment is "violent," 453 F.2d 463, 477 (1971).
141 A $4,500,000 or a 30 percent decline was alleged by the Sudbury Power and Light
Comm., UGLY, supra note 104; but disputed by the Dep't of Util., Commonwealth of Mass.,
Petition of Boston Edison Co., at page 22, June 12, 1968. The court found no property value
loss in Walton Hills v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 884,475 (Cuyahoga County C.P.
Oct. 29, 1970), afd, No. 30,869 (Ct. App. 1971), appeal dismisscd, No. 71-621, Ohio Bar
1275 (S. Ct Oct. 18, 1971).
142 Ultrahigh, supra note 135, at 1550.
143 Id. at 1552.
14 Some difficulty in computation of rates may exist until more definite figures on th2
relative durability of an underground line compared to an overhead line are available. In-
terview, David L Pemberton, Secretary, Pub. Util. Commnn, State of Ohio, Oct. 13, 1971.
14 5 The possibility of state assistance either through a rotary fund of state money made avail-
able to utilities for borrowing at a low rate of interest, or favorable state tax advantages for
utilities might be explored.
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another context that all the customers of a utility are likely to be forced
to share in the cost of such things as smoke emission inhibitors at the
generating plant, while only the municipality in which it is located gains
the clear air.
Two methods of allocating costs present themselves if a narrower
base is necessary. One method would limit increased rates solely to those
property owners who are immediately affected by the line. This appears
unrealistic both because it is unduly restrictive 40 and because costs in such
an event would clearly be prohibitive. The second method would assess
costs to only those customers who are served within the affected commu-
nity. This method has both the attractiveness and the shortcomings of a
compromise. It has the strength gained from common acceptance. 14 7  It
is also the approach chosen by the State of Massachusetts recently in its
precedent setting legislation for dealing with the problem of prohibiting
construction and eliminating existing overhead lesser voltage distribution,
as distinguished from transmission, lines.148  Moreover, this method is the
direction suggested for Ohio in legislation proposed as a modification of
§ 4905.65 of the Revised Code.14 9
E. Conclusions To Be Drawn
Underground installation requirements have been a feature of utility
regulations since 1880.10 Starting with distribution lines in congested
areas, these requirements have generally been upheld on a safety ration-
ale.'51 But the trend has been both to more restrictive regulation of dis-
tribution lines 5" and to attempts at limiting the more objectionable fea-
146 Miller, Public Utilities Underground, 1 CAL. WVEST. L Rim. 97, 109 (1965).
147 Hooley, supra note 114, at 93-98.
14SiVASS. ANN. LAwS, ch. 166 §§ 22A-22N (1970). In the interest of public safety,
health and welfare, new construction of overhead distribution lines (less than 20 kV) across or
along municipal streets can be forbidden by a municipality and progressive removal of existing
lines can be required. In the latter event, if the lines are needed a removal plan calling for the
expenditure of two percent of the gross revenue of the utility from customers within the munic-
ipality may be submitted, and when approved a surcharge of two percent of total billing to each
customer located within the municipality may be assessed by the utility. A utility may also
agree with the municipality for the latter to replace overhead lines with underground construc-
tion upon the utility paying the municipality two percent of its gro:;s annual revenue from cus-
tomers within the municipality.
149 HousE BILL 779, introduced in the 109th General Assembly by Reps. Mayfield and
Cruze, proposed the addition to the Ohio Revised Code of sections numbered 4905.66 through
4905.69. Section 4905.66 provided for the state Public Utilitis Commission to ascertain
where underground installation of distribution lines in nonpublic places is required by law, the
cost difference between that installation and that contemporaneously utilized elsewhere "and
shall allocate such difference equitably among all of [the utility':;] customers served within
such . . . municipal corporation." Such an allocation for transmission line construction costs
under similar circumstances was proposed in § 4905.69.
150 Hooley, supra note 114, at 84.
151 Id. at 87.
152 Id. at 81, 89.
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tures of transmission line construction. 15 3 In light of the considerations
pointed out above, this trend even as to transmission lines cannot be dis-
missed as irresponsible. As a general proposition, it is difficult to state that
municipal requirements for underground transmission lines are clearly
unreasonable. These requirements are unreasonable in advance of the
ability of the industry to conform. This may be the case today with re-
spect to very high voltage transmission. Moreover, these requirements
may be unreasonable if based on safe construction considerations when
adequate safety standards already exist and are being met. On the other
hand, when, in addition to the safety hazard of overhead lines, a compari-
son is made between the costs to the industry and ultimately to the public,
including the environmental damage done by overhead transmission, the
conclusion of unreasonableness is not quite so certain. This is especially
true if provision is made for a fair distribution of the utilities' costs in
the municipal legislation or in the rate-setting power of state utility com-
mission. Certainly, the trend toward such municipal requirements, which
must be viewed as increasing, suggests that the public is conscious of the
harm to the environment and is becoming more willing to pay the bills
necessary to avoid it.M
All of this does not necessarily mean that the Painesville ordinance
was reasonable. Special circumstances must be noted. State safety con-
struction standards did exist. 5 ' The ordinance in question barred even
the higher voltage lines-' and was not limited to those areas of the mu-
nicipality where aesthetic harm and property devaluation might be sig-
nificant.'57  In addition, aesthetic considerations were not apparent in the
location of the proposed line. 58 Finally, the cost of underground con-
struction could not be conveniently imposed on those who benefitted within
the city since CEI did not service any of the inhabitants of Painesville.' 9
For these reasons the court might well have avoided the problems posed
by § 4905.65 by qualifying the Euclid decision to the point of finding the
Painesville ordinance unreasonable.
F. Section 4905.65 of the Revised Code versus Reasonableness
An examination of the varied considerations that play their part in a
single municipal regulation and a recognition of the changes the future
153 Ultrahigh, supra note 135, at 1548.
154 UGLY, supra note 104. Although it is claimed that this is not universally true. Dep't
of Pub. Util., Commonwealth of Mass., Petition of Boston Edison Co. 25 (De. 2, 1964).
15  Supra note 111.
'5 6 Brief for Appellant at 26a-27a. Ordinance 18-65 made it unlawful to construct a
power line carrying greater than 33 kV within the City of Painesville without obtaining a per-
mit therefor based on the submission of plans calling for underground installation.
'57 Id.
15s Brief for Appellee at 3. The line was to parallel State Route No. 2, a four-lane high-
way.
159 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 126,239 N.E.2d 75, 76 (1968).
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might hold in a technical field serve to emphasize the difficulty in justifying
the establishment of one uniform answer to the problems raised in
Painesville, an answer which is statewide in scope and impervious to the
passage of time. Variety and change serve to emphasize the localness
of a problem. 160 As it now stands, however, § 4905.65 has been upheld
as such an answer. This section does not seek to prevent ordinances which
require that which is engineeringly unsound or even prohibitively expen-
sive, because it applies to all lines, 22 kV and above, and to suburban
and urban municipalities alike. It does not attempt to correct possible un-
fair distribution of costs because it does not relate to that consideration.
Nor does this section consider the future.
On the other hand, § 4905.65 does deny a municipality the power to
adopt regulations found reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Or
does it? The section permits reasonable municipal regulation unless the
lines are intercity, meet accepted safety standards of construction, and
do not unreasonably affect the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
municipality. 1'6 This is really no limitation upon municipal power if it
can be said that a municipal exercise of police power would not be rea-
sonable or-as it must be-if it is used to regulate that which does not pose
an unreasonable threat to the general welfare of its inhabitants. But this
is not a true expression of the limits of police power. Not only does it
include the power to eradicate threats to the public well-being such as
nuisances, but also the power to promote affirmatively that well-being
through such measures as planning and zoning. In addition, § 4905.65
was certainly intended to serve some limiting purpose following, as it did,
on the heels of the Euclid decision. It shifts the burden from the ag-
grieved party to show that the municipal regulation is unreasonable to the
municipality to show that the regulated activity is an unreasonable threat
to the inhabitants of the community.
But § 4905.65 does more than this. CEI contended for more" -' and
the court in Painesville found more. There the court clearly overturned
160 In Massachusetts, the Department of Public Utilities can overrule a municipal refusal
to permit a utility to cross its streets with a transmission line only where a majority of munic.
ipalities concerned or two adjoining municipalities have given consent. MASS. ANN. LAWS,
ch. 166, § 28 (1970).
161 "(B) To the extent permitted by existing law a local regulation may reasonably re-
strict the construction, location, or use of a public utility facility, unless the public utility
facility: (1) Is necessary for the service, convenience, or welfare of the public served by the
public utility in one or more political subdivisions other than the political subdivision adopt-
ing the local regulation; and (2) Is to be constructed in accordance with generally accepted
safety standards; and (3) Does not unreasonably affect the welfare of the general public...
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page Supp. 1970).
1'2 Brief for Appellee at 1, 16-18, and in later cases, Brief of Defendant at 3, WX'alton Hills v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 884,475 (Cuyahoga County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), aff'd,
No. 30,869 (Ct. App. 1971), appeal dismissed, No. 71-621, Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. Oct. 18,
1971); Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 7, Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Macedonia,
No. 288331 (Summit County C.P.).
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a municipal regulation that it refused to call unreasonable, and it specifi-
cally admonished the lower court for deciding differently.10 It refused
to hold that § 4905.65 made unreasonable what had been held to be rea-
sonable in Euclid."" Based on a limited concession of counsel and on
the finding of the trial court,6 5 the supreme court permitted overhead
construction for the reason that the construction did not unreasonably af-
fect the inhabitants of Painesville. 166
The principal casualties, then, of this legislation would appear to be
the very local considerations which are most likely to be raised as counter-
balances to a finding of economic interference with construction of an
intercity transmission line. The promotional aspects of police power and
control of the less clearly defined hazards to aesthetics, environment, mu-
nicipal planning,167 property values and noise pollution are no longer with-
163 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 131,239 N.E.2d 75,79 (1968).
164 Id. at 130, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
165Id. at 131, 239 N.E.2d at 79. Counsel for Painesville had made the limited conces-
sion: "3. The proposed transmission lines described in the petition will not adversely affect
the welfare of the general public to a greater extent than similar 33 kV, 132 kV and 345 IV
overhead transmission lines which traverse areas similar to the areas in the City of Painesville to
be traversed by the transmission lines described in the petition." Brief for Appellent at 24;.
The finding of the court in Walton Hills v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 884,475
(Cuyahoga County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), af'd, No. 30,869 (Ct. App. 1971), appeal dismtised,
No. 71-621, Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. 18, 1971) at 7 is of a similar vein: 'such lines would
not adversely affect the general welfare of the people of Walton Hills to a greater degree than
such lines would affect the general welfare of persons similarly situated."
166 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 131, 239 N.E.2d 75, 79 (1968).
167 The court in Painesville suggested that a munidpality might still seek compliance with
its overall community plan from the utility subject to review by higher governmental authority
15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 132, 239 N.E.2d 75, 79 (1963) and reject a utility proposal, but only if
it would "so interfere with city planning as to affect the general welfare under § 4905.65(B)
(3), REvsm CODE .... " Id. at 131, 239 N.E.2d at 79. Although not presented in its brief
to the supreme court (Brief for Appellee, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968)), CEI
contended that it was exempt from planning commission regulation by virtue of § 4905.65
at the trial level (Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 31, No. 42,887 (Lake County C.P.) ) where it
was rejected by the court (Brief for Appellant at 12, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968))
and in later cases, Walton Hills v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 884,475 (Cuyahoga
County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), aff'd, No. 30,869 (Ct. App. 1971), appeal dirmisscd, No. 71-621,
Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. Oct. 18, 1971) (Brief for Defendant at 10-11) and in Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co. v. Macedonia, No. 288331 (Summit County C.P. 1969) (Memorandum for
Plaintiff on Zoning Code applicability at 1). In the lValton Hills case supra CEI added the
ground that provisions of Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 713.02 (Page Supp. 1970) exempt public
utilities from planning commission control The court found that the interference with Walton
Hills planning from use of an existing right-of-way would not be such as to adversely affect the
general welfare of its inhabitants, see note 87 supra. In the Afaccdonia case supra, CEI added the
ground that a public utility having the power of eminent domain is not subject to local zoning
laws on the authority of Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505
(1915) (restrictive covenant and public utility); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Gale, 119 Ohio
St. 110, 162 N.E. 385 (1928) (restrictive covenant, mentioned zoning ordinance and public
utility) and the State ex tel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d
345, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952) (state agency and zoning ordinance). The court ac-
cepted this contention. The applicability of local planning and zoning measures to public utilities
possessing the power of eminent domain would appear to be essentially a question of the extent of
state superiority which raises a "no conflict" problem. In the case of electric companies the prob-
lem is returned to the provisions of § 4905.65, REVISED CODE, as insofar as they are said to
modify the munidpal authority to regulate electric companies contained in the provisions of
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in municipal power unless they reach the "unreasonable" or nuisance
stage. Is this a necessary reconciliation of intercity and local interests?
At this stage the test of reasonableness would appear to be adequate to
limit errant municipal regulations, even as liberally applied in Euclid,
particularly if a balanced distribution of costs were insured. Yet this test
has been sacrificed; no provision has been made for the basic economic
problems involved; 1 8 and it would seem that the scales have been weighted
against local considerations to the point of making the meeting of safety
standards all but determinative of the issue.'0 9
Given the variety of local considerations in requiring underground
construction and the opportunity to safeguard against burdening intercity
service with the costs of local advantages, the constitutional validity of
the provisions of § 4905.65 making the imposition of such a requirement
in large part a state decision, becomes more clearly important to munici-
pal autonomy. Moreover, given the means of preventing burdening in-
tercity service, the advantages to be derived from underground construc-
tion, and the national trend toward acceptance of regulations imposing
such restraints, the wisdom of such provisions as § 4905.65 is opened to
question as well.
Having developed both the possibility that Painesville could have been
decided on grounds of unreasonableness because of its peculiar facts and
the presence of constitutional and policy misgivings over the breadth of
the legislation which gave rise to the case, attention can now be directed
toward the actual legal significance of the decision and the statute. How
is municipal autonomy affected by each as to the source of power, free-
dom from state control, and scope of power? In balance, of what advan-
tage is enhanced state power?
V. To WHAT EXTENT DOES A MUNICIPALITY DEPEND ON THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE As THE SOURCE OF
POWER TO REGULATE A PUBLIC UTILITY?
The answer to this question is basic to any consideration of the prob-
lems raised in Painesville, for if the General Assembly is the source of
municipal power on the subject, it would follow thr.t any statutory modi-
fication of or limitation upon its exercise, including such provisions as are
contained in § 4905.65 would be above objection. The court in Pin's-
ville suggested that this section "places control" in the city over lines
meeting statutory standards1" and counsel for CEI spoke of the legisla-
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953) (see textual discussion accompanying note
322-33 supra.) For application to public bodies, see note 528 infra.
168 A deficiency that HOUSE BILL 779, supra note 149, would correct.
169 Walton Hills v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 884,475 (Cuyahoga County C,P,
Oct 29, 1970), aIJ'd, No. 30,869 (Cr. App. 1971), appeal dismissed, No. 71-621, Ohio Bar
1275 (S. Ct. Oct 18, 1971).
170 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 130,239 N.E.2d 75,78 (1968).
[Vol. 33
STATE-MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
ture as "doling"'171 out power over utilities to municipalities. This
approach may be based on any one of three theories: (1) the municipal-
ities of the state had no authority previous to the enactment of statutes
by the General Assembly; (2) what authority municipalities possessed is
subject to modification by statute; (3) what authority municipalities
have had has been lost, for example, through changes in circumstances.
The first of these possibilities is the least likely basis for the suggestions
made relative to the scope of state control, considering the context in
which each was made.1 2  Because it postulates maximum state power it
can, however, serve as the logical starting point for the examination of
state-municipal relations. The other two possibilities will be examined in
connection with larger problems treated later in this article.
As a brief examination of judicial decisions in the area of state-mu-
nicipal relations will quickly reflect, municipal dependency upon legisla-
tive authority to regulate public utilities, as suggested by CEI and stated
in the supreme court's opinion in Painesville, cannot rest on the proposition
that the initial source of such power has always remained in the state leg-
islature. The source of municipal Home Rule is constitutional and not
statutory." 3 Prior to Home Rule a municipal corporation was the crea-
ture of the legislature, to which it looked both for its existence and its
tpowers.'7 1 In statutes dating from this era which are still part of the law
'of the state the right to regulate the use of municipal street 1 75 and the
construction and repair of electrical facilities was conferred in terms of
grants of municipal power,'76 while the right to impose regulations on
electric utilities' r ' was conferred by means of a provision making munid-
171 Brief for Appellee at 24, quoting from counsel for Appellants treatise, 3 J. FARRELL,
FARRELL-ELLIS OnIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 1.59 (11th ed. 1962).
172 The court was apparently thinking of power no longer "local" in nature and therefore
subject to state control, 15 Ohio Sr. 2d 125, 129-30, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (1968), and counsel
was apparently suggesting as alternatives either exclusive state power over that which is beyond
Home Rule, Brief for Appellee at 25, or a type of state preemption of regulation within the
Home Rule theory, Brief for Appellee at 24.
17 3 Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
174 State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 93 N.E. 1019 (1912); Ravenna v.
Penna. Co., 45 Ohio St. 118, 12 N.E. 445 (1887).
17 5 Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (Page 1953).
17 6 OnIo REv. CODE ANN. § 715.27 (Page 1953).
177 State cx rel. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 159 N.E.2d
756 (1959), appeal dismissed, 362 U.S. 457 (1960); Cincinnati v. Diamond Light Co., 4 Ohio
App. 177 (1915), involving the predecessor section OHio GEN. CODE § 9193 (1938) to
O1EO REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953). In pre-Home Rule cases a statute empower-
ing a municipality to grant a franchise upon "regulations and restrictions" was construed as
enabling a municipality to charge compensation of a gas company, for the use of municipal
streets, Federal Gas & Fuel Co. v. Columbus, 96 Ohio St 530, 118 N.E. 103 (1917) (involving
Onto GEN. CODE § 10129 (1938) now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1723.02 (Page Supp. 1970) ),
and to fix utility rates by contract which are free from subsequent state alteration as part of the
condition for its consent to a telephone company for the use of municipal streets, Columbus
v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 103 Ohio St. 79, 133 N.E. 800 (1921) (Marshall, CJ.) (involving, OntO
GEN. CODE § 9197 (1-938) now OHIO REV. CODE § 4931.20 (Page 1953) ).
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-pal consent a precondition to such a utility's use of municipal streets,118
Prior to the enactment of these statutes a municipality was without power
to regulate a public utility. 7' However, with Home Rule these statutes
have become obsolete as a source of power, since"80 it has been repeatedly
held from the earliest cases that Home Rule does include municipal regu-
'lation of public utilities whether directly' 8' or in the context of a munici-
pality's control over its streets.'8 2
Caught up in Home Rule enthusiasm and frecjuently untempered by
state legislative judgments as to the presence of state interests, the courts
tended in early cases to emphasize the broad scope of this new constitu-
tional power by finding municipal control of the use of the streets to be
a matter of local self-government.' 3  Before long a shift to a police regula-
178Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953). Counsel for CEI (Brief for Appellee, at
6-16, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968)), contended that OHIO REV. CODE ANN,§ 4933.16 (Page 1953), was only a limited conferral of power to a municipality to deal with
local electrical service matters and not one to deal with what amounts to the intercity aspect
of the supply of electrical power. This contention, of course, only has significance in the
present context if the statute is in fact the source of municipal authority. In that event it be.
comes either an unnecessary alternative argument to one urging the validity of § 4905.65,
REVISED CODE, since this section is clearly a limiting statute and within state authority to adopt
if the municipal power it limits is fully dependent upon the state legislature for its existence,
or it raises a question as to the need for the passage of § 4905.65 at all, except for the unlikely
purpose of expanding previously limited municipal authority.
'79 Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 93 Ohio St. 428, 113 N.E. 402
(1916) af'd, 251 U.S. 173 (1919). Also in pre-Home Rule cases it was held that the state had
authority over municipal streets subject to delegation to a municipality, Corry v. Cincinnati,
10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 601 (Super. Ct. Cincinnati 1888), or to a county, Mills v. Norwood, 6
Ohio C.C.R. 305 (C.P. 1892). A municipal street could not be used by a public utility as a
matter of xight, Columbus v. Public Util. Comm'n, 103 Ohio St. 79, 133 N.E. 800 (1921), and
even when use was authorized by statute the grant was subject to the municipal duty to care for
the streets, Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 65, 33 N.E. 292 (1893).
18 0 See textual discussion accompanying notes 5, 7 supra.
18'E.g., Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918). References
to statutory grants continue to be made which are at most confusing when the source of power
is not in issue, e.g., State ex tel. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476,
159 N.E.2d 756 (1959), appeal dismissed, 362 U.S. 457 (1960); Cambridge v. Pub. Utl,
Comm'n, 159 Ohio St. 88, 111 N.E.2d 1 (1953). They are at times considered to be necessary,
see 3 J. FARRELL, FARRELL-ELLIS OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 7.11 (11th ed. 1962). Yet they
can be of significance if they serve to fend off what otherwise might be a finding of conflict with
state regulations in the area. See 23 OHIo ST. LJ. 557, 560 (1962).
182E.g., Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.l. 595 (1923). References to
statutory grants in conjunction with constitutional power, e.g., Union Sand & Supply Corp. v
Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961), and without direct mention of Home
Rule authority, still appear, e.g., Galion v. Galion, 154 Ohio St. 503, 96 N.E.2d 881 (1951).
SeeNelsonvillev. Ramsy, 113 Ohio St. 217, 148 N.E. 694 (1925).
183 Two very early cases involving a state requirement (OHIO GEN. CODE § 9105 (1938)
now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4951.06 (Page 1953)) that the consent of abutting property
owners be obtained before a municipality could authorize the extension of local service street
railway lines, show the marked difference of approach where Home Rule powers were found
applicable and where they were not. In Billings v. Cleveland Ry., 92 Ohio St. 478, 111 Ni.
155 (1915), the Cleveland charter provided against the consent rcquirement and this was up.
held over the state statute because, "the granting of permission and the making of a contract
to construct and operate a street railway in the streets of a city or village is a matter that may
be provided for in a charter adopted by the municipality under article XVIII of the Constitu-
tion" (syllabus, para. 1) and "conferring ... [a consent right by the state], being a matter
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tion approach became evident with respect to such matters as rate-fidng
for public utility service.sra What remains now of the early local self-
government approach is largely restricted to control over streets, as dis-
tinguished from utility regulation, and even then to their construction and
maintenance'ra rather than the regulation of their use180
of local concern, when inconsistent with the provisions of the charter . . . would fall simply
because it is inconsistent. .. ." Id. at 491, 111 NE. at 168. Concern for municipal autonomy is
even dearer in the trial court's treatment of the case, sub nom. Goebel v. Cleveland Ry., 17
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 337 (C.P. 1915). In Carpenter v. Cincinnati, 92 Ohio St. 473, 111 NE. 153
(1915), decided the same day, as Billings, supra, the city of Cincinnati not having a charter,
when charters were considered necessary to the exercise of Home Rule powers (from State cx
rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 NE. 670 (1913), to Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 103
Ohio St. 245, 140 NE. 595 (1923)), proved fatal to a resolution of necessity to extend a
line without consent to abutting owners. Since without Home Rule, the city was dependent
upon the General Assembly for power and this power was considered modified by the statutory
pre-condition consent provision. The Pertrsburg v. Ridgway, .rupra, decision with Home
Rule proponent Judge Wanamaker speaking shows some shift of emphasis. Although it
was held that "fihe power to establish, open, improve, maintain and repair public streets
within the municipality, and fully control the use of them, is included within the term 'powers of
local self-government.'" (syllabus, para. 2), it was not necessary to differentiate between
local self-government and police power since, as noted by Judge Day in concurrence, conflict
with a state statute was not in issue. The local nature of a regulation of intercity bus line stops
to embark and disembark passengers within the city was stressed, and the question of the entire
prohibition of the use of the streets was reserved. A strong plea for exclusive state control
over this "non-local' type of regulation was made by the dissenter, Judge Jones. In the com-
panion case of Murphy v. Toledo, 108, Ohio St., 342, 140 N.E. 626 (1923), a similar result
was reached with respect to prescribing the route of intercity buses in the city in a similarly
limited fact situation. Two, more recent, lower court cases, relied on Pcrrisburg v. Ridgwa,
supra, to find power of local self-government involved, but neither is a real test of that conclu-
sion as conflict with state statutes was not in issue. Ricketts v. Mansfield, 43 Ohio App. 316,
183 N.E. 181, appeal dismissed, 125 Ohio St. 631, 185 NE. 881 (1932), modification of a
franchise with consent of a street railway company and involving municipal utility contract
power contained in Omo CONs'r. art. XVIII, § 4, but with the further suggestion that modifi-
cation could have been made without consent under Omo CoNs'r. art. XWIII § 3, police power,
DiBella v. Ontario, 4 Ohio Misc. 120, 212 N.E.2d 679 (C.P. 1965), conditions in a franchise
to use municipal streets for supply of cable television, requiring conformity with municipal
regulatory measures by a non-public utility.
3s4 Cleveland TeL Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 NE. 701 (1918). In rejecting
the local self-government clause of OMO CoNsr. art. XVHI, § 3 as the source of power, the
court found that this clause did not contain the local portion of a divisible police power, but
that the police regulation clause of this section gained purpose only by being interpreted to
encompass the full scope of an indivisible municipal police power, subject to the "no conflict"
provision. Judge Wanamaker, in dissent, would have divided the police power between the
two clauses leaving only the state portion when exercised by a municipal corporation subject
to state controL OHO CONST. art. XVIII, § 4, which confers power upon municipalities to
acquire, or contract for the services of, a public utility, was rejected by the court, over dissent,
as a source of regulatory power over a public utility. On the other hand, the Home Rule
power to fix rates by contract with the utility was suggested in dictum in Columbus v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 103 Ohio St. 79, 133 NE. 800 (1921); found to be included in OHIo CONSr.
art. XVIII, § 4 in Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Columbus, 42 F.2d 379 (6th Cit. 1930), but
was subjected to charter limitations, and was also found to be part of OHIO CoNsr. art. XVIII,
§ 3 power in Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry. v. Cincinnati, 71 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1934).
185 Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 NE. 212 (1919). The court treated street
maintenance as reflected in a vehicular weight limitation as a matter of business management
of the city rather than as a control of the use of its streets. It thereby again refused to sanction
Judge Wanamakers theory of including some police power within local self-government or to
subject street maintenance to the "no conflict" limitation as urged by the disenter, Judge Jones.
Predictions of confusion in the law as a result of the majority holding made by these two
judges seems to have been born out in the contrary finding in a lower court case, Lakewcol v.
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Despite these shifts, Home Rule power remains the source of munici-
pal authority over utilities. By rejecting a local self-government approach
in favor of police regulation, the courts failed to make this municipal
authority exclusive. Rather, each level of government can regulate and
in case of conflict the state law prevails. Consequently, municipal regu-
lation of utilities has been upheld in absence of conflict with state regula-
tions as promulgated by the state Public Utilities Commission, 8' but the
latter have been repeatedly upheld over inconsistent municipal ordi-
nances.' This approach received renewed confirmation in a recent deci-
Johnson, 8 Ohio Op. 205 (Lakewood Mun. Ct.), rev'd, appeal ditmissed, 133 Ohio St. 110,
11 N.E.2d 1022 (1937), a finding based on a procedural point in Perkins v. Quaker City, 165
Ohio St. 120, 133 N.E.2d 595 (1956), in reluctant reaffirmance in Union Sand & Supply Corp.
v. Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961), and in the use of maintenance case pre.
cedent to sustain an essentially police power objective, Cincinnati Motor Transp. Ass'n. v. Lincoln
Heights, 25 Ohio St2d 203, 267 N.E.2d 797 (1971). Accord, Wilson v. Springfield, 105 Ohio
St. 647, 138 N.E. 927 (1922) (cleat and spike regulations); Massa v. Cincinnati, 51 Ohio Op,
101, 110 N.E.2d 726 (C.P. 1953), appeal dismissed, 160 Ohio St. 254, 115 N,.I2d 689 (1953)
(street repairs). Maintenance regulations must still meet the te:;ts of reasonableness, Gates v.
Parma, 96 Ohio L. Abs. 18, 201 N.E.2d 814 (C.P. 1964); Vaughn v. Parma, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 6,
201 N.E.2d 722 (C.P. 1962), and of equal application, Western Trucking Co. v. Lincoln Heights,
19 Ohio App. 2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 925 (1969); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Reading, 166 Ohio St.
279, 142 N.E.2d 525 (1957). In making street improvements a municipal assessment pro-
cedure is limited by state statutes under power conferred upon the state by OHmo CoNsT. at,
XIII, § 6; State ex rel. Osbourne v. Williams, 111 Ohio St. 400, 145 N.E. 542 (1924); Berry v.
Columbus, 104 Ohio St. 607, 136 N.E. 824 (1922); Youngstown, v. Mitchell, 30 Ohio Op. 122
(C.P. 1943).
18 6 Niles v. Dean, 25 Ohio St. 2d 284, 268 N.E.2d 275 (1971); Lindsay v. Cincinnati, 172
Ohio St. 137, 174 N.E.2d 96 (1961); Mayer v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458, 14 N.E,2d 617, ccrI,
denied, 305 U.S. 621 (1938); Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
Again, the regulations must be reasonable, Niles v. Dean, supra; Cincinnati Motor Transp, Ass'n
v. Lincoln Heights, 25 Ohio St. 2d 203, 267 N.E.2d 797 (1971); Cincinnati v. Luckey, 153
Ohio St. 247, 91 N.E.2d 477 (1950); Ashtabula v. Kovacs, 8 Ohio App. 2d 320, 222 N.E,2d
440 (1965). Municipal regulatory control is affected by the state's exercise of its police power
in Or-'o REV. CoDE ANN. § 723.01 (Page 1953) and predecessor sections in imposing a duty
upon municipalities to keep their streets, "open, in repair, and fr.ee from nuisance." This duty
in pre-Home Rule days gave rise to the power to regulate the use of municipal streets, Stiving v.
Pioneer, 24 Ohio Dec. 333 (C.P. 1914), but this duty cannot now be conditioned, Wilson v.
East Cleveland, 121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929). It is rot violated if a street purpose
is permitted by a municipality which is not a nuisance and does not substantially interfere with
traffic, United States Bung Mfg. Co. v. Cincinnati, 73 Ohio App. 80, 54 N.E.2d 432 (1943), but
it is violated if an obstruction results, Gerspaker v. Cleveland, 21 Ohio Op. 537 (C.P. 1941).
A municipality cannot convey an interest in the streets prejudicial to the rights of the public,
Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry. v. Hatford, 15 Ohio App. 305 (1921). Nor can a municipality
charge a license fee for the ordinary non-commercial use of the streets, Wooster v. Evans, 92
Ohio St. 504, 112 N.E. 1082 (1915); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Tippecanoe, 85 Ohio
St. 120, 96 N.E. 1092 (1911).
187 The municipal power to regulate a utility was confirmed and the limiting of motor
buses to certain streets to prevent congestion was found reasonable at the same time that the
court admonished against "interference" with PUC powers, Lorain Street R.R. v. Public Utill.
Comm'n, 113 Ohio Sr. 68, 148 N.E. 577 (1925). Municipally designated location of stop.
for bus passenger service was sustained when no route was prescribed by the PUC, Eastern
Ohio Transport Corp. v. Bridgeport, 44 Ohio App. 433, 185 N.E. 891 (1932), appcal dismisied,
126 Ohio St. 238, 184 N.E. 852 (1933).
188 Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918) (conflicting
rates); Nelsonville v. Ramsey, 113 Ohio St. 217, 148 N.E. 694 (1925) (municipal barring of In.
tercity PUC approved motor bus transport); Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 130 Ohio St.
503, 200 N.E. 765 (1936), (PUC setting intercity bus routes without municipal consent). The
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sion which ended protracted litigation involving the municpal power to
force a utility found to have no franchise to discontinue service and re-
move its poles from the city's streets without first seeking PUC approval
as required by statute."'o Of more direct significance to this point, a lower
court in another recent case10 followed the "no conflict" approach rather
than the local self-government one to find invalid a city ordinance com-
pelling a telephone company to place its wires underground in an urban
renewal area. Telephone companies, unlike electric utilities, have been
above cases, those in notes 186 and 187 supra, represent a retreat from the broad lozal self-
government language of Billings v. Cleveland Ry., 92 Ohio St. 478, 111 N.. 155 (1915),
supra note 183, and Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919), supra note
185, as the concurring opinion in Lorain Street R.. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68,
148 N.E. 577 (1925), and the dissenting opinion in Nclsonrille t. Ramsey, supra, indicate.
They are less of a departure from Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.Y. 595(1923), supra note 183, in that, even though they involved a statutory grant, municipal power
was sustained, with the possible exception of Ndsonville v. Ramsr , supra, on a onstitutinnal
basis and municipal regulation was overturned only when it was of an obstructive nature and in
conflict with state regulations, matters expressly reserved in the Pcrrysbzrg case. Although
Home Rule power to operate a public utility or to contract for such services, conferred by pro-
visions of OHuo CONST. art. XVIII, § 4 is not subject to a "no conflict" limitation, it has been
subjected to municipal regulation when exercised in a neighboring municipality in Cleveland
Ry. v. North Olmsted, supra, and in effect curtailed by statute in Local Tel. Co. v. Cranberry
Mutual TeL Co., 102 Ohio St. 524, 133 N.E. 527 (1921), on the rationale of a state regulation
of a utility.
189 State ex rel. Klapp v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 14, 225 N.E.2d 230
(1967), Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4905.20-.21, as amended, (Page Supp. 1970). Home
Rule power under Omo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3, did not become an issue until a state court
of appeals treated the case for the second time, 11 Ohio App. 2d 64, 228 N.E. 2d 673 (1962).
This court noted that the extraterritorial effects of an ouster of a company supplying intercity
services, observed in State ex rel. Wear v. Cincinnati & Lake Erie RIL, 128 Ohio St. 95, 190 N.E.
224 (1934), were not in issue in the Dayton Power & Light care nor was a company's volun-
tary abandonment of service. It concluded, however, that the city's efforts at ouster was an
exercise of the police power which failed since it was in conflict with the state regulation of the
"mode of its exercise." Id. at 72. It was this conclusion of conflict between the ures of the police
power which was Affirmed by the supreme court, 10 Ohio St. 2d 14, 225 N.E.2d 230 (1967).
The suit had first been filed as a quo warranto proceeding in 1933 and had been removed to
the federal courts on diversity grounds, 170 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Ohio 1957), a~g'd, 263 F.2d
909 (6th Cir. 1959), but was reversed 359 U.S. 552 (1959) on the ground that removal had
been improper. The main thrust of these lower federal court decisions and the initial basis
of the Ohio court of appeals decision, 113 Ohio App. 433, 178 N.-2d 838 (1960), on first
reconsidering the question, was that the state's statutory procedure for ouster was not an
impairment of a franchise existing at the time of the passage of the statute. Rather, it vas found
that there was no valid franchise, since when granted prior to 1886, the city had no power to
make a grant to a power company in view of the decision in Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v.
Upper Sandusky, 93 Ohio St. 428, 113 N.E. 402 (1916) afd, 251 U.S. 173 (1919). The
court of appeals also considered the issue of curtailment of municipal contract power for util-
ity services under OHIo CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 4, as a result of this statutory procedure. It
found no deprivation on the authority of State ex rel. Wear v. Cindatti & Lake Erie R.R.,
supra, which in turn had cited with approval the previous dismissal, East Ohio Gas Co. v. Cleve-
land, 121 Ohio St. 628, 172 N.E. 379 (1930), of an appeal from a court of appeals decision,
34 Ohio App. 97, 170 N.E. 586 (1929), which had reached the same result. This latter de-
cision concluded that the overturning of a franchise provision for abandonment of service
because of a prior conflicting statutory procedure did not lessen the municipal constitutional
power to contract but only provided for orderly discontinuance of service by requiring that
the consent of the state PUC be obtained first.
190 Cincnnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati, 7 Ohio Mic. 159, 215 N.E2d 631
(P. Ct. 1964).
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granted the right by statute"9 ' to use municipal streets without the con-
sent of the municipality, subject to arbitration by the probate court as to
the mode of construction."0 2 It was with this provision that the court
found the municipal ordinance in conflict.193
In light of this Home Rule approach to the source of municipal power
over public utilities, municipal dependency upon the state legislature is re-
duced to the extent to which a denial or modification of power is consis-
tent with Home Rule theory and to the degree to which it might be said
that circumstances have made obsolete those decisions which have placed
authority within Home Rule. These possibilities will be considered in the
next three sections.
VI. To WHAT EXTENT DOES STATE REGULATION OF UTIL1TIES
SERVE As A LIMIT ON MUNICIPAL RLEGULATION?
This question, although not directly considered by the court in Paines-
ville, is one that might well be raised, as it was by counsel for CEl,'0'
in view of the scope of state regulation of the electric utility industry.
Considering the problem within the confines of Home Rule theory as de-
veloped by Ohio courts, the exercise of the state's regulatory power over
utilities does not itself serve to preclude municipal regulation except inso-
far as a "conflict" between the sets of regulations results.' That con-
flict must be "head-on;" that is, the municipal charter or ordinance must
either permit what the state forbids or vice versa.10
The extensive nature of the state regulations on a particular subject
should not change this basic approach. 7 Therefore, even though in
19 1 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953).
192 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4931.01, .11 (Page 1953), .08 (Page Supp. 1970).
193 Although the city could not compel underground construction of telephone lines, neither
could the company undertake it, nor could the court order it, without the consent of the city
in light of OHo Rsv. CODE ANN. § 4931.20 (Page 1953), which provides for underground
construction "when the consent of such municipal corporation has been obtained."
194 Brief for Appellee at 13, 24, Cleveland Elec. Illuminating; Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio
St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
195 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
19 6 Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923). The "conflict by implica-
tion" variation as applied primarily in the liquor field, Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus, 144
Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944), bears some resemblance to preemption. Yet there is i
basic difference. The conflict theory rests on state regulation of individuals from which a spe-
cific affirmative permission is implied, while preemption, as will be seen, is a broader denial
of power to a lower level of government implied from a higher le'sel's entrance into a particular
field of regulation. The court in Cleveland v. Raffa, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 235 N.E.2d 138
(1968), clearly refused to equate the two.
197 It, or a state license requirement, does, however, place additional strain on the theory
as evidenced by the frequency in which some more comprehensive displacement of municipal
power is suggested, e.g., Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal
dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955); Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90
(1964); Lyndhurst v. Compola, 112 Ohio App. 483, 169 N.E.2d 558 (1960); Williams v.
Jackson, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 164 N.E.2d 195 (C.P. 1959); Ferrie v. Sweeney, 34 Ohio Op.
272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1946); Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, Inc., 7 Ohio Misc. 292,
220 N.E.2d 151 (Canton Mun. Ct. 1966).
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Painesville the state Public Utilities Commission had under statutory au-
thority' 1t adopted comprehensive national safety standards of construc-
tion for the electrical industry, 90 both levels of government would still
have police power, and a municipal regulation would be invalid only if
it contradicted a valid use of the state's power. The doctrine of preemp-
tion, whereby the higher level of government is said by its own regula-
ltions to deny impliedly an area of regulation from a lower level of govern-
ment, has not been the development of Ohio municipal law.2°
But this does not mean that expressions and even holdings of pre-
emption do not appear in Ohio. It would be strange if they did not. The
doctrine is fully applicable to the actions of the federal government both
in its relations to the states as well as to municipal corporations.2 '9 Since
the state's relationship to counties is on a different basis from that to mu-
-nicipal corporations, preemption may well be applicable against a county's
regulatory efforts.202 Even with respect to municipal corporations, the
state's power over taxation, resting on specific constitutional provisions, 3
has long been held to include a preemption approach.20 4 In addition, men-
tion of preemption might be inadvertent as an outgrowth of these ac-
cepted uses or because the doctrine is not uncommon in other states even
as applied to the generality of municipal-state problems.203 It might be
used unnecessarily and certainly misleadingly in fields in which the state
is held to have exclusive power.20  But in the broad range of state-mu-
nicipal exercise of police power, the doctrine of preemption-the judicial
determination of legislative intent to deny municipal power through the
mere exercise of the state's own regulatory power-has no place. This
has been made evident in lower and supreme court decisions dating from
early Home Rule times to the most recent days.207 The state cannot deny
198 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4905.06,4963A0, 4963A1 (Page 1953).
19 Administrative Order No. 72 and Session Order No. 285, as amended, (1966), incorpo-
rating "Safety Rules for Electric Supply and Communication Lines," Part 2 of National Electric
Safety Code (6th ed.), National Bureau of Standards Handbook H-81.
2 0 0 Vaubel, Municipal Corporations and the Police Power in Ohio, 29 OHIO ST. LJ. 29, 46-
50 (1968). Express statutory denial is more properly reserved for treatment in the next section
of this article.
201 Greater Fremont, Inc. v. Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom.; Wonderland Ventures v. Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970); Cleveland
v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1945).
202 Security Sewage Equip. Co. v. Beebe, 5 Ohio Misc. 173, 214 N.E.2d 853 (C.P. 1965).
203 Owo CoNsT. arc. XIII, § 6, art. XVIII, § 13.
204 State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
2051 C. ANTiEAu, LocAL GovE ,rItr LAW, § 3.06, at 109-111 (196S).
206 In cases involving the management and operation of courts: In re Parks, 45 Ohio L Abs.
379, 67 N.E.2d 459 (Ct. App.), appeal dismisscd, 146 Ohio St. 694, 61 N.E.2d 713 (1916);
Myers v. Defiance, 67 Ohio App. 159, 36 N.E.2d 162 (1940); Underwood v. Isham, 61 Ohio
App. 129, 22 N.E.2d 468, appeal dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 320, 20 N.E.2d 719 (1939).
207 Cleveland v. Raffa, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 235 N.E.2d 133 (1963) (liquor); Akron v.
Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E.2d 279 (1939) (liquor); Columbus v. Glascock, 117 Ohio App.
63, 189 N.E.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 9, 135 N.-2d 437 (1962) (crime and traf-
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and the courts cannot imply a denial of power granted by the constitu-
tion.20 8
Despite the clarity of this reasoning and the repeated use made of it,
reference to preemption is made in apparent contiadiction even more of-
ten at all judicial levels. Although it would be unnecessarily strained to
conclude that none of these decisions is in fact contradictory of the broad
statement that the state cannot preempt a regulatory field, still, most of the
decisions can readily be distinguished on one of several grounds. The
clearest are those which, as noted, did not deal with police power matters
but with those subjects to which the use of preemption is well estab.
lished.'0 9 In most of the cases where this was not true the reference to
preemption was little more than a reference.210  Thus, no clear definition
fie); Stary v. Brooklyn, 51 Ohio Op. 378, 114 N.E.2d 633 (C.P. 1953), affid, 162 Ohio St. 120,
121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955) (housetrailer); Dayton v.
Stearns, 26 Ohio Misc. 115 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1971); Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St.
282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918) (dictum) (crime).
208 "[Local police . . . regulations . . . are subject to no limitations of the General As-
sembly, except that such ordinances shall not be 'in conflict with the general laws' .... [whlle
pre-emption by implication has been held to exist in the area o state and local taxation . ..
[these factors, however, are not relevant here." Cleveland v. Raffa, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 113.
15, 235 N.E.2d 138, 140-41 (1968); "[If there were a statute creating the same offense, It
could not be exclusive, even if the general assembly of Ohio in express terms prohibited the
municipality from legislating upon the same subject-matter...." Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98
Ohio St. 282, 286, 120 N.E. 829, 830 (1918); "The Legislature cannot deprive a municipality
of that constitutional power, directly or indirectly. The validity of a local police regulation
therefore depends not on any question of a state prohibition or pre-emption of the municipal
constitutional power, but rather upon existence of a 'conflict. ...." Columbus v. Glascock,
117 Ohio App. 63, 64, 189 N.E.2d 889, 890, appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio St. 9, 185 N.1,2d 437
(1962).209 See sources cited supra notes 201-02, 204, 206. At timef the courts have assumed the
validity of express or implied preemption in the regulatory area when concerned with tie
validity of a municipal measure as a tax. These assumptions were not necessary for the deci-
sions and may have been influenced by the presence of the tax is sue. Globe Security & Loan
Co. v. Carrel, 106 Ohio St. 43, 138 N.E. 364 (1922), af'g sub nom. Welfare Loan Co. v.
Carrel, 32 Ohio Ct. App. 65 (1921) (statutory); Richmond Heights v. LoConti, 19 Ohio App.
2d 100, 250 N.E.2d 84 (1969).
21o The cases deal with crime, the regulation of liquor, house-trailers and various other
subjects. Most groups would seem to be refuted directly by the holdings of the cases cited In
note 207 supra and the others by implication: Cassidy v. Ohio Pub. Service Co., 78 Ohio App.
221, 69 N.E.2d 649 (1946), appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 580, 79 N.E.2d 912 (1948) (util-
ities); Photos v. Toledo, 19 Ohio Misc. 147, 250 N.E.2d 916 (C.P, 1969) (crime); Williams v.
Jackson, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 164 N.E.2d 195 (C.P. 1959) (liquor); Epoch Producing Corp. v,
Davis, 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465 (C.P. 1917) (motion pictures). Cases in which no preemption
was found: Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal dimissed,
348 U.S. 923 (1955) (housetrailers); Mayer v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458, 14 NE.2d 617, ccrt.
denied, 305 U.S. 621 (1938) (motor vehicles); Wilson v. Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199
N.E. 181 (1935), overruled on other grounds, 141 Ohio St. 535, 4) N.E.2d 412 (1943) (hours);
Conrad v. Lengel, 110 Ohio St. 532, 144 N.E. 278 (1924) (peddlers, statutory preemption);
Akron v. Williams, 113 Ohio App. 293, 177 N.E.2d 802 (1960), appeal dimninsse,, 172 Ohio
St. 287, 175 N.E.2d 174 (1964), rev'g a finding of precmption in 84 Ohio L. Abs. 499, 172
N.E.2d 28 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1960) (crime); State ex rel. Wynne v. Urban, 91 Ohio App,
514, 107 N.E.2d 637 (1953) (civil service); Davis v. McPherson, 72 Ohio L. Ab, 232, 132
N.E.2d 626 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 164 Ohio St. 375, 130 N.E.2d 791 (1955) (houe-
trailers); Columbus Legal Amusement Ass'n v. Columbus, 50 Ohio L. Abs, 353, 79 N..2d 915
(Ct. App. 1947) (amusement devices).
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of what was meant by preemption was given. It seems generally as if the
term has been used interchangeably with "conflict"2 11 in the traditional
police regulation sense.2 1"  In a few cases the courts seem to have placed
greater reliance on preemption. -13 But even these decisions cannot be
considered as firm precedent because they were not divorced from the con-
flict approach and each can be said to have been contradicted21- or pointed-
ly avoided215 by Supreme Court of Ohio holdings involving similar facts.
Negative preemption-the state's removal of itself from or refusal to en-
ter a field serving to imply a limit on municipalities' power to enter-al-
though applied in the tax field,2 10 was rejected in an appeals court case in-
volving utility regulation. 17 The court assumed that a statute prohibiting
a city from requiring the insulation of electrical wires would be valid, but
it refused to consider repeal of a statute requiring insulation as amount-
ing to such a preclusion.218
The most serious impetus to the adoption of a preemption approach
to the state's use of police power can be discerned when either of two fact
patterns exist or, more particularly, when they coincide. The mention of
preemption has been more common when matters of health were in is-
sue219 or when the courts have suggested that a matter of "statewide"
rather than "local" concern was involved 220 or when both were presentY2 '
211 OmHo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
2 12 Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
213 Noland v. Sharonville, 4 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90 (1964) (statutory preemp-
tion, housetrailer); Lyndhurst v. Compola, 112 Ohio App. 483, 169 N.E2d 558 (19C0) (li-
quor); Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, Inc., 7 Ohio Misc. 292, 220 N...2d 151 (Canton
Mun. Cr. 1966) (liquor).
2 14 Cleveland v. Raffa, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 235 N.E.2d 138 (1963) (liquor).
215 Anderson v. Brown, 13 Ohio Sr. 2d 53, 233 N.E.2d 584 (1968) (housetrailer). The
court carefully rested its decision on the ground of "conflict" between municipal and state li-
censing requirements and not on the express preclusion of municipal licenses contained in
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3733.07 (Page Supp. 1970).
216 Haefner v. Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58,68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
2 17 Cassidy v. Ohio Pub. Service Co., 78 Ohio App. 221, 69 NE.2d 649 (1946), appeal
dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 580,79 N.Y.2d 912 (1948).
21s Nor was the establishment of the state Public Utilities Commission thought to be an
implied affirmative limit on a municipality's power to regulate its streets. Mayer v. Ames, 133
Ohio St. 458,14 N.X.2d 617, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 621 (1938).
219 Davis v. McPherson, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 232, 132 N.E.2d 626 (Ct. App.), appeal disiici,
164 Ohio St. 375, 130 N.E.2d 794 (1955) (involving house-trailers, but no preemption was
found).
220 State ex rel. Helsel v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (C.P. 1947),
aff'd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694, appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.Y.2d 911
(1948). Attempts to apply the preemption theory were rejected in lower court decisions, ir-
pliedly, by acceptance of a "no conflict" approach, Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport
Authority, 16 Ohio Misc. 69, 237 N.E.2d 173 (C.P. 1967), and expressly in Stary v. Brook-
lyn, 51 Ohio Op. 378, 114 N.E.2d 633 (C.P. 1953), but simply found not to be prezent in the
affirming decision, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.Y.2d 11 (1954), appeal distisscd, 348 U.S. 923
(1955). In Painesville, although a "matter of statewide concern' was found, no mention was
made of preemption.
-
22 1 Ferrie v. Sweeney, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1946), but with an alterna-
tive basis for decision.
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It is with respect to a statewide matter, though, that the only well-developed
theory of preemption involving the use of police power has been articu-
lated.2" But this articulation was by only a single judge223 and his theory
has not gained express acceptance. 4
Where cases have reached beyond the mere mentioning of preemp-
tion to suggest a more comprehensive state power in health and "state-
wide" matters, those cases were rather more dearly involved with identify-
ing a retention of state authority in face of claims of curtailment by
municipal Home Rule grants225 than they were with establishing either
exclusive state power or a theory by which the state could achieve exclu-
siveness. Consequently, it is difficult to say that preemption has become
sufficiently formulated, even with respect to those matters with which it
most frequently appears, to serve as a theory to strike down the municipal
regulation in Painesville.
In the present discussion, the relatively recent supreme court case of
State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron,220 remains the most troublesome. It
would seem from the thrust of the court's opinion that a state fee placed
on the operation of watercraft on state waters, including those waters
owned by a municipality, is a tax, which on basic tax theory preempts
similar municipal taxes from the field.227  But the court deeply concerned
itself with police regulation considerations in a carefully noted "statewide
concern" context. In fact, the syllabus of the case is phrased in police
regulation and preemption terms228 and a statute expressly prohibits further
municipal licensing of watercraft.2 29  Still, it is difficult to believe that this
case sets a point of new departure for preemption. The issue was not clear-
222 State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944) (Williams, J.,
concurring). It was proposed that in matters of local self-government a municipality was
supreme, in the use of police power on local matters, the municipality could not conflict with
state law, but that in the use of police power in a matter of "statewide concern" a municipality
could be required by the state to act or it could voluntarily act until the state preempted the
field.
223 Id.
224 This is to say, no clear establishment of a separate preemption approach to statewide
matters, as distinguished from more frequent use of the term, is disclosed in Ohio case law.
225 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 NXE.2d 773 (1940) (health and
statewide); Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929) (health
and statewide); Bd. of Health v. State ex rel. O'Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N.E. 215
(1931) (health and statewide). However, it is somewhat less clearly reflected in Hickey v.
Burke, 78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio St. 217, 70 N.X.2d 274
(1946) (health and statewide); Smith v. Mayfield Heights, 48 Ohio Op. 443, 108 N.B2d 861
(C.P. 1952) (statewide).
226 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962).
227 State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
228 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962), com-
mented on Dayton v. Stearns, 26 Ohio Misc. 115 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1971). A lower court, In
considering the position of the municipal corporation, accepted in dictum this broader language
despite finding a state-county conflict on a health problem. Security Sewage Equip. Co. v.
Beebe, 5 Ohio Misc. 178,214 N.E.2d 853 (C.P. 1965).
229 OHfO REV. CODE ANN. § 1547.61 (Page Supp. 1970).
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cut considering the prominence given to the tax question. Moreover, the
court presented no analysis of preemption as a distinct theory nor did it sug-
gest the boundaries of the area to which it might be applied. Intertwined
as well was the express statutory denial of municipal regulation, the valid-
ity of which the court dearly refused to consider in a more recent deci-
sion.m° But since this aspect of the case raises an independent, though
related problem, it is better treated separately as a consideration that goes
to the heart of the Painesville case.
VII. Is AN "EXCLUSION" OF MUNICIPAL POwER A "GNERAL
LAw" 'IWrN THE MEANING OF HOME RULE PROVISIONS?
A. General Laws
1. Judicial Development
The supreme court's early adoption of the "head-on" collision -311 ap-
proach as the basic interpretation of the "no conflict" provision of the
municipal Home Rule grant and its relatively steadfast adherence to this
approach through the years has represented a fundamental friendliness to
Home Rule.232 No doubt, the approach stemmed from early enthusiasm
shown both on and off the bench for municipal autonomy at the time of
the adoption of the Home Rule amendments and in succeeding yearsY33
This enthusiasm was evidenced by the desire not only to free municipal-
ities from addressing the General Assembly of the state as their source of
power, but also to free them as much as possible from state supervision
or restriction in the exercise of power234  As previously noted, =  concern
was expressed on the court in early Home Rule decisions over giving a
broad scope to the concept of local self-government, "311 soon found avail-
able to all municipalities,2 37 in order that exclusive municipal power might
be established in a wide area of activities. Although response to the need
230 Anderson v. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 2d 53, 233 N.E.2d 584 (1968). Similar statutory pro-
visions are involved in several cases as previously indicated.
2 3 1 Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
232 Note, Validity of Municipal Ordinances Prescribing Penalties Greater than State Laws,
20 U. CiN. L. REv. 400, 406 (1951). The court has also found conflict by implication, that
is, an implication of permission is derived from a prohibition, which is to be distinguished from
the broader and therefore more significant implied preemption of a regulatory field, Neil House
Hotel Co. v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944), and conflict between a statu-
tory felony and an ordinance creating a misdemeanor, Cleveland v. Berts, 163 Ohio St. 386,
154 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
2 33 
roelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919); Billings v. Cleveland Ry.,
92 Ohio St. 478, 111 N.. 155 (1915); Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio Sr. 338, 103 N.E.
512 (1913).
234 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 348, 103 N.E. 512, 515 (1913).
23 5 See note 183 supra.
230 Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919); Billings v. Cleveland
Ry., 92 Ohio St. 478, 111 N.E. 155 (1915).
2 37 Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
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for state regulation was forthcoming through the development of the police
regulation aspect of Home Rule_ 8 and accompanying "no conflict" re-
straint, it was treated as a clear defeat by the uncompromising Home Rule
enthusiast."s
It is no wonder then that preemption did not gain a foothold as the
preferred doctrine, for it is premised on the power to deny or to restrict
and is, therefore, essentially a negation of Home Rule. The power to
deny can be exercised either expressly or impliedly. In dealing with pre.
emption in the previous section, major emphasis was placed on implied
denial. If the power to deny impliedly is rejected, can express denial be
sustained? Express denial, at least, greatly lessens the courts' difficult task
of discovering an oftentimes nebulous legislative intent. But if the basic
power to deny is rejected it should make no real difference whether it is
attempted expressly or impliedly. It is to this conclusion that the courts
have come through an interpretation of what is meant by the "general
laws" with which a municipality may not constitutionally conflict.
From the earliest cases,240 even though at times in dictum, 41 the Su-
preme Court of Ohio has formulated a clear and simple definition of a
"general law." It is a law enacted by the General Assembly212 or promul-
gated under its authority24 3 having uniform application throughout the
state,244 which evidences the state's concern for its citizens by providing
them with rules of conduct.24" 5 It is not an exercise of the state's constitu-
tional power to provide for the governance of municipal corporations, "
absent charter,2 47 for it is not one which purports to grant, limit,218 or deny
238Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918).
2id. at 387, 121 N.E. at 709 (Wanamaker J., dissenting).
240 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
241 Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929); Grcenburg v. Clove.
land, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 NE 829 (1918); Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E.
114 (1917).
24 2 But not all so enacted, despite the failure to qualify the statement in the syllabus that a
law passed by the General Assembly is a "general law," State ex rcl. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio
St 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944). See also, Note, Regulation of Door to Door Solicitation by
Enactment of a Green River Ordinance: Application and Validity in Oh Jo, 32 U. CAN. L. RIEV.
92 (1963). However, common law principles do not qualify, Leis v. Cleveland Ry., 101 Ohio
St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920).
243 Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 NE.2d 665 (1944).
244 Leis v. Cleveland Ry., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920).
24 5 Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929).
246 West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
247 Substantive rules, Leavers v. Canton, 1 Ohio St. 2d 33, 203 N.E.2d 354 (1964), or proce-
dural rules, Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447, 123 N.E.2d 419 (1954).
248 The words "general laws" as set forth in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Ohio
Constitution means statutes setting forth police, sanitary or similar regulations and not
statutes which purport only to grant or to limit the legislative powers of a municipal
corporation to adopt or enforce police, sanitary or other similar regulations.
West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, syllabus para. 3, 205 N1.2d 382 (1965).
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municipal power.249  A general law is simply the state's exercise of its
police power upon its citizens without reference to any of its subdivisions.24
The mosaic pattern of the application of these principles through the
years does not present a completely accurate reflection either of this defini-
ion or of the concern underlying it.2 1 This is no doubt due to a combina -
tion of causes. The supreme court has not often spoken directly to the
issue; pre-Home Rule statutes expressed in municipal power terms still
abound;252 the legislature is prone to speak authoritatively when dealing
with municipal corporations, 0 3 regardless of whether it is setting rules of
governmentas4 or of police; and lower courts are naturally reluctant to
look behind explicit legislative pronouncements. Moreover, the Home
Rule concept and the enthusiasm for it waxes and wanes oftentimes in
inverse relationship to the pressing nature of the need for legislative ac-
tion. Even so, the several supreme court pronouncements do go a long
way in directly settling the law in a number of areas and in setting straight
previously divergent lower court views or even at times devitalizing sub-
sequent ones.
Statutes directly denying municipal authority have been disapproved, -2 "
as have those which purport to grant authority to municipalities with ex-
press limits25 16 or exceptions-57 or are daimed to imply limits. = s  Statutes
249 Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929); Greenburg v. Cleve-
land, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918); Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 48, 113 N.E.
114 (1917).
250 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
251 See generally Vaubel, Municipal Corporations and the Police Poucr in Ohio, 29 OHIO
ST. LJ. 29, 62-81 (1968).
252The Municipal Code of 1902, 96 OmIo LAws 20 (1902), now found in OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. Title 7, and particularly Chapter 715, still awaits comprehensive revision.
2 5 3 E.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1547.61 (Page Supp. 1970), 3733.07 (Page 1971).
254 E.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 143.27 (Page 1969).
255 "Local authorities shall not regulate the speed of motor vehides by ordinance, by-law
or resolution .... The term 'local authorities,' as used herein, means all officers, boards, and
committees of counties, cities, villages or townships." OMo GEN. CODE § 6307, rcpeascd, 121
Omo LAWS 682, 684 § 2 (1945). Stated not to be a general law, Fremont v. Keating, 96
Ohio St. 468, 118 N- 114 (1917) (dictum).
256 -[Any municipal corporation may] ... make the violation of ordinances a misdemeanor,
and to provide for the punishment thereof by fine or imprisonment, or both, but such fine shall
not exceed five hundred dollars and such imprisonment shall not exceed six months." OHIO
GEN. CODE § 3628 now Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 715.67 (Page 1953). Stated not to bE a
general law, Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929) (dictum), in
agreement, Lorain v. Petralia, 8 Ohio L Abs. 159 (Lorain Mun. Ct. 1929) (as to charter
cities); Marko v. Youngstown, 6 Ohio L Abs. 477 (Ct. App. 1928), followcd, Mathews v.
Russell, 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E.2d 696 (1949); In re Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 94
N.E.2d 388 (1949); Kistler v. Warren, 58 Ohio App. 531, 16 N.E.2d 948 (1937); and Erme-
keil v. State, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 121 (Ct. App. 1930), rcv'g Brannon v. Wilmington, 31 Ohio App.
307, 165 N.E. 311, appeal dismissed, 119 Ohio St. 652, 166 N.E. 199 (1928), and refuting
the assumption of validity in Magris v. Canton, 22 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 312 (C.P. 1919), and,
In re Sherlock, 19 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 302 (C.P. 1916).
Punishment of breaches of peace. Such punishment may be by imposing and col-
lecting fines, or by imprisonment in the proper jail or workhouse at hard lahor, or
both, at the discretion of the court, but no perron shall be fined for a single offense
19721
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which merely prohibit conflicting municipal regulations are susceptible
to a constitutionally sound, "no-conflict" interpretation.2"a Statutes, even
though directed at a municipality, have been held valid when their dom-
to exceed fifty dollars. Such imprisonment and hard labor shall nor, for the first of-
fense, exceed thirty days, for the second offense, ninety day., for the third offense
six months, and for the fourth or any further repetition ol the offense, one year.
OHIo G, . CODE § 3665 now OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 715.56 (Page 1953). Held not to
be a general law, Leipsic v. Folk, 38 Ohio App. 177, 176 N.E. 95 (1931). Contra, Morris v.
Conneaur, 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 289 (C.P. 1917). Note, however, that a limit upon penalty to
be imposed upon females contained in 01o GEN. CODE § 2148-7, repealcd, 120 OHIO LAWS
329, § 2 (1943), was construed in Lewis v. Columbus, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 213 (C.P. 1924),
as a matter exclusively within legislative competence, under its authority over courts, State ex rc,
Kudrick v. Meredith, 24 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 120 (C.P. 1922), as ruled generally in State ex rel,
Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St. 468, 147 N.E. 647 (1925).
2
-7 Any municipal corporation may license... hawkers, peddlers ... hucksters In the
public streets .... No municipal corporation may require of the owner of any product
of his own raising, or the manufacturer of any article manufactured by him, a license
to vend or sell... any such article or product.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 715.63 (Page 1953).
"Any municipal corporation may license transient dealers .... This section does not apply
to persons selling by sample only, nor to any agricultural articles or products offered or exposed
for sale by the producer." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.64 (Page 1953). Both §§ 715.63
and 715.64 were held not to be general laws in West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d
113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965). Prior lower court decisions treated these or predecessor sections
as having a limiting effect upon municipal regulation of peddlers, Wooster v. Gentile, 116
Ohio App. 386, 188 N.E.2d 172 (1962); Frecker v. Dayton, 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.132d 419
(1949), affd, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851 (1950); North College Hill v. Woebkenberg,
59 Ohio App. 458, 18 N.E.2d 614 (1938); Nickles v. Echelberger, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 679, 31
N.E.2d 474 (Ct. App. 1935); Washington v. Thompson, 80 Ohi, L. Abs. 598, 160 N.E.2d
568 (C.P. 1949); Schul v. King, 35 Ohio Op. 238, 70 N.E.2d 378 (C.P. 1946); Frecker v. Zanes-
ville, 35 Ohio Op. 234, 72 N.E.2d 477 (C.P. 1946); or assumed them to have such limiting
effect, Ravenna v. Ivec, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 202, 202 N.E.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1963); Defiance v.
Nagel, 108 Ohio App. 119, 159 N.E.2d 791 (1959); Mogadore v. Coe, 93 Ohio L. Abs. 449,
197 N.E.2d 570 (C.P. 1963); See generally Note, Regulation of Door to Door Solicitation by
Enactment of a Green River Ordinance: Application and Validity in Ohio, 32 U. CIN. L. RlV.
92 (1963).
25s OHIO GEN CODE § 6064-22 now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4301.22 (Page Supp.
1970), Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E.2d 279 (1939); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 715.55 (Page 1953), Akron v. Criner, 112 Ohio App. 191, 175 N.E.2d 746 (1960); OHIO
GEN. CODE §§ 3657-76 (1938) now Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 715.48-.64 (Page 1953, Supp,
1970), Columbus Legal Amusement Ass'n v. Columbus, 50 Ohio I. Abs. 353, 79 N.E.2d 915
(Ct. App. 1947). Copftra, Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Evandale, 54 Ohio Op. 354,
124 N.E.2d 189 (C.P. 1954).
259 'The provisions of section twelve thousand six hundred and three shall not be dimin-
ished, restricted or prohibited by an ordinance, rule or regulation of a municipality or other
public authority." OHIO GEN. CODE § 12608, repealed, 119 OHIo LAws 766, 805 § 112
(1941). This section has been found not to be violated, Reed v. Hensel, 26 Ohio App. 79,
159 N.E. 843 (1927) as reenforcing conflict by implication, Schneiderman v. Sesansteln, 121
Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929), and Eshner v. Lakewood, 121 Ohio St. 106, 166 N.E. 904
(1929), and applied without analysis, F.D. Lawrence Elec. Co. v. Enterprise Lumber Co., 28
Ohio App. 30, 162 N.E. 434 (1924). Insofar as it limited municipal power it was thought not
to have been a general law, Note, The Stating of the Police Potcte of Ohio Municipalilicy to
Enact Criminal Ordinances, 14 W. RES. L REV. 786 (1963). Schncidcrntan v,' Sesansitcin,
supra, suggests the prohibitory language implies an affirmative right with which a municipality
may not conflict, see textual discussion accompanying notes 312-19, infra.
Sections 4511.01 to 4511.78, inclusive, 4511.99 and 4513.01 to 4513.37, inclusive,
of the Revised Code shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all
political subdivisions and municipal corporations therein, and no local authority shall
enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with such sections.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.06 (Page 1953). This and a predecessor section were not
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inant nature as regulations of the public has been recognized." But there
remain lower court as well as supreme court cases in which questionable
laws of denial, limitation, and implied limitation have been assumed to
be valid.26 1 There are also holdings in which legislative authority to
mentioned in two conflict cases, Toledo v. Best, 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961),
appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 657 (1962) and Toledo v. Ransom, 84 Ohio L Abs. 12, 169 N.E.2d
657 (Toledo Mun. Ct. 1960), but have been applied on the basis of conflict, Dollar Savings &
Trust Co. v. Youngstown, 19 Ohio App. 2d 225, 250 N.E.2d 883 (1969), liberally in favor
of the ordinance, Cleveland v. Sado, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 61 N.E.2d 910 (Ct. App.), appcd
dismissed, 146 Ohio St. 126, 64 N.E.2d 322 (1945), and as providing constitutionally sound
basis for preemption, Columbus v. Glascock, 117 Ohio App. 63, 189 N.Y.2d 889, appcal dis-
missed, 174 Ohio St. 9, 185 N.E.2d 437 (1962), but in Hiram v. Conner, 85 Ohio L Abs.
161, 173 N.E.2d 408 (Ravenna Mun. Ct. 1960), as a statement of policy with which the mu-
nicipal corporation could not conflict under the Cleveland v. Bets, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d
917 (1958), rule. The Hiram v. Conner, supra, case also suggested that denial of authority in
this context is a definition of a crime and therefore distinguishable from Youngstown v. Evans,
121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929).
The public utilities commission of the state of Ohio is hereby vested with power and
authority to supervise and regulate each such motor transportation company in this state
... in all other matters affecting the relationship between such companies and the
public to the exclusion of all local authorities in this state, except as hereinafter other-
wise provided. The commission, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it
by this chapter, shall have the power.., to prescribe rules ... notwithstanding the
provisions of any ordinance... or permit enacted ... or granted by any incorporated
city or village... and in case of conflict between any such ordinance... or permit ...
the order, rule or regulation of the public utilities commission shall, in each instance
prevail; provided that such local subdivisions may make reasonable local police regu-
lations within their respective boundaries not inconsistent with the provisions of this
chapter ....
OHIo GEN. CODE § 614-86 now O-IO REV. CODE ANN. § 4921.04 (Page 1953). In Lorain
Street R.R. v. Public Util. Common, 113 Ohio St. 68, 148 N.E. 577 (1925), the court -ought to
avoid conflict between municipal powers and those of the commission, but on the same day lan-
guage suggesting that this statute was the source of municipal power over motor transport com-
panies was used in Nelsonville v. Ramsey, 113 Ohio St. 217, 148 N.E. 694 (1925). The provi-
sions of 107 OHno LAws 69, 140 (1917), OH-O GEN. CODE § 7250, repealed, 110 01O LAwS
319, 322 (1923), "weights of loads ... shall not be decreased or prohibited by any ordinance
... of a municipal corporation .... "was not found determinative in the local self-government de-
cision of Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919), a result apparently
questioned by the court in the relatively recent case of Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Fairport,
172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961). Prohibition against contrary municipal regulation
was found not to be violated since the ordinance did not entirely prohibit state permitted use
in Patric v. New Carlisle, 31 Ohio Dec. 65 (C.P. 1919), OHIO GEN. CODE § 13421-12 now
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5589.08 (Page 1970). For a more full treatment of these conflict-
type statutes, See Vaubel, supra note 251, at 70-75.
200 Dayton v. Adams, 9 Ohio Sr. 2d 89, 223 N.E.2d 822 (1967); Englewood v. Bettis, 15
Ohio L. Abs. 8 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 127 Ohio St. 504, 189 N.E. 4 (1933).
201 Statutory bars against further municipal corporation license fees were not found to be
directly applicable in the following cases: Conrad v. Lengel, 110 Ohio St. 532, 114 N.E. 278
(1924), Omo GEN. CODE § 6351, repealed, 124 Omo LAWS 53, § 1 (1951), construed
not to prevent additional licenses; Globe Security & Loan Co. v. Carrel, 106 Ohio St. 43, 138
N.E. 364 (1922) aff'g sub nom. Welfare Loan Co. v. Carrel, 32 Ohio Ct. App. 65 (1921),
OHIO GEN. CODE § 6346-2, repealed, 120 OHIO LAWS 75, 88 § 21 (1943), municipal tax. Limits
on statutory authorized municipal speed limits for railroad cars contained in OMo REV.
CODE ANN. § 723A8 (Page 1953) and predecessor section, have been used as an indicator of
what constitutes a reasonable municipal regulation in the following cases: Baltimore & O.R.R.
v. DeLeone, 289 F. 201 (6th Cir. 1923); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Grambo, 103 Ohio St.
471, 134 N.E. 648 (1921); Bender v. New York Cent. R.R., 3 Ohio App. 2d 150, 209 N".E.2d
589 (1963); Banks v. Baltimore & O.R.., 76 Ohio L Abs. 83, 145 N.E.2d 350 (C.P. 1957),
and provision in this statute for collection of a civil penalty was assumed in dictum to prevent
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"withdraw" municipal power has been asserted. These can in general
be distinguished, as indicated before,2"2 on the ground that the court was
not concerned with the precise nature of the power relationship between
the state and municipalities2 3 or because they deal with matters not en-
compassed within municipal Home Rule.20 4
2. Significance of the General Law Concept
With the development of judicial interpretation of the term "general
laws," a sometimes faltering but still protective line has been drawn around
municipal autonomy. This line has been drawn at a cost-a cost which
can be characterized as Ohio "abhors a vacuum." 20  The state may not
deny municipal power; it cannot exclude the municipality; and it cannot
insure that an area will be free from regulation or further regulation. All
it can do is regulate and thereby prevent a municipality from enacting "con-
flicting" or contradicting regulations. This is clearly a limitation, although
just how serious a limitation is open to question.
After nearly 60 years of municipal Home Rule in Ohio a debate over
the merits of each horn of the dilemma, municipal autonomy or a pos-
sible increase in the effectiveness of state authority, would appear aca-
demic. As has been seen, in that period of time the courts have deter-
mined what was intended by the writers of the Home Rule Amendments
and how in judicial wisdom the intent may be adapted to the needs of the
times. But of course this does not settle the matter, for discussion of the
merits of legal interpretations is always appropriate in law as a means of
bringing about change. Given the role of judicial review, it is entirely
possible that the court might well shift its position in the interpretation of
basic theory-a form of judicial legislation or, perhaps more accurately
here, a form of constitution making. It is for this reason that the decision
a municipality from imposing a criminal one, Toledo, C. & 0. River R.R. v. Miller, 108 Ohio
St. 388, 140 N.E. 617 (1923).
262 See textual discussion accompanying note 225 supra.
203 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940); Bucyrus
v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); Hickey v. Burke, 78 Ohio
App. 351, 69 N.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio St. 217, 70 N.E.2d 274 (1946); Bd, of
Health v. State ex rel. O'Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N.E. 215 (1931); Smith v. Mayfield
Heights, 48 Ohio Op. 443, 108 N.E.2d 861 (C.P. 1952).
26 4 Niehaus v. State ex rel. Bd. of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924). The
case may be considered as an interpretation of the state's exclusive power over education even
though the court put considerable emphasis upon the state's authority in the police power areA.
A court's willingness in Columbus v. Kraner, 111 Ohio App. 484, 169 N.E.2d 44 (1960), to
permit legislative limit of the municipal power to fix a statute of limitations, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1905.33 (Page Supp. 1970) and now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.06 (Page Supp,
1970), has been ascribed to the exclusive power of the state over its courts and their procedures,
Akron v. Smith, 14 Ohio St. 2d 247, 237 N.E.2d 396 (1968), which overturned the "no con-
flict" approach of Cincinnati v. Faig, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 449, 145 N.2d 563 (Cincinnati Mun.
Ct. 1957).




in Painesville takes on significance both for the legal scholar and the
practitioner. Has the court shifted its position or is it about to do so? If
it has or is going to shift its position, is the shift in response to a recognized
or recognizable need or perhaps only in reaction to a limited problem?
B. Painesville, a Departure?
Argument of counsel for Cleveland Electric Illuminating, presented
to the court in Painesville, followed traditional patterns. It was not
claimed that the state could, in enacting § 4905.65 "forbid the exercise of
local police power nor direct the manner of its exercise." " " Rather it
was claimed that the failure to have phrased the statute affirmatively, i.e.,
that a public utility could construct transmission lines meeting certain
standards, should not be fatal to its being held a "general law."2cT This
position was countered by argument of counsel for the City of Paines-
ville that § 4905.65 was a statute limiting municipal power and nothing
more--'it does not authorize electric companies to do anything...."283
Section 4905.65 is phrased in pertinent part:
(B) To the extent permitted by existing law a local regulation may rea-
sonably restrict the construction, location or use of a public utility facility,
unless.... Nothing in this section prohibits a political subdivision from
exercising any power which it may have to require, under reasonable regu-
lations not inconsistent with this section, a permit for any construction or
location of a public utility facility proposed by a public utility in such po-
litical subdivision.2 69
In addition, CEI contended, § 4905.65 "is a 'general' law because it
amends and becomes a part of other statutes which are unquestionably
.general laws.' "270 The City of Painesville turned the argument around.
Singling out § 4933.16, 271 as a utility regulation and therefore a "general
266 Brief for Appellee at 21.
2 657 Id. at 23.
268 Brief for Appellant at 6. It was also suggested by counsel for Painesville that the state
legislature can not make a determination of whether a municipal ordinance is rexonab!e
without usurping the judicial function. Brief for Appellant at 8. Although such a determina-
tion cannot be conclusive, it would ordinarily be sustained since courts will defer to legislativejudgment if there is a rational basis for it. A determination of this nature would rahe a ques-
tion of legislative definition of municipal power. Such a definition would plate ultimate
power in the legislature instead of the constitution. Specifically a determination of reatanable-
ness as applicable to future ordinances would be an encroachment on municipal power to
make such a judgment. Then too, in an area where there can be a difference of opinion and
the legislative expression usually prevails, it might be difficult to say which legislative judg-
ment, that the General Assembly or of the council, would be the more accurate, consequently,
a curtailment of council's power to judge would likely result at times in an actual curtailment
in its regulatory power. Cf.Vaubel,supra note 251, at 70 n.171.
269 O O EV. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page Supp. 1970).
270 Brief for Appellee at 25.
2 71 OsO REV. CODE ANN. (Page 1953).
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law," it reasoned that § 4905.65 does not modify the former statute since
the latter is dearly a power modification provision."'
1. The Power to Exclude
a. Opinion of the Court
The supreme court in Painesville began its analysis by emphasizing the
statewide significance of the problem presented in the facts and went on
to conclude:
[I]t is in the paramount interest of the state to provide general laws regu-
lating the intrastate transmission of such current and to see that such trans-
mission is not impeded by local regulation. Laws of general application
are therefore essential.
Section 4905.65, Revised Code, is such a law.273
It then phrased the effect of § 4905.65 as one which,
[p]laces in each political subdivision control over matters which relate
strictly to that subdivision but removes from absolute local control matters
which relate to intrastate and intercity transmission of high voltage elec-
tricity.274
At still another point the court stated:
In other words, section 4905.65, Revised Code, providing for the regu-
lation of the construction of high voltage electric Fower lines by local
subdivisions excludes from the control of such subdivisions intercity lines
constructed with regard to the proper safety standards which do not un-
reasonably affect the welfare of the general public.27
Putting aside for the present the significance of the court's determina-
tion that it was dealing with a matter of statewide concern, 70 the court's
language raises some doubt as to whether it was using "general laws" as
it had earlier defined the term. It at least seems evident that the court
was not analyzing § 4905.65 in terms previously used in determining the
effect of a "general law."
First, it would not seem that this section "removes from absolute local
control"27 high voltage transmission matters since these matters could
not be said to have ever been in absolute municipal control. Certainly,
in light of the history of Home Rule such regulations would be within
the police regulation rather than the local self-government portion of that
constitutional grant of power . 7  As such, any exercise of municipal control
272 Brief for Appellant at 5-6.
273 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 130, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (1968) (emphasis added).
2 74 Id. (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 131,239 N.E.2d at 79 (emphasis added).
276 Id. at 129, 239 N.E.2d at 78; see textual discussion accompanying notes 346-534, it Ira,
277 Id. at 130, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
278 State ex rel. Klapp v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 14, 225 N.E.2d
230 (1967); Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
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would not be free from all outside supervision but would rather be subject
to the limitation of "no conflict" with general laws.'"
Next, should the court have meant that the statutory grant of such con-
trol was now being removed by § 4905.65, two objections might be raised.
One, the municipality is not dependent upon statutory grant for its author-
ity over utilities.28 Two, if it were, it would not seem plausible to char-
acterize such control as absolute when a municipality would then be de-
pendent upon state largess for conferral of the authority and consequently
would be subject to the state's limiting or removing it at any time.
Furthermore, was the court dealing with "general laws" in the tradition-
al sense? It did not reiterate that a "general law" is one which prescribes
rules of conduct for citizens and not just for municipal corporations. It
did use the term "general law" in connection with the need to regulate the
transmission of current,21 but then immediately coupled that statement
with one expressing the need to see to it that state regulations are not
"impeded" by local ones.2 8' As a consequence, the court's subsequent des-
ignation of § 4905.65, as a law of "general application -"2 3 is ambiguous
since it cannot readily be determined whether the court was characterizing
this section as regulatory of utilities or one directed at possible local gov-
ernment impediments.
Finally, the court's characterization of state authority raises further
problems. It spoke of § 4905.65 as being an effort by the state legislature
to "exclude" high voltage lines from local control.8- This would suggest
that the very "vacuum" regretfully thought that the state was incapable
of creating 85 is now within its panoply of powers. In fact, as contended
by counsel for Painesville, 88 that is the effect of § 4905.65. Its provisions
do "exclude" a municipality from regulating while they exert no state
compulsion against utilities to abide by any specific standards. This is not
the effect of a "general law.' 28 7  The court was forced to face misgiving
at this point from one of its own members. The late Chief Justice Taft
in a concurring opinion s8 expressed displeasureF89 over this portion of the
court's opinion as not being consistent with the court's previous holdings,
27 Omo CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 3; Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519
(1923).
280 Cleveland TeL Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.. 701 (1918).
281 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 130,239 N.E2d 75, 78 (1968).
282 Id.
28314d.
284Id. at 131, 239 N.E.2d at 79.
285 See F. icnmu.tx & T. SANDA.OW, supra note 265, at 374.
286 Brief for Appellant at 8-9.
287 West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965); Youngstown
v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342,168 N.E. 844 (1929).
288 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 132,239 N.E.2d 75, 79 (1968).
289 Id. at 132-33, 239 N.-2d at 80.
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including that of West Jefferson v. Robinson,290 in which the Chief Jus-
,tice had recently and comprehensively treated the subject of "general
laws."
b. Recent trend?
Before concluding that the court's opinion is inconsistent with prece-
dent and therefore perhaps suggestive of a new approach, thought must
'be given both to a recurring style of legislative drafting and to judicial
reaction to it. Although by no means new,291 it would seem that the leg-
islature is resorting more of late to provisions prohibiting municipal li-
censing." 2 In previously noted cases the courts have, when not crucial
to the outcome and without discussion, assumed these earlier statutes to be
valid.2 3  In another instance an appellate court has interpreted statu-
'tory provisions in a way that avoided the creation of a conflict. "0
More recently in State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 0 5 the supreme court,
at least in the syllabus to the case, seems to have given its blessing to a
statutory limit on the regulatory power of a municipality. This is at best
a misleading result, since the court in its opinion could well be inter-
preted as concluding that a tax and not a regulation was really involved.""
Moreover, if there were a regulatory basis for the decision it could have
been intended to be limited to a situation in which a matter of "state-
wide concern" was found,"0 7 the significance of which will be discussed
later.2 8 An appellate court in Noland v. Sharonville,00 partly in reliance
upon State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, °0  found such prohibitory language
valid in a statute dealing with trailer regulation." It made no reference
to finding a matter of "statewide concern," although health considera-
200 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
201 E.g., 91 OHIo LAWs 370 (1894), OHIO GEN. CODE §} 6351, repealed, 124 OHIO
LAws 53, § 1 (1951); 106 OHIO LAws 281 (1915), OHIO GEN. CODE § 6346-2, repealed, 120
OHIo LAWS 75, 88, § 21 (1943).
202LE.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1547.61 (Page Supp. 1970), 3733.07 (Page 1971);
also observed as a legislative tendency in Duffey, Non-Chartcr Alunicipalities: Local S0l1.
Government, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 304, 313 n.30, 326 (1960).
2 93 Conrad v. Lengel, 110 Ohio St. 532, 144 N.E. 278 (1924), OHIO GEN. CODE § 6351,
repealed, 124 OIo LAwS 53, § 1 (1951), construed not to prevent additional licenses; Globe
Security & Loan Co. v. Carrel, 106 Ohio St. 43, 138 N.E. 364 (1922), affg, sub. nora. \Velfare
Loan Co. v. Carrel, 32 Ohio App. 65 (1921); OHIO GEN. CODE § 6346-2, repealed, 120 OHIO
LAWS 75, 88 § 21 (1943), municipal tax.
214 Klein v. Cincinnati, 33 Ohio App. 137, 168 N.E. 549 (1929), 110 OHIO LAWS 221
(1923), OHIO GEN. CODE § 614-97, repealed, 120 OHIO LAWS 142 (1943).
295 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S, 35 (1962).
296 Id. at 195, 181 N.E.2d at 30.
207 Id. at 192-93, 194, 181 N.E.2d at 28-29.
98 See textual discussion accompanying note 489, infra.
290 4 Ohio App. 2d 7,211 N.E.2d 90 (1964).
300 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962).
301 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.07 (Page Supp. 1971).
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tions were involved."' Yet at the same time this court did not divorce
itself from either the taxL-30 3 or "no conflict"304 approaches. The supreme
court,305 when presented with the same statutory provision, chose not to
resolve the difficulty but rather to rest its decision on the traditional
"head-on collision" approach 306 of conflict between two licensing require-
ments. 0 7 It is difficult to state that these developments of the recent past
with respect to the "general law" concept formed a firm basis for the
Painesville result, any more than it can be said that the Painesville de-
cision has lent clarity to a situation which must be described as rapidly be-
coming confusing.308
2. Affirmative from a Negative
In regard to the contentions of counsel it will be recalled that no daim
was made by CEI in favor of a state denial power.02 Rather, it was as-
serted that § 4905.65 should be treated as if it affirmatively stated a util-
ity's right to construct power lines meeting standards.3Y0 This interpreta-
tion would shift the statute from a measure ostensibly regulating munid-
pal corporations, as claimed by Painesville,"' to one regulating utilities
and would therefore put it on a "general law" basis. At least two prob-
lems arise from this approach, one interpretive and the other substantive.
a. Interpretation
If § 4905.65 expressed in the negative with respect to municipal power,
can be interpreted to have a positive meaning as to private rights, what is
3024 Ohio App. 2d 7, 10,211 N.E.2d 90,92 (1964).
303 Id. at 9, 211 N.E.2d at 92.
304 Id. at 8, 10, 211 N.B.2d at 91-92.
305 Anderson v. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 2d 53, 233 N.E.2d 584 (1968).
3 0 Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
3 0 7 Auxter v. Toledo, 173 Ohio St. 444, 183 N.E.2d 920 (1962).
3 08 An additional point of possible strength in the Paincsvile opinion is the fact that, al-
though the court was faced with a statutory denial of municipal power, this was conditioned
upon the finding of precisely defined circumstances:
(B) To the extent permitted by existing law a local regulation may reasonably re-
strict.. unless the public utility facility;
(1) Is necessary for the service, convenience, or welfare of the public served by the
public utility in one or more political subdivisions other than the political subdivi-
sioa adopting the local regulation; and
(2) Is to be constructed in accordance with generally accepted safety standards; and
(3) Does not unreasonably affect the welfare of the general public ....
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page Supp. 1970). It might be contended that the more
detailed the statutory conditions to the denial of power the less discernible is the difference ibe-
tween a denial and a regulation of an individual, Vaubel, supra note 251, at 72 n.178. Yet,
this really only goes to the attractiveness of the case, since the basic issue remains whether the
statute is state preclusion or regulation.
300 Brief for Appellee at 21.
alo Id. at 23.
311 Brief for Appellant at 6.
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to prevent similar statutes from being treated in the same manner? And
if this interpretation is accepted, what happens to the distinction between
"general laws" and those thought to regulate municipal corporations?
What happens to the constitutional nature of the grant of police power to
municipalities or to the significance of the relatively narrow interpretation
given the constitutional term "no conflict"? Is the problem and its at-
tendant constitutional theories reducible to one of expression? Unfor-
tunately, as problems become more attenuated "nice distinctions" must
be drawn in law. To turn a negative into a positive may appear to be a
simple exercise in semantics but more than semantics is at stake.
A plea for such transformation is the very argument presented and
accepted by the court in Schneiderman v. Sesanstein.8 "1  The relatively
mild language of § 12608 of the General Code 13 was thought not to
deny municipal power but to confer a positive right on motorists to travel
at nonprohibited rates of speed.31 4  However, this interpretation was of-
fered by the Schneidetinan court largely as a conclusion supporting one
which was based on an expanded view of "no conflict." 316 The court found
"conflict" to include "conflict by implication," i.e., the statutory prohibition
of conduct implies an affirmative permission to do that which is not pro-
hibited. 1' This interpretation of legislative intent was then thought to be
reinforced by the accompanying limitation on municipal action of § 12608,
General Code. Although this approach expands the area of possible
state-municipal conflict beyond that of the "head-on collision," a conflict
between state and local regulations remains necessary before a municipal
regulation will fail. A simple denial of power still will not suffice. How-
ever, the dangers to be discerned in an increased area of conflict are lim-
ited, since a finding of conflict by implication has not been widely ap-
plied, 17 and in fact the theory seems to be considered, somewhat surpris-
ingly by the courts as part of the more restrictive "head-on collision"
test. 81
On the other hand § 4905.65 could not be regarded as supporting an
implied permission derived from prohibitions directed at electric com.
312 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
313 "The provisions of section twelve thousand six hundred and three shall not be dimin.
ished, restricted or prohibited by an ordinance, rule or regulation of a municipality or other
public authority." Orno GEM. CODE § 12608, repealed, 119 O01O LAWs 766, 805 § 112
(1941).
314 Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 90, 167 N.E. 158, 161 (1929).
316 Id. at 86, 167 N.E. at 160.
316 Id., although it has been suggested, not a "necessary" implication, Duffey, Non-Cbarier
Municipalities: Local Self-Government, 21 OHIo ST. LJ. 304, 328 n.65 (1960).
3 1 7 Vaubel, supra note 251, at 54.
318E.g., Cleveland v. Raffa, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 235 N.E.2d 138 (1968), the court at tie
same time refused to equate the related doctrine of preemption with that of "conflict by implica-
tion." See also Note, Municipal Control of Liquor in Ohio, 12 W. RES. L. Ruv. 377 (1961).
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panies, since it is not linked to any prohibitions. Nor would it be appro-
priate to use this section to derive an implied permission to support what
might be contended are statutory grants of rights, or express permissions
contained in §§ 4931.01, 4933.13, 4933.14, and 4933.16 of the Revised
Code. To treat § 4905.65 as an expansion of rights would transcend a
supportive role by using it to tread the dangerous area of creating private
rights through express restrictions on municipal power. The particular
interpretive problem raised by a claimed expansion of a right limited
by a municipal power of consent and arguably present in the interrelation-
ship of § 4905.65 with other sections of the code, will be considered
later.
Although muted by time, the decision in Schneiderman still remains a
threat to municipal autonomy, despite the use of the relatively mild lan-
guage of § 12608 of the General Code to support a "no conflict" conclu-
sion, since it would probably be difficult to limit the effect of the decision
to these circumstances. 19 This risk is apparent whether the denial of local
power appears without a regulatory statute, in a statute separated from a
regulatory one, or even in the same statute as the regulation.
Efforts to give effect to intended municipal autonomy and to give a
natural meaning to the "no conflict" words themselves have led courts to
an interpretation which prevents a state denial of municipal power. Safe-
guarding local autonomy and the logic that only the people can alter a
constitutional grant have led to a judicial definition of "general laws"
consistent with this "no denial" aspect of the "no conflict" concept. The
consideration underlying both of these concepts would be destroyed if a
denial power were found, whether in a shift in the meaning of "general
laws" itself or in the distortion of the meaning of "no conflict."
b. Grant as a Regulation
An even more fundamental substantive problem demands considera-
tion even though it too calls for making nice distinctions. Does an af-
firmative grant of permission amount to a "regulation" in the sense of a
"general law" regulatory of private individuals?
It would seem that to be truly regulatory a measure should have a
negative effect on the entity regulated. If permission is an implication
3 19 Fordham and Asher, Home Rule in Thcory and Practice, 9 OtIo ST. Lj. 18, 54
(1948). Cf. Hiram v. Conner, 85 Ohio L Abs. 161, 173 N.E.2d 408 (Ravenna Mun. Ct.
1960). Approval of OHto GEN. CODE § 12608, supra note 313, as a statutory determination of
the evident fact that local interests are not involved in traffic regulations which is linked with
the general law provision of OHIo GEN. CODE § 12603 has been expressed but, at the same
time, the expansion of "head-on collision" conflict by the addition of "conflict by implication"
was disapproved. Hitchock, Ohio Ordinances in Conflict with Gencral Las, 16 U. CIN. L RE-v.
1, 27-31 (1942). Yet, state superiority was admittedly attained, and the need to resort to either
of these approaches was removed, by a simple change in the language of § 12603. 113 Onto
LAws 283 (1929), OnIo GE . CODE (1938). This section has since been replaced by OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.21 (Page Supp. 1970).
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from a municipal power denial statute it should rail as a "general law"
for the reasons just proposed. If a measure is expressly permissive where no
permission was needed (that is, an individual could have acted anyway),
it is difficult to consider it as a regulation. Moreover, if considered a
regulation, the measure would look suspiciously like an affirmative denial
of municipal power. If a measure is permissive where permission is
needed (that is, it removes in part an otherwise existing prohibition or
lack of power) it can readily be considered regulatory. In that case to
exceed the permission is to risk a penalty320 or a determination of a lack
of power.32' Therein is a negative effect. It is here that the courts apply
that portion of the "head-on collision" test, which defines a state-local
conflict as a municipality forbidding what the state "permits."
What are the consequences of a utility constructing a transmission line
within a municipality without meeting the standards stated in § 4905.65?
As a result of that statute-nothing. No transgression is identified, no
penalty is provided. Taken alone then, a statute such as § 4905.65 would
seem to present more than a mere problem of negatives and affirma.
tives but one reaching the very nature of a regulation. Restrictive action
would result only if there were other state statutes or regulations which
would be violated or if the municipalities chose to exercise the power left
to them by § 4905.65 and in some way penalized substandard construc-
tion or unreasonable threats to their inhabitants. But municipality-
imposed penalties, dependent as they are on the individual judgments of
legislative bodies on a level of government different from the General
Assembly, could hardly make § 4905.65 a regulation within the meaning of
"general laws." On the other hand, companion state statutory regulations
might well change the result, which leads to the next argument presented
by counsel for CEI.
3. A "General Law" because it modifies "General Laws"
The second prong of CEI's argument is more persuasive than the first.
It, too, attempts to stay within the traditional interpretation of "generol
laws" and makes no claim for a state denial power. It is a simple sugges-
tion that § 4905.65 is a "general law" because it modifies and fits into a
pattern of "general laws." 2'  After all, § 4905.65 cannot be considered
in isolation. It has already been related to the needs of the industry and
of the community when the reasonableness of municipal regulation was
320 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.58 (Page 1965), 4301.99 (Page Supp, 1970);
OWO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4507.02, 4507.99 (Page Supp. 1970).
3217 FLETCHER, CYcLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRivATE CORPORATIONS §§ 3413, 3417,
3459 (1964), at least, in the case of contracts of private corporations, where fully executory on
both sides; Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 93 Ohio St. 428, 113 Nl. 402
(1916).
322 Brief for Appellee at 25. This assertion of relationship even though denied by Painecs




examined.3' Now it is appropriately considered in relationship with pre-
vious legislative enactments and the present state regulatory scheme.
Prior to 1886 a municipality did not have the power to grant to an elec-
tric company the right to use its streets. 24 In that year the state, the reser-
rvoir of all power at that time, granted this authority to municipalities in
the form of a statute which permitted electric companies the use of such
streets provided they first obtained the consent of the municipality. 25
Later, electric companies were tied to the statutory provisions of telegraph
companies,"' whose right to use municipal streets was thought to flow di-
rectly from the state 27 because a municipality did not possess the power
to deny use but could only have the manner of its exercise resolved in a
probate court 28 However, after nearly 10 years the earlier municipal con-
sent power to electric companies without intervention of the probate court
was reestablished.32  This state of affairs now exists in current statutes.O
The significant question is the nature of these statutes and therefore the
3 2 3 See textual discussion accompanying note 155 supra.
32 4 Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 93 Ohio St. 428, 438, 113 N.. 402,
404 (1916), aft'd, 251 U.S. 173 (1919).
325Id.; 83 Omo LAWS 143 (1886) now O1O REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.13 (Page 1953).
326 84 OMO LAWs 7 (1887) now OrIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4933.14, .16 (Page 1953).
3 2 7 Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 93 Ohio St. 428, 439, 113 N... 402,
405 (1916), aff'd, 251 U.S. 173 (1919); Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati, 7
Ohio Misc. 159, 215 N.E.2d 631 (P. Ct. 1964), in which it was held that telegraph company
provisions, Om-o REV. CODE ANN. § 4931.01 (Page 1953), applied to telephone companies
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4931.11 (Page 1953) and was a general law with which a municipal-
ity could not conflict.
3 2 8 Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & TeL Co., 64 Ohio St. 67, 80, 59 N.E. 781, 785 (1901).
32992 OmIo LAWs 204 (1896) now O-O REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953).
3 30 
"A telegraph company ... may construct telegraph lines upon and along any of the
public roads ... within this state, by the erection of the necessary fixtures.... Such lines shall be
constructed so as not to incommode the public in the use of the roads or highways...." OIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 4931.01 (Page 1953).
Except section 4931.08 of the Revised Code, [involving probate court settlement of dis-
putes] sections 4931.01 to 4931.23, inclusive, and 4933.13 to 4933.16, inclusive, of
the Revised Code, apply to companies organized for supplying public and private
buildings ... with electric light and power.... Except as provided by section 4931.03
of the Revised Code, every such company shall have the powers and be subject to the
restrictions prescribed for telegraph companies by sections 4931.01 to 4931.23, in-
clusive, of the Revised Code.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4933.14 (Page 1953).
A company organized for supplying electricity for power purposes, and for lighting
the streets ... may manufacture, [and] sell... electric light and power required in
such municipal corporation.... With the consent of the municipal corporation, un-
der such reasonable regulations as such municipal corporation prescribes, such com-
pany may construct lines . .. through the streets....
OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 4933.13 (Page 1953).
No person or company shall place... a line, [or] wire... to conduct electricity
for lighting... through a street... without the consent of such municipal corpora-
tion.... The penalty provided by section 4933.99 of the Revised Code for violation
of this section [a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dol-
lars] is cumulative to other means of enforcing this section open to the municipal
corporation....
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953).
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nature of the modifying provisions of § 4905.65. Do they create a state
conferred right in electric companies limited by municipal consent provi-
sions or do they confer power upon municipalities to grant rights to those
companies ?"3' Over 50 years ago the supreme court seemed to accept the
latter approach when it found that electric companies possessed less power
than telegraph companies and that the legislative intent to vest a munici-
'pality with the power to make grants to the electric companies seemed
clear. 32 Moreover, this approach received support in dictum as recently as
1953:
[Mlunicipalities have exdusive control over the rights and privileges
of electric, gas and water companies.
Municipalities not only have complete control in granting franchises to
electric, gas and water companies but have the power to regulate the rates
charged by such companies.as s
If this conclusion is accepted, then § 4905.65 in modifying this
statutory picture, does not modify "general laws" as claimed, but rather
modifies power statutes and is thus itself a power denial statute and not a
"general law." On the other hand, if in light of Home Rule the obsolete-
ness of the municipal-power-granting aspect of these electric company
statutes is emphasized, if the history of a creation-of-rights dimension to
these statutes is not forgotten, and if the regulatory features of § 4933.16
of the Revised Codel3 4 are not overlooked, a modifying statute, such as §
4905.65 could then be reasonably termed a "regulatory law" because it
would be amending private rights or regulatory measures and as a regula-
tory law it would be a "general law." Nor, in following this approach,
would the negative expression of § 4905.65 prevent giving it a right-ex-
panding meaning. It would not be necessary to jeopardize the "general
law" concept by broadly interpreting a negation or restraint of municipal
power as creating a private right, nor even by tolerantly considering such
31 Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 93 Ohio St. 428, 439, 113 N.E. 402,
405 (1916), afl'd, 251 U.S. 173 (1919).
332 Id. at 441, 113 NE. at 405. The phrase which helped reinforce the court's opinion,
"In order to subject such companies to municipal control alone," was omitted in the 1953 codi-
fication of OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.16 (Page 1953).
3 Cambridge v. Public Util. Comm'n, 159 Ohio SL 88, 96-97, 111 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1933).
At the same time the court in stressing municipal statutory power made no mention of any
Home Rule grant. The court in Walton Hills v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. 884,475
(Cuyahoga County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), aff'd, No. 30,869 (Ct. App. 1971), appeal dismLmcd,
No. 71-621, Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. Oct. 18, 1971), held that OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4933.13
(Page 1953), confers a franchise right on electric utilities with municipal consent. Id. at 8.
It also held municipal regulatory authority as to intercity transmirsion lines to be statutory and
not part of Home Rule. Id. at 10.
3 34 The penalty provision, supra note 330, was especially noted by counsel for Painesville.
Brief for Appellant at 5-6. The municipal power aspect of the predecessor of this section was
emphasized in Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 93 Ohio St. 428, 113 N.11.
402 (1916), aff'd, 251 U.S. 173 (1919), see textual discussion accompanying note 331 s1upra.
See also note 332 supra.
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provisions as impliedly expanding an existing private right. Rather, be-
cause it deals with a right limited by a municipal consent power, § 4905.65
could, as contended by CEI,335 be accepted on the narrow ground that in its
curtailment of municipal power it is expanding the right of public utilities
by the not unnatural method of reducing the limit placed upon it.
As will be recalled, it is with respect to the interrelationship of these
early statutes with the provisions of § 4905.65 that counsel for Painesville
presented a directly contradictory argument to that just offered. 3 0 Rather
than dispute that these early statutes dealing with electric companies and
municipal consent power are "general laws," Painesville conceded this
point. In fact, § 4933.16 was singled out because of its prohibitory provi-
sions as dearly being a state police regulation. But this fact instead of
suggesting, as it did to CEI, that § 4905.65 by modifying these "general
laws" was therefore also a "general law," serves to stress, according to
Painesville, the dissimilarity between these early statutes and the power
annulling provisions of § 4905.65 and forces the conclusion that this latter
section was not meant to be a modification of these earlier statutes. As an
'independent statute, then, § 4905.65 would fail to qualify as a "general
law."
On the other hand, support for a "right-expansion" approach to §
4905.65 is not limited to the argument of CEI's counsel. Chief Justice
Taft criticized the court in its conclusions with respect to "general laws"
and the power of the state "to exclude" municipal power while still con-
curring in the judgment of the court. The Chief Justice first noted the
broad grant of right 7 made applicable to electric companies, =3s the munic-
ipal consent statute, § 4933.16 as a "proviso" thereto, and the statutory
power of utilities to condemn land. 39 He then expressed his agreement
with that portion of the court's opinion in which § 4905.65 was treated as
an amendment to § 4933.16. 40 Thus it would seem that Chief Justice Taft
was adopting the argument that an affirmative statutory right in the utilities
had been created and that § 4905.65 properly constitutes an expansion of
this grant by restricting the limitation on it. Accepting § 4905.65 as a
modification of earlier statutes as found by the Court and urged by Chief
Justice Taft, then despite the weight to be accorded precedent that held
these earlier statutes to be municipal power provisions, the closeness of the
question between this interpretation and one which considers these provi-
sions to be a conferral of a limited electric company right makes a cate-
335 Brief for Appellee at 23.
33G Brief for Appellant at 5-6.
337 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4931.01 (Page 1953), supra note 330.
338 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.14 (Page 1953), supra note 330.
339 Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 4933.15 (Page Supp. 1970).
340 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 133,239 N.E.2d 75, 80 (1963).
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goric rejection of § 4905.65 as a regulatory law or a "general law" un-
tenable.
There remains, however, a consideration raised earlier. Even if §
4905.65 is treated as a modification of a grant of right to utilities, is such
a grant without expressed negative restrictions a "general law"? De.
spite the "niceness" of the question, taking the section alone, it might
well not be a "general law." But § 4905.65 is not to be taken alone
if it is considered as an expansion of a statutory righte l into an area
heretofore "off limits. '' 342  It then is regulatory. In addition, its provi-
sions fit into a general regulatory scheme of the state providing compre.
hensive safety construction standards for electric utilities to abide by.a4u
Consequently in this situation, a utility straying beyond the safety condi-
tions set in a permissive statute would not be free from state imposed
penalties . 44
4. Significance of the decision
a. Summary
Even though some support for a conclusion that § 4905.65 is a "general
law" on the particular facts of Painesville might be found on the basis of
the argument presented by CEI and the one apparently adopted by Chief
Justice Taft, this is not to say that this result is devoid of danger. A nega-
tive might with some misgivings be properly interpreted as an affirmative,
given the peculiar history of the statute to which § 4905.65 is related. An
affirmative grant can be treated as a regulation where restrictions for over-
stepping the permission are in fact present. Yet, where these qualifica-
tions are not made clear in a decision the case might well become precedent
for a broader rule of general state denial power--one much more injurious
to municipal autonomy. This is even more likely if the language used, as
is true in the majority opinion of Painesville, is actually inconsistent with
a "general laws" finding.
Painesville thus poses a distinct threat to municipal Home Rule because
of its apparent departure from the principles which have been developed
in relationship to the constitutional concept of "general laws." This is
more a departure than a shift of position, because the court failed to pre-
sent a basis for the abandonment of the old or the establishment of a new
341 OIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4931.01, 4933.13,4933.14 (Page 1953).
34 2 A municipal street can not be used by a public utility without authorization as a matter of
right, Columbus v. Public Util. Comm'n, 103 Ohio St. 79, 133 N.E. 800 (1921), and an electric
company is expressly prohibited from doing so by OHIO RnV. CODE ANN. 4933.16 (Page
1953).
343 Administrative Order No. 72 and Session Order No. 285, as amended, (1966), issued
under provisions of OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4963.40 (Page 1953), incorporating "Safety
Rules for Electric Supply and Communication Lines," Part 2 of National Electric Safet Code
(6th ed.), National Bureau of Standards Handbook H-81.
344 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4963.41 (Page 1953).
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position. Nor does it sketch, even in outline form, the dimensions of a
new theory.
b. Limitation
The Painesville decision did not present only a "general laws" issue.
Rather, the court relied heavily on its finding that a "matter of statewide
concern" was involved.24 In fact, it is upon this latter aspect of the case
that the major emphasis of the future is likely to be placed. Whatever
justification can ultimately be found for this decision will rest upon its
development, if any, of the doctrine of "statewide concern."
What then does the presence of a state interest suggest? Is it indica-
tive of a matter outside of municipal Home Rule over which the state has
complete control and, if so, how is this to be determined with adequate
safeguards to local autonomy? Or, if not, can "statewide concern" serve
to denote a limited theory of increased state authority rather than a gen-
eral power to deny municipal police power-an increase which, although
likely inconsistent with the theory of "general laws," might arguably be
justified by the state's need to meet broader and more complex problems in
the modern setting, particularly, if the power were exercised with restraint
as was done in § 4905.65?
If "statewide matter" is beyond municipal power, Painesville could be
a threat to local autonomy only if its facts did not justify finding a state
interest or if the concept of "statewide concern" itself has been developed
too expansively. If a theory of enhanced state power is intended, Paines-
ville need not be a complete reversal of previous concepts, nor need it
necessarily stand for the demise of Home Rule, given adequately drawn
limits. Rather, it could stand for a new accommodation of interests-for
a sort of intermediate theory. But since the drawing of such limits is
often no simple matter, much depends on whether Painesville's construc-
tion of a "statewide concern" framework does provide protective restraint
against an overexpansion of state power. Consideration of the significance
of this aspect of the Painesville decision necessitates an examination into
the judicial use of the term. What is the scope of "statewide concern"
and what are its merits within the structure of state-municipal relations
in Ohio?
VIII. To WHAT EXTENT DOES THE CONCEPT "STATEWIDE
CONCERN" SERVE AS A LImIT ON MUNICIPAL POWER?
With the adoption of Home Rule provisions in 1912, political power
was divided into three segments between the state and municipal levels of
government. First, exclusive state power remained in those areas where a
345 A finding that apparently did not impress Chief Justice Taft, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 132, 239
N.E.2d 75, 79 (1968) (concurring opinion).
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municipality was in no way affected or in which for various reasons state
dominance seemed required.34 Second, an area of exclusive municipal
power 47 was created by the Home Rule amendments insofar as local self-
government is exercisable 348 by charter municipalities 49  as well as in
acquiring and operating public utilities or contracting for their services50
Third, an area of mutual power-the promulgating of police regulations
-was established with points of friction in the enactments of the two levels
subject to resolution by the "no conflict" test. " 1 Given such a division
there is no place for a fourth category. Yet, the courts have made fre-
quent enough reference to matters of "statewide concern" to suggest
that some modification in these divisions of authority have been judicially
found or created, unless the term is used simply as another way of refer-
ring to an already existing division. Certainly, counsel for CEI strongly
urged the importance of a "statewide concern" theory in Painesville625 and
the majority opinion of the supreme court emphasized its presence.32 3
A. Statewide Concern-Judicial Development
1. Historical View
Viewed from a historical standpoint, it can readily be observed that
the principal initiating decision for a "statewide" concept was not rendered
until 1929, 3 4 seventeen years after the adoption of Home Rule. Conse-
quently, "statewide concern" is to be viewed as a part of the evolution of
Home Rule rather than as an early close companion of it. A noticeable
increase in judicial use of the term occurred in the 1940's and 1950's,355
only to be followed by decisions undercutting not the theory itself but
its applicability to specific subject matter. 50 Also, from the standpoint
346 State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929) (courts); State e.
rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St. 468, 147 N.E. 647 (1925); Niehaus v. State
exrel. Bd. of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924) (education).
347 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
3 48 Omo CoNsT. art. XVIIL § 3.
349 State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
3 5 Omo CONSr. art. XVIII, § 4; Interurban Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
98 Ohio St. 287, 120 N.E. 831 (1918).
35'OHIo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3; Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519
(1923).
352 Brief for Appellee at 25-33.
353 15 Ohio St. 2d at 129,239 N.E.2d at 78.
354 Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
355 E.g., State ex tel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944), overruled,
State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958); Cincinnati v. Gam-
ble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941); overruled, State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168
Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958); Sullivan v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 102 Ohio App. 269,
131 N.E.2d 611 (1956).
356 State ex rel Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958); State ex rel,
Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956), noted in 25 U. CIN, L, REIV.
378 (1956) and26 U. CN. L. REV. 412,415 (1957).
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of time, a current shift of approach may be developing based in no small
measure on Painesville itself 3 57
2. Nature of the Issue
The nature of the issue presented can be of importance to a court in
reaching a finding of "statewide concern" and in assessing the significance
of the determination. It is not uncommon for the term to appear when a
question of state, as distinguished from municipal, power is raised; but its
use in this context minimizes its effect on state-municipal relations. In
state power cases reliance has frequently been placed on "statewide con-
cern" in order to emphasize that the state has lost no sovereignty over the
subject by the establishment of Home Rule,35s that authority has not been
vested in a municipality "exclusively," 3 9 or that a municipality cannot
"hamper, '" 0 "throttle,"30' or "stop,"3 62 the state in the performance of its
functions. With these conclusions there can be no argument. Home
Rule is a grant of authority to municipalities and was not intended to be
a curtailment of state power. The state must of necessity function and
meet its general responsibilities to its citizens 363
3 57 See also State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26, appeal dis-
missed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962). On the other hand, the use of the term may simply be a coa-
firmation of acknowledged state power. Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39,
278 N.E.2d 658 (1972).
358 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940); Bucyrus v.
State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); State Rd. of Health v. Green-
ville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912); Taylor v. Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132, 93 N..2d
594 (1950); Hitchcock, Ohio Ordinances in Conflict itb General Laws, 16 U. CIN. L REV.
1, 49 (1942).
359 Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 NY..2d 658 (1972); State Cx Tel.
lMowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940); Bucyrus v. State Dept of Health,
120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio Sr. 1, 98
N.E. 1019 (1912).
360 State ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 157 N.E 330 (1927); Hickey v. Burke,
78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio Sr. 217, 70 N.Y.2d 274 (1946).
3 6 -Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923) (dissenting opinion).
3 a2l.akewood v. Thormyer, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 61, 154 N.E.2d 777 (C.P. 1958), afj'd, Ill
Ohio App. 403, 157 N.E.2d 431 (1959), af'd, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d (1960). Fur-
thermore, a municipality cannot "interfere" with the state, State ex rel. Taylor v. French, 96
Ohio St. 172, 117 N.E. 173 (1917), not "exclude" the state, State ex rel. Helsel v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (C.P. 1947), afr'd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78
N.E.2d 694, appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911 (1948), nor "encroach" oa a
state field of regulation, Baldwin v. Newark, 65 WEEKLY I.. BULL. 131 (Newark Mun. Cr.
1920).
363 Silvey v. Commissioners, 273 F. 202 (S.D. Ohio 1921) (creating conservancy districts);
State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 865 (1952) (constructing highways); State ex tel. Automatic Registering Mifzch. Co.
v. Green, 121 Ohio St. 301, 168 N.E. 131 (1929) (conducting state elections); State ex Me.
Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929) (maintenance of courts); Stare ex rel.
Cuyahoga Heights v. Zangerle, 103 Ohio Sr. 566, 134 N.E. 686 (1921); State ex rel. Taylor v.
French, 96 Ohio St. 172, 117 N.E. 173 (1917) (conducting state elections); Miami County v.
Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 110 N.E. 726 (1915) (creating conservancy districts); Bd. of Health
v. State ex rel. O"Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N.E. 215 (1931) (creating health districts);
Brook Park v. Cleveland, 26 Ohio Op. 536 (C.P. 1943), appeal dismissed, 143 Ohio St. 607,
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The emergence of municipal autonomy was not meant to tear down
state government. The only loss of authority by the state caused by Home
Rule was to be in the area of its dealings with the municipalities them-
selves. Here the state can no longer supervise the actions of a charter mu-
nicipality with regard to matters of local self-government"64 or in its ac-
quisition or operation of a public utility;" nor can it deny municipal
police power,3c6 the state can only supersede municipal regulation by the
exercise of its own power to the extent that municipal action is in conflict.'"'
But this does not limit the state's exercise of police power 68  In fact, in
the leading "statewide concern" case36 9 the court carefully noted that the
only loss of state power in the police area was stated in Section 3 of article
XVIII itself as occurring when the state failed to exercise its police power
by use of general laws.370 When the state does legislate this may sug-
gest a greater measure of state control than the "no conflict" theory per-
mits, but this statement certainly is sound in the stress it places upon the
fact that the state's police power stands unimpaired by the Home Rule
amendments. In the exercise of this retained state power, requirements
that municipalities contribute to the success of the state project have been
upheld. 71 But in these state power cases the use of "statewide concern"
usually does not relate to municipal authority at all, even though courts
have at times unnecessarily spoken of the "withdrawal" of municipal
power.37
2
56 N.E.2d 515 (1944) (resolving territorial divisions of local subdivisions); Fordham & Asher,
Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 31 (1948).
364 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913); State ex rel, Petit v.
Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
305 Interurban Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 98 Ohio St. 287, 120 N.E 831
(1918).
360 West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
367 Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
368 State ex rel. Brainard v. McConnaughey, 137 Ohio St. 431, 30 N.E.2d 699 (1940).
3G9 Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
370 Id. at 427, 166 N.E. at 370.
371 Contributions can be required of a municipality for the support of a state created munici-
pal health district, State ex rel. Cuyahoga Heights v. Zangerle, 103 Ohio St. 566, 134 N.E. 686(1921); Baldwin v. Newark, 65 WEEKLY L BULL. 131 (Newark Mun. Ct. 1920); and for a state
created local court, State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929). Rc-
quiring funds for a more efficient fire department was sustained in State ex rel. Strain v. Houston,
138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941), but questioned in State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168
Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958), after the department was no longer considered of "state-
wide concern."
372 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940); Bucyrus v.
State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); State Bd. of Health v. Green.
ville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912); Bd. of Health v. State ex rel. O'Wesney, 40 Ohio
App. 77, 178 N.E. 215 (1931). But "exclusive" state authority has been mentioned. Taylor v.
Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132, 93 N.E. 2d 594 (1950); Baldwin v. Newark, 65 WEEKLY L.
BULL. 131 (Newark Mun. Ct. 1920).
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3. Exclusive State Power
One of the possible uses for "statewide concern" involves the inter-
governmental power structure, that is, as a designation of matters which
are exclusively the concern of the state and beyond municipal compe-
tency. There are decisions of this nature in which expansive language
has been used, 73 including that of "statewide concern," when creating
courts and providing for their procedure.3 7 These decisions, in general,
rest on specific constitutional grants of power to the legislature and pose
no real threat to municipal autonomy. Another possible use for "state-
wide concern" involves the relationship between state and municipal power
more directly. The term might be used to identify that area of the police
power which is beyond municipal cognizance and within exclusive state
authority. Certainly this use would be appropriate, given the fact that
Home Rule is limited to "local" self-government and "local" police regu-
lations.37 It is in this manner that counsel for CEI urged the court apply
the termY76 However, there is little precedent for this approach. In one
case377 "statewide concern" was given an "exclusive state power" meaning
to exclude a municipality from territory detachment matters, while in two
other decisions exclusiveness was merely mentionedU8
Despite its theoretical soundness, an over-expansive finding of exclu-
sive state police power can result in an undue restriction of municipal
power over local interests. In one decision, where a finding of exclu-
sive state power would have represented a shift of traditional authority
away from the municipality,37 a "statewide concern" concept was not fully
3 73 OsO CONST. art. II, § 36, construed in Miami County v. Dayton, 92 Ohio Si 215, 110
N.E. 726 (1915) (creation of a conservancy district), accord, Silvey v. Comm'rs, 273 F.
202 (S.D. Ohio 1921); Omo CONSr. = I, § 7, art. VI, §§ 2, 3, construcd in Niehaus v. State
ex rel. Bd. of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924) (education in maintenance of
schools); Onto CoST. art. II, § 34, construed in Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49
N.E.2d 412 (1943) (regulation of hours of business). But sce Akron v. Klein, 171 Ohio St.
207, 168 N.E.2d 564 (1960). In earlier decisions mnusicipal power was found for the terting of
hours for municipal workers on public works, Strange v. Cleveland, 94 Ohio S. 377, 114 N.E.
261 (1916), and assumed for municipal employees in general. Staw cx rcd. Strain v. Houston,
138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941); Taylor v. Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132, 93 N.E2d
594 (1950). An order transferring pension funds of municipal police and firemen to the state
fund, Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 742.26 (Page Supp. 1970), was sustained as an employce wel-
fare measure under art. H, § 34 authority in State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Pension Fund v.
Bd. of Trustees of Relief Fund, 12 Ohio St. 2d 105, 233 N.E.2d 135 (1967).
374 E.g., State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 293 (1929).
3 75 Onto CONST. arm. XWIII, § 3. Sec Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory
and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. l.J. 18, 33 (1948).
376 Brief for Appellee at 25.
377 Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
378 Taylor v. Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132, 93 N.E.2d 594 (1950) (civil service); Baldwin
v. Newark, 65 WEEKLY L BULL. 131 (Newark Mun. C. 1920) (health). Both were essentially
state power cases since no competing municipal regulation was involved.
379 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio Sr. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941), orerruled by, State
ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio Sr. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958). The dissean's will-
ingness to permit a complete state takeover of a municipal function was not limited to a matter
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developed and the court quickly retreated from the suggestion of exclu-
siveness in subsequent cases.380
4. Independent Theory within Police Power
Is the significance of a finding of "statewide concern" limited merely to
the confirmation of areas as ones of exclusive state power and only at times
suggestive of an outer limit to municipal police power? Or does the con-
cept in effect establish a new and separate theory of state-municipal rela-
tions--one of expanded state power with a resulting curtailment rather
than elimination of municipal power for certainly "statewide concern"
does not suggest the expansion of municipal power into areas previously
controlled by the state? If "statewide concern" does fill this more complex
role it is most likely to be in that area of intergovernmental relations where
each level possesses authority. This is the area of police power. But this is
also the area to which the constitution provides the mediating test of "no
conflict,"381 a test reasonably firmly established in judicial interpretation.,,"
There appears to be no good reason to resort to the different terminology
of "statewide concern" to reach the same result of "no conflict" and even
less reason to use "statewide concern" as a vehicle for overturning this
result. To give an expanded state power meaning to "statewide concern"
within the outer limits of local police power could only serve, then, to
jeopardize the "no conflict" concept.383 To give it a meaning of exclusive
state power or of power to become exclusive, would constitute, as has
been seen, a denial of a constitutional grant and consequently of the "gen-
eral laws" concept which has been developed from it."'4
a. Dividing Lines-Subject Matter
But the theory of "statewide concern" is not offered by the courts as a
reordering of all state-municipal power interrelationships in the police
power area, but only those which are of "statewide" importance. So
limited, it might serve an intermediate role of meeting state interests more
fully while preserving municipal interests as much as possible. Unfor-
of "statewide concern" so it does not abide by "preemption" or "general law" doctrines nor did
it fit within the state's power to set rules of government for non-charter cities.
380 State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944); State ex rel,
Daly v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.X.2d 338 (1943); State ex "I. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138
Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941) . These were all overruled as to statewide findings. State
ex rel. Canadav. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).381 Omo CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 3.
382 See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
M83 Columbus v. Glascock, 117 Ohio App. 63, 189 N.E.2d 889, appeal dismisred, 174 Ohio
Sr. 9, 185 NXE.2d 437 (1962).
384 West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965). It would also
suffer from the rigidity which marks a constitutional distribution of power, Duffey, Non.Charier
Municipalities: Local Self-Government, 21 O1-81o ST. L.J. 304, 307 (1960), and would by broad
application take us back to pre-amendment days. Id. at 328 n.63.
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tunately this approach creates difficulties of its own, because the establish-
ment of a theoretical basis for differentiating between subjects of regulation
is likely to be artificial. 15 Moreover, the practicalities of applying such
an approach would be troublesome. It has already proved difficult for
the courts to define what is a matter of "local" self-governmente" and,
to some extent, what is an "exclusive" state area. To reinforce this as-
sertion, reference need only be made to the problems which linger from
finding street construction to be a matter of local self-government, s
while finding education 8 and the creation of courts and courtroom pro-
cedure to be matters which exclusively concern the state.3to
If "statewide concern" were to be given independent significance in
the police power area, determining what subject is "state" and what is
"local" would likely prove more difficult than even past delineations for the
very reason that such a division is unrealistic. Few subjects are dearly
all state or all local, even though as time passes more subjects may to an
imprecise degree become more state than local. If state and local interests
are in fact inseparable it would be sensible to permit both levels of gov-
ernment to regulate, while preserving a method of resolving points of
friction which furthers this objective. That method should not weigh
the scales too heavily in favor of the state as the superior level of govern-
ment, particularly in light of the municipal powers provision of article
XVIII, § 3, of the Ohio Constitution.390
b. Dividing Lines-Territorial Application
In determining the appropriate division of police power between state
and local governments, rejection of the artificial distinction between mat-
385See State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944) (Williams,
J., concurring). The division line within "police regulations" was said to be between mis-
demeanors and other police regulations. The former were under the "no coaflict" limitation
while the latter were matters of "statewide concern." It was thought that the effect of finding
a matter to be of a "statewide concern" was to enable the state to preempt the field. And
"necessity" provided the basis for municipal power in a "statewide" area in absence of the
state's preemption.
386 State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 439, 132 N.X.2d 118, 120 (1956).
The court itself doubted that it had been more than "remotely" consistent in finding what was
"local" which recalls the earlier misgivings as to the "hazy and ambiguous" nature of the con-
stitutional terms. State ex rel. Cooper v. Toledo, 97 Ohio St. 86, 91, 119 N.E. 253, 254 (1917).
387 Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N...2d 224 (1961).
388 State ex rel. Daley v. Parma, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 577, 123 N.E.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1952),
where state authority to deny municipal power to operate a library was assumed to exist, per-
haps on the basis of state power over education. Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in
Theory and Pratice, 9 OsnO ST. LJ. 18, 66-63 (1948). The supreme court later failed to find
any state denial. State ex rel. Buescher v. Linton, 6 Ohio St. 2d 218, 217 N..2d 201 (1966).
M In Akron v. Smith, 14 Ohio St. 2d 247, 237 N.E.2d 396 (1963), state authority to
provide a statute of limitations for violation of a municipal income tax ordinance was sus-
tained under its authority over courts.
390 See Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practlce, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 18,
65 (1948).
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ters which exclusively concern one level of government or another would
permit the acceptance of the more obvious and natural standard based on
the area of a regulation's effectiveness-territorial application. Accep-
tance of this approach would have a double effect. It would remove
"statewide concern" as an independent concept of state power intruding
upon municipal police power and at the same time it would provide the
means for drawing a constitutionally acceptable line between the outer
limit of municipal police power and exclusive state power. Territorial
application, and the "no conflict" test as to police regulations would be
the only recognized limits on Home Rule power.
It has been argued that to apply only a territorial meaning to the con-
stitutional phrase "local regulations" would be redundant because a mu-
nicipal regulation could have no application other than within the terri-
torial limits of the corporation;3 and both a subject matter and a
territorial application approach were mentioned with respect to local reg-
ulations in the first case in which an interpretation of the Home Rule
amendments was requiredV12  On the other hand, it has also been sug-
gested that a subject matter approach to state regulation has been ruled
out in the constitutional convention proceedings leading up to the adop-
tion of these amendmen&93 and in another early interpretative decision8 "
If the state regulatory power is to be given a territorial rather than a sub-
ject matter meaning, it would not seem unreasonable that the same ap-
proach be followed with respect to local regulation. A finding of redun-
dancy could be avoided by resort to the not uncommon conclusion that the
term "local" was simply used by the constitution writers as a form of em-
phasis. Moreover, support for full municipal power can be found in those
decisions in which it has been held that municipal police power within its
corporation limits is as complete as that of the state's within its limits.3 3
Territorial application, however, unless adhered to rigidly is not free
from problems. "Local" regulations limited to the territory of the corpo-
ration have "extraterritorial effects." 30  Any advantage from adopting a
territorial application approach is lost if intraterritorial regulation of a
statewide subject matter is permitted, only to be overturned because of
extraterritorial effects which flow from the very statewide scope of the
subject matter being regulated. This close identity of the "effects" and
391 Id. at 26.
392 State ex re. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 97, 102 N.E. 670, 673 (1913).
393 Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Praaice, 9 OnIo ST. L.J. 18, 26
(1948).
394 Leis v. Cleveland Ry., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920).
393 Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), cert, dcnied, 357
U.S. 904 (1958); Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 NXE. 829 (1918); 3 J. FARRELL,
FARRELL-ELLIS OMO MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.3 (11th ed. 1962).
3 96Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958); Perrysburg
v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923) (dissenting opinion).
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"subject matter" approaches and the coincidence of results to be derived
from their application makes differentiation between them difficult and
fruitless. The courts have both emphasized the scope of a subject" and
have sought answers to questions on whether a subject is "purely local."' m
or whether it "transcends borders" 30 or "concerns inhabitants outside"40
the territorial limits of the municipality. It has even been said that a
matter is of "statewide concern" if outsiders would be affected when they
merely come within the municipality, 0 1 which argument if accepted makes
local power little more than an illusion in our modern world.
The use, then, of either a subject matter or a territorial application
approach, modified to take into consideration extraterritorial effects of
the regulation, lends itself to the creation of a separate "statewide con-
cern" concept. Each, in addition to being a constitutionally questionable
turtailment of municipal power, suffers from practical problems of siz-
able proportions. Only strict adherence to the principle of comprehen-
sive municipal police power within corporation boundaries subject only
to the "no conflict" and "general laws" limitations would obviate these
difficulties.
c. Fact or Fiction?
Two fundamental problems with respect to "statewide concern" as a
designation for an independent concept of state authority remain unre-
solved. First, do the cases actually confirm its existence and second, if
so, what purpose does it serve? Taking the second question first, the
397 Those items which are used statewide, State av fel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189,
181 N.E.2d 26, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962); or prevade the state, Cincinnati &
Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati, 7 Ohio fisc. 159, 215 N.E.2d 631 (P. Ct. 1964).
398 State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944); State ex Mc. Daly
v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E.2d 338 (1943); State ex tel. Taylor v. French, 96 Ohio Sr.
172, 117 N.E. 173 (1917); Schultz v. Upper Arlington, 88 Ohio App. 281, 97 N.E.2d 218
(1950); Massa v. Cincinnati, 51 Ohio Op. 101, 110 N..2d 726 (C.P.), appcal disnissd,
160 Ohio St. 254, 115 N.E.2d 689 (1953).
3 99 Security Sewage Equip. Co. v. Beebe, 5 Ohio Misc. 178, 214 NY.2d 853 (C.P. 1965).
400 State ex tel. Hackley v. Edmonds, 150 Ohio St. 203, 80 N.E.2d 769 (1948).
01 State ex tel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941); Smith v. fay-
field Heights, 48 Ohio Op. 443, 108 N.E.2d 861 (C.P. 1952). This approach was rejectel by
CEI in its brief to the court of appeals. Brief for Appellee at 58, 10 Ohio App. 2d 85,226 N...2d
145 (1967). But just as a continuing enticement, sometimes of considerable strength, to finding
increased state power arising from the nature of the subject matter or because of "outside effects"
of a local regulation needs to be resisted to avoid a distortion of local autonomy, so does a similar
attraction which seems to demand, at times, treating some police power matters as exclusively lo:al.
In Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St 2d 39, 278 NY-2d 658 (1972), the court was
successful in resisting the claim that municipal zoning was an exclusive municipal power even
though state zoning of municipal corporations would be a difficult, and fortunately unlikely, even-
tuality to accept. The case did not involve this stark possibility of the state itself zoning a munic-
ipality but rather the issue presented was whether the state had power to vest county commis-
sioners as an "airport zoning board" with authority to act to safeguard an "airport hazard are'
within a municipality but only when an airport was located in more than one political subdi-
vision. Ono REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4563.01 (Page Supp. 1970), 4563.03 (Page 1965).
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most evident objectives sought to be accomplished by a finding of "state-
wide concern" have been to avoid accepting claims of municipal control
and to establish state control. Not infrequently the issue of a case is
framed by claims of superiority of municipal regulations over state regu-
lations based on local self-government authority. When found unaccept-
able, these claims have to varying degrees influenced courts to over-
respond through a "statewide concern" finding.0 2 In other cases the courts
have deliberately sought to establish a form of state control because it
was considered "essential" 403 to the state, because it permitted the avoidance
of local politics,404 or, as is frequently mentioned, because it enabled the
achievement of uniformity of regulation.405 These reasons suggest the
presence of a "statewide" concept and might be thought to be sufficiently
important to justify embarking on a steeplechase of theoretical and prac-
tical hurdles to establish it. But the concept can be identified and these
objectives achieved only if a finding of "statewide concern" is accompanied
by a transformation of state power tailored to permit accomplishment of
the objectives.
As has been observed, when problems of preemption and the nature of
"general laws" were considered, a finding of "statewide concern" has
given rise to a variance in judicial language from that usual to Home
Rule,4 0 although often not crucial or even important to the results reached.
Unfortunately for purposes of clarity, this variance ranges from exclusive
state power,407 which as noted,40 " is infrequent and is not suggestive of
special areas, to the most frequent "no conflict, "400 which, of course,
402 E.g., Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958) (not to
be left to the "whims" of each municipality); Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.A,2d
226 (1941), overruled as to statewide finding, State ex rel. Can,:da v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St.
191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958) (prevent possible complete municipal abolishment of police and
fire departments); State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912) (a pre-
Home Rule case) (avoid the folly of permitting a municipality to act entirely in its own self
interest); Bd. of Health v. State ex rel. O'Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N.E. 215 (1931)
(avoid nonuniform regulation).
403 State ex rel. Giovanello v. Lowellville, 139 Ohio St. 219, 39 N.E.2d 527 (1942).
404 Smith v. Mayfield Heights, 48 Ohio Op. 443, 108 N.E.2d 861 (C.P. 1952).
40 State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26, appeal dismissed, 371
U.S. 35 (1962); Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
921 (1958).
40 See text accompanying notes 213-29, 261.64 supra.
407 Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 NE.2d 921 (1958); Taylor v.
Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132, 93 N.E.2d 594 (1950), and Baldwin v. Newark, 65 WIv3mKLY L,
BULL. 131 (Newark Mun. Ct. 1920). No municipal regulations were involved.
408 See text accompanying notes 373-80 supra.
400 State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944); State ex rel4
Daly v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E.2d 338 (1943); State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138
Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941); State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d
219 (1941); Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941); Schultz v. Upper
Arlington, 88 Ohio App. 281, 97 N.E.2d 218 (1950); Cleveland v. Mulloff, 28 Ohio L. Abs.
324 (Ct. App. 1938); Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport Authority, 16 Ohio Misc.
69, 237 N.E.2d 173 (C.P. 1967); Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati, 7 Ohio
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amounts to no real variance at all. Between these interpretations of
"statewide concern" are those which hold state authority to "supersede,"410,
"change," 41.1 or even "confer" municipal power, 12 occasionally to "pre-
empt" it 13 or prescribe the manner of its use, 1 4 and to impose duties upon
municipalities to ensure that the functions involved are properly carried
out.
41 5
From this summary of results it is evident that municipal power is
sometimes curtailed, but it is also evident that no discernible pattern
emerges which provides a firm basis for the establishment of a special the-
ory of enhanced state competence. It can be said, particularly when re-
flection is given to the other ways in which "statewide concern" is used,
that the results of a finding of "statewide concern" are as multi-headed as
the types of problems to which the term has been applied. To make it into
a single concept is to distort its history. To seek its significance as a pli-
able approach to problems depends on a more detailed examination of the
subjects to which it has been applied.
5. Subject Areas
a. Exclusive State Power
Findings of exclusive state jurisdiction have been made in a group of
cases already noted,41 6 which are based upon special constitutional grants
Misc. 159, 215 N.E.2d 631 (P. Ct. 1964); Stary v. Brooklyn, 51 Ohio Op. 378, 114 N.E2d
633 (C.P. 1953), afl'd, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S.
923 (1955); Campbell v. Hassay, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 391, 67 N.E.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1945) (dic-
tum).
410 Sullivan v. Civil Seer. Comm'n, 102 Ohio App. 209, 131 N.E.2d 611 (1956).
411 Smith v. Mayfield Heights, 48 Ohio Op. 443, 108 N.E.2d 861 (C.P. 1952).
412 Hyde v. Lakewood, 2 Ohio St.2d 155, 207 N.E.2d 547 (1965) (dissenting opinion);
Wright v. Lorain, 70 Ohio App. 337, 46 N.E.2d 325 (1942).
413 State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962), appeal dis.
missed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962); State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.B.2d 501
(1944) (concurring opinion); Hickey v. Burke, 78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E.2d 33, appeal dis-
missed, 147 Ohio Sr. 217, 70 N.E.2d 274 (1946); Security Sewage Equip. Co. v. Beebe, 5 Ohio
Misc. 178, 214 N.Y.2d 853 (C.P. 1965); Ferrie v. Sweeney, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128
(C.P. 1946); Note, Regulation of Door to Door Solicitation by Enactment of a Green River
Ordinance: Application and Validity in Ohio, 32 U. CIN. L REV. 92, 107 (1963). This was
rejected in Stary v. Brooklyn, 51 Ohio Op. 378, 114 N._.2d 633 (C.P. 1953), aff'd 162 Ohio St.
120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955).
414 State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941). This was
questioned in State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio Sr. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958), where
the "statewide" designation was removed. See also Hickey v. Burke, 78 Ohio App. 351, 69
N.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio S. 217, 70 N.E.2d 274 (1946) (with a state pa:er
thrust).
415 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941), questioned in State
ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 163 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958), with removal of ".tate-
wide" designation; Hyde v. Lakewood, 2 Ohio St. 2d 155, 207 N.E.2d 547 (1965) (distening
opinion); State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944) (concurring
opinion); Hickey v. Burke, 78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E.2d 33, appeal diisscd, 147 Ohio St.
217, 70 N.E.2d 274 (1946).
416 See note 373 supra.
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of power to the General Assembly. The use of "statewide concern" 417 in
this context is sound, although hardly necessary.
b. State Highways and Bridges
Similarities with the cases discussed previously can be discerned in the
area of state highway or bridge construction within a municipality, al-
though in this area the curtailment of municipal power is more debatable.
Despite a municipal interest in this area, the state through its agencies is
performing a state function. What is being built is essentially a state
structure and claims that a municipality can veto a project within its boun-
daries because of the power of local self-government418 have been met
-with findings of "statewide concern." It would be natural for a court to
compare this situation with the construction of a state house by the state,
a project which is free from municipal control,419 rather than with the
construction of a city hall by a city, which has been treated as a matter
within exclusive municipal control.420 It would be natural for a court to
conclude that municipal consent for state highway construction is not nec-
essary and that the municipality cannot impede this state project, even
though construction, maintenance, and repair of municipal streets is a mat-
ter of local self-government. 421 More than a local matter, and, in fact,
more than a matter of state jurisdiction is involved. Rather, regulation
of the state itself as it carries out its functions is at stake. This is really
not too dissimilar from the distinctions to be drawn at the federal-state
governmental levels involving reciprocal tax immunity422 and the more
cooperative interrelationships which result when each level uses its powers
to regulate private individuals and companies. 423
This is not to say that local interests are to be ignored; and indeed,
a regularized procedure for their presentation ought to be provided. " '
But, on balance, the final word should remain in the state so that state ac-
tions which do not constitute an abuse of power-a test to which they still
must conform-are not defeated. Moreover, not all local regulatory pow-
417 E.g., State ex rel. Ramsey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929).
4 18 Lakewood v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960); State ex el. Ohio
Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. denicd, 344 U.S. 865
(1952); State ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 157 N.E. 330 (1927).
419 State ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 157 N.E. 330 (1927),
420Mulcahy v. Akron, 27 Ohio App. 442, 161 N.E. 542 (1924). But this would also
leave a "statewide" improvement constructed by a municipality, as implied by the court in State
ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 157 N.E. 330 (1927), subject to state supervision.
421 Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961);
Massa v. Cincinnati, 51 Ohio Op. 101, 110 N.E.2d 726 (C.P.), appeal dismissed, 160 Ohio St.
254, 115 N.E.2d 689 (1953).
422 Lakewood v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960).
423 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
424 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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er is said to have been lost with respect to state highway construction,42z
even though local planning and zoning measures are inapplicable. 425 How-
ever, even if local interests are thought to be greater than these state
facility cases recognize, this would merely serve to question the use of
"statewide concern" in them and would not provide a basis for the courts
to extend its use into areas where state interests are less dearly evident.
c. Annexation and Detachment
Another area of the "unusual," where the intermixture of state-munic-
ipal relations suggests state control, involves annexation and detachment
procedures. These have been found to be properly imposed by the state-m
over initial claims of a violation of Home Rule powers -"28 In a leading
case' the Supreme Court of Ohio found detachment to be of "statewide
concern,". "exclusively"4 30 within state control, on the broad ground that a
municipal measure covering such a matter would not be local because its
effects would extend beyond its boundaries. Here there is need for uni-
formity of regulation 3 1 The results of a measure should be examined
and if they affect only the municipality the measure is within local self-
government, but if they have extraterritorial effect, and thus are not en-
tirely local, it is a matter for the General Assembly 43 2
The result reached in these cases should meet with no serious objec-
tions, given the nature of the subject matter, 33 but one should be hesitant
to accept the full implications of their rationale. They suggest that any
municipal measure which has effects outside the territorial limits of the
municipality fails because it is within an exclusive state area. Applied
strictly, or even literally, Home Rule of the past 60 years in Ohio is dead.
The courts in these cases faced a problem which permitted the application
of a much more tailored rationale. They were dealing with physical ter-
ritory and the alteration of other units of government. To have treated
425Lakewood v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960).
42State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345,
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); State ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 157
N.E. 330 (1927).
427 Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958); Schultz
v. Upper Arlington, 88 Ohio App. 281, 97 N.E.2d 218 (1950); Brook Park v. Cleveland, 26
Ohio Op. 536 (C.P. 1943), appeal dismissed, 143 Ohio St. 607,56 N.E.2d 515 (1944).
2Brook Park v. Cleveland, 26 Ohio Op. 536 (C.P. 1943), appeal dismissed, 143 Ohio
St. 607, 56 N.E.2d 515 (1944).
4 9 Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.-2d 921 (1958).
420 "No conflict" terminology was used in Schultz v. Upper Arlington, 88 Ohio App. 281,
97 N.B.2d 218 (1950).
4 3 1Beachwoocl v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, syllabus para, 2, 148 N.Y.2d 921
(1958).
432 Id. at 371, 148 N.E.2d at 923.
433 Abolishment of municipal identity through dissolution of a corporation or merger of
two is a different matter. See N. LrrLEFELD, METRoPoLUTAN ARBn PROBmIS AND bIuxIC-
IPAL HOME RuLE 25-30, 32 (1962).
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such a measure as being within Home Rule would have eliminated the
territorial dimension of that concept43 4 and, in putting other political sub-
divisions in the retention of their territory at the mercy of municipal cor-
porations, such treatment would have interjected municipal corporations
between the state and its subdivisions. In the case of annexation, a Home
Rule finding would have had the further effect of permitting a municipality
more than a franchise to regulate outside of its boundaries, which usually
demands legislative grant for support.435  Such a finding would have been
permission to bring the outside territory into the municipality on its terms
and to subject this territory to all municipal taxes, debts and regulations,
even though accompanied by the conferral of citizenship rights. Although
at least one state permits this type of territorial adjustment,430 it need not
be accepted in Ohio. Its rejection, however, should not be placed on an
overly broad ground that would permit what amounts to the establish-
ment of broad exclusive state power in the area of municipal competence-
state encroachment into municipal regulation of its territory through the
overturning of all internal municipal measures which have extraterritorial
effects.
Moving on from those cases in which exclusive state jurisdiction and
state power issues were evident,437 consideration may now be given to those
cases in which the extent of municipal police power or the independence
of a "statewide concern" theory was more frequently involved.
d. Airports
The establishment and regulation of airports would not appear to be
beyond municipal competence,48 nor certainly that of the state. In a re-
cent Supreme Court of Ohio case, claims of exclusive municipal power to
434 OHO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3, Prudential Co-Op. Realty Co. v. Youngstown, 118 Ohio St.
204, 160 N.E. 695 (1928), cited in Beachwood; Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powcrr in
Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. LJ. 18, 69 (1948).
435 Prudential Co-Op. Realty Co. v. Youngstown, 118 Ohio Sr. 204, 160 N.E. 695 (1928).
436 Texas ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v. Texas City, 157 Tex. 450, 303 SAN.2d
780 (1957).
437 Sharp lines of division between diverse interests appear in several cases making them
brief studies in contrasts. In State ex rel. Rhodes v. Bd. of Elecdons, 12 Ohio St. 2d 4, 230
N.E.2d 347 (1967), an issue for initiative vote of municipal citizens could be placed upon the
ballot if it were a matter over which the municipal legislative body would have competence,
but a question calling for the President of the United States to withdraw troops from Vietnam
was found not to come within this limitation. In State ex Mc. Cist v. Cincinnati, 101 Ohio St.
354, 121 N.E. 595 (1920), operating municipal offices and conducting municipal proceedings ac-
cording to daylight-savings time was found to be a matter of local self-government, but placing
the entire city on such time must not conflict with state law. In State ex rel Taylor v. French,
96 Ohio Sr. 172, 117 N.E. 173 (1917), municipal enfranchisement of women and qualifying
them for public office were found to be issues within local self-government power, but qualifi.
cations to vote in state elections or for state created judicial offices was beyond municipal
power.
438 Constitutional authority would appear ample and statutory authority exists in OIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 719.01(0) (Page Supp. 1970).
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zone within the territorial limits of a municipal corporation, despite statu-
tory authorization of an independent "airport zoning board" with author-
ity to zone for an "airport hazard area" when an airport is located in more
than one political subdivision, were denied on the ground that the state is
not precluded from acting on a matter of "state concern" such as public
safety near a modern airport. Although the court suggested, without being
required to decide, that a municipal zoning regulation might be "nulli-
fied" by an airport zoning board, it does not appear that the court con-
templated an exclusive state power nor is it dear that the court was con-
sidering a preemptive one.439 Without either intent, a reference to "state
concern" would dearly seem to have been unnecessary because a simple
recognition of a state-retained police power and of the probable applica-
bility of the "no conflict" approach would have sufficed.
Reference was made to "statewide concern" in two lower court cases.
In one of these, the presence of state power was again in issue and was
found to be unimpaired by municipal Home Rule. The state's authori-
zation of the establishment of an airport was sustained despite a claim
that the operation of airports was a municipal power which the state could
not confer upon county authorities. The court also noted that the state
had "assumed control over" aviation.440 A second case raised essentially a
police power problem and a "no conflict" approach to a solution was more
evident. The court found that the extension of an airport by a state-ap-
proved airport authority was not subject to municipal zoning prohibitions
because they would create a conflict with a state determination."4
The combined effect of these decisions is at most only suggestive of a
curtailed municipal power and not of an independent theory of "statewide
concern" with respect to airport matters.
e. Police and Fire Departments
Beginning in 1941 through a series of cases which reached into the
late 1950's, various aspects of the operation of fire and police departments
were held to be matters of "statewide concern." Internal management
of these municipal departments, including the selection of personnel, 4 -
439 Villoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St2d 39, 278 N.E2d 653 (1972); OHIo REV.
CoDE ANN. § 4563.01 (Page Supp. 1970), § 4563.03(B) (Page 1965). Neither exclusive
nor preemptive state power appears to have been contemplated by the legislature since it is also
provided that in case of conflict between any airport zoning board regulation and another zon-
ing regulation the one "best calculated to insure safety shall govern." OHIO REV. CODIE ANN.
§ 4563.04 (Page 1965).
440 State ex rel. Helsel v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 60, 79 N.E.2d 698,
702 (C.P.), aff'd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694, appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio Sr. 583, 79
N.E.2d 911 (1948). Local zoning ordinances were found inapplicable.
441 Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport Authority, 16 Ohio Misc. 69, 237 N.2d
173 (C.P. 1967).
442 State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138 Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941); Smith v. Mray-
field Heights, 48 Ohio Op. 443, 108 N.E.2d 861 (C.P. 1952).
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[V
hours worked,443 tenure held, 444 pensions received, 445 claims for pay44"
and the manner in which employment disputes would be resolved,447 all fell
within this designation even where the creation of a municipal office would
have been required.448  Government structure and the selection and re-
tention of personnel questions would appear to be matters of local self-
government, particularly in view of earlier decisions.449  Yet the questions
were not resolved in this manner.
This variance in result was caused in part by the court's reaction in one
of the initial cases to what it feared would be the consequences of a find-
ing of municipal dominance.3 The case involved municipal efforts to re-
place state pension provisions for the personnel of fire and police depart-
ments by a locally devised system. The court sought to prevent this from
happening in order to protect, as it said, the intere;ts of the state in fire
fighting and crime suppression which would be injured if some future mu-
nicipal abolishment of the departments themselves would occur. As a
consequence, it found the public's interest in fire and police protection
transcended municipal borders. Subsequent decisions added little to this
rationale.451
Even though this finding of "statewide concern" emphasized state
power452 and was reinforced to some extent by later lower court cases
favorable to state control,4 3 the courts when dealing with police-fire de-
443 State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941); Taylor v.
Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132,93 N.E.2d 594 (1950).
444 State ex rel. Daly v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E.2d 338 (1943); State e rel.
Giovanello v. Lowellville, 139 Ohio St. 219,39 NE.2d 527 (1942).
445 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220,34 N.E.2d 226 (1941).
440 Wright v. Lorain, 70 Ohio App. 337,46 N.E.2d 325 (1942).
447 State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944); In re Fortune,
138 Ohio St. 385, 35 N.E.2d 442 (1941); Sullivan v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 102 Ohio App.
269, 131 N.E.2d 611 (1956).
448 Sullivan v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 102 Ohio App. 269, 131 N.E.2d 611 (1956).
449 State ex rel. Lentz v. Edwards, 90 Ohio St. 305, 107 N.E. 768 (1914); Fitzgerald v.
Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913); accord, State cx rel. Hackley v. Edmonds,
150 Ohio St. 203, 80 N.E.2d 769 (1948). See also State ex ret. O'Driscoll v. Cull, 138 Ohio
St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941) (dissenting opinion); Note, Regulation of Door to Door Solticila
tion by Enactment of a Green River Ordinance: Application and Validity in Ohio, 25 U.
Cn,. L. REV. 378, 380 (1956).
450 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941), companion case of State
ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941).
4 51 See notes 442-48 supra.
452 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941) (the state could impose
duties); State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 NX.2d 219 (1941) (the state could
prescribe the manner and method of carrying out functions).
4 5 3 In Sullivan v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 102 Ohio App. 269, 131 N.E.2d 611 (1956), it
was held that state law "supersedes" local control and a charter city must create a municipal
office to conform to statute. In Smith v. Mayfield Heights, 48 Ohio Op. 443, 448, 108 N.2d
861, 867 (C.P. 1952), it was held that the legislature has the power to "decrease, change, rexgu-
late, or take back powers which it has already given to municipalities." Taylor v. Cleveland,




partment cases rather quickly settled on what was essentially a "no con-
flict" rationale.454 "Statewide concern" was reduced to a traditional police
power approach, but in an area in which such a solution did not com-
fortably fit all the problems presented, that is, those which were primarily
matters of local self-government. After an interval of stress 55 the court
rejected "statewide concern" as an automatic designation for the police
and fire departments and returned to a local self-government rationale
where government structure and personnel selection and retention were
involved, with "no conflict" apparently serving as the solution for per-
sonnel welfare problems.4"0 This change of approach by the courts, al-
though altering its application, did not itself destroy what little support
these cases accorded "statewide concern '' 457 as an independent theory.
f. Health
When the broad scope of Ohio municipal corporation decisions is
viewed, the area of health stands out as the one most likely to support
the conclusion that "statewide concern" is a separate viable approach to a
group of state-municipal power problems. This, too, is no doubt in part
45 State ex tel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944); State x tel.
Daly v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E.2d 338 (1943); State ex tel. O'DriscoU v. Cull, 138
Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941); Note, Regulation of Door to Door Solicitation by Enact-
ment of a Green River Ordinance: Application and Validity in Ohio, 25 U. CIN. L REV. 378
(1956). For a general review of these police-fire department cases up to 1948, ice Fordham &
Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 Omo ST. LJ. 18, 31-34 (1948).
455 State ex tel. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E2d 118 (1956).
45o State ex tel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.Y.2d 722 (1958), noted in
20 OHo ST. I.J. 152 (1959). See also Blume, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio: The New Looh,
11 CASE W. RES. 1. REV. 538, 545-50 (1962). The court directly overruled state ex tel. Daly V.
Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E.2d 338 (1943), State cx rel. ODriscoU v. Cull, 138 Ohio S.
516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941), and those portions of the holdings dealing with "statewide con-
cern" in State ex tel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio S. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944), and Cininati
v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941). The theory of local self.government
still accepts state superiority, however, in absence of a charter. Leavers v. Canton, 1 Ohio Sr.
2d 33, 203 N..2d 354 (1964). Sustaining the statutory right to court review of a civil service
commission dismissal in In re Fortune, 138 Ohio St. 385, 35 N.E.2d 442 (1941), was moved
to its alternative ground of state control over courts in Cupps v. Toledo, 170 Ohio St. 144,
163 N..2d 384 (1959). The suggestion that state police power continued to be a factor in
support of state dealings with police and firemen was carried a step further when a state order
to pay the pension funds of these groups into the stare fund, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 742.26
(Page Supp. 1970), was sustained as an exercise of the state constitutional authority, OHIO
CoNST. art. II, § 34, to regulate wages and hours and promote the general welfare of "all em-
ployees." State ex tel. Bd. of Trustees of Pension Fund v. Bd. of Trustees of Relief Fund, 12
Ohio St. 2d 105, 233 N.E.2d 105 (1967).
45 7 The application of the more expansive effects ascribed to "statewide concern" in several
cases was questioned once that designation was overturned, State ex rcl. Canada v. Phillips, 168
Ohio St. 191, syllabus para. 8, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958), as to the state's authority to impose
duties, Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941), or pre-crie the man.
ner and method of carrying out functions, State ex tel. Strain v. Houston, 133 Ohio St. 203,
34 N.Y.2d 219 (1941). There also remains the conclusion that the state serves as the source of
municipal power. Wright v. Lorain, 70 Ohio App. 337, 46 N.E.2d 325 (1942). In essentially
a state power case, Taylor v. Cleveland, 87 Ohio App. 132, 93 N.E.2d 594 (1950), Home Rule
was found not to be a deprivation of "exclusive" state power.
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a consequence of the manner in which the issue of state authority was first
raised and of the approach by which the state has chosen to exercise its
regulatory power with respect to matters of health.
The first significant case158 was decided while the constitutional con-
vention which was to propose municipal Home Rule debated. Perhaps
as a consequence, the court was apparently faced with some form of mu-
nicipal power claims because it concluded that power over health had not
been delegated exclusively to the municipality. Rather, the state retained
its sovereign power through an agency of its creation to order a municipal-
ity to take steps to stop stream pollution, which after all was of concern
to the entire state. A similar result was reached in a leading post-Home
Rule case "9 which involved almost an identical fact situation. The court
again stressed the undiminished power of the state over problems of
health which have no respect for political boundaries. It added the sug-
gestion that the condition of municipal power was no different from pre.
Home Rule days. Even though municipalities needed no longer look to the
state for conferral of power, they possessed power over health matters sub-
ject to state withdrawal at anytime.460
Between these two cases, in point of time, the court was faced with the
claim"8' that municipalities need not contribute to the costs of newly
formed municipal health districts as required by statute. Here it was noted
that the state could enact general health laws and this included the power
to require contributions from its political subdivisions to carry them out
without running afoul of a Home Rule claim of diversion of municipal
-funds. When subsequently faced with the claim4 2 that employees of these
districts were municipal employees, an appeals court ruled that the districts
were properly created by the state under its health power as separate agen-
cies of the state subject to its control, even though there was a coincidence
of boundaries between municipality and health district. Therefore, dis.
trict employees were not amenable to municipal regulation. The court
pointed out that matters of health were not of local concern.
Put in basic terms, these cases present issues dealing with the thrust of
state power. They stand for the propositions that the state has undimin-
ished police power over the matters of health, and that it can choose to ex-
458 State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912).
4 59 Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); accord, State
ex rel. Neal v. Williams, 120 Ohio St. 432, 166 N.E. 377 (1929).
4 6 0 Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 427-28, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
461 State ex rel. Cuyahoga Heights v. Zangerle, 103 Ohio St. 566, 134 N.E. 686 (1921); Bald-
win v. Newark, 65 WEEKLY L. BULL. 131 (Newark Mun. Ct. 1920). During this period a
Home Rule proponent, Chief Justice Marshall suggested in dictum that matters of health were
of general concern which were "not to be affected by special local regulations." Lorain Street
R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68, 79, 148 N.E. 577, 580 (1925) (concurring
opinion).
4 6 2 Bd. of Health v. State exrel. O'Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N.E. 215 (1931).
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ercise this power by directives to municipal corporations or by delegation
to independent local subdivisions of its own making. With none of these
conclusions can Home Rule proponents seriously object.
Home Rule, as earlier suggested, was not meant to hamstring the
state in its exercise of its own police power even when directed at munici-
pal activities. Nor is it tenable to contend that the state cannot do by agent
what it dearly can do directly, that is, regulate health matters. Still, there
is an obvious danger to Home Rule involved in state creation of indepen-
dent agencies463 to exercise power "withdrawn from municipalities."' "
The difficulty arises, then, with the term "withdraw." Even if a state
agency is created it should be empowered only to regulate citizens and
thereby supersede conflicting municipal regulations, not to preclude the
making of these regulations,4 given the real and continuing interest of
municipalities in matters of health.4 66 There was no need to find or to sug-
gest a withdrawal of municipal power in order to sustain a state power to
meet state health objectives either through newly created agencies of the
state or through municipal corporations themselves. Nor has this been
the pattern with respect to other state regulatory agencies. " Yet, it is
not surprising that a court might fail to observe this distinction and adopt
withdrawal language, given the combination of the strong state power
thrust of the issues presented, given fact patterns involving actions of state
agencies created for a special purpose, and given the fact that where mu-
nicipal agencies were replaced they had been created under statutory grants
of authority to municipalities predating Home Rule. 68
The pattern of later decisions suggests that these early cases have
played a role in setting matters of health apart from other areas of police
power regulation, even when dealing with municipal power despite the
fact that there is no theoretical basis for it. Certainly this different treat-
463 3 J. FARRELL, FARRELL-ELLIS OmHO MUNICIPAL CODE § 1.59 (11th ed. 1962) suggests
a broad scope for state power which was used in support of a similar view in Brief for Ap-
pellee at 24.
464 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 5, 27 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1940)
(confirming earlier decisions); Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory ard Prwtire,
9 Omo ST. L.J. 18, 37 (1948). The danger as noted by these authors (at 65) is increased when
not limited to creation of state agencies.
465 Casey v. Youngstown, 9 Ohio App. 2d 246, 224 N.E. 2d 155 (1967).
466This interest is dearly recognized as part of the municipal police power. Cleveland v.
Terrill, 149 Ohio Sr. 532, 80 N.E.2d 115 (1948); State ex rel. Moock v. Cindnnati, 120 Ohio
St. 500, 166 N.E. 583, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 578 (1929); Dayton v. Jacobs, 120 Ohio Sr. 225,
165 N.E. 844 (1929).
467 Mayer v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458, 14 N.E.2d 617, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 621 (1938).
No general limitation on municipal power was to be implied from the creation of the Public
Utilities Commission. Nor was the establishment of the Board of Liquor Control treated as
establishing an exclusive regulatory agency, Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St.
248, 58 N.E2d 665 (1944), even though the courts have applied "conflict by implication" most
frequently in this field. See generally Note, Mfunicipal Control of Liquor in Ohio, 12 W. RES.
L REv. 377 (1961).
468 96 Oino LAwS 79 (1902), Omio GEm. CODE § 4404 (1910).
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ment has not placed health beyond municipal competency and within ex-
dusive state jurisdiction. 00  However, the claim that the state has the
power to become exclusive is not devoid of support. The dearest support
is found in the unnecessary references to "withdrawn" municipal power
in state power cases,470 and where municipal power was in issue preemption
,has made its appearance in lower court decisions. 471 Yet, at similar times
so has "no conflict"472 made an appearance. With this variegated picture
in view, it is difficult to reach a judgment that a firm independent theory
of "statewide concern" has been introduced judically into the state-munici-
pal power structure.
As a preliminary to considering the Painesville decision in this "state-
wide concern" setting, two further problems most close to Painesville in
fact pattern or in point of time must be examined.
g. Public Utilities
Municipal regulation of utilities has been considered earlier,47" but of
significance here is the fact that at times the courts have noted the extra-
territorial aspects of the services such utilities perform. The courts have
done this to support state regulation of the utilities through the Public
Utilities Commission in face of exclusive municipal power, local self-
469 Casey v. Youngstown, 9 Ohio App. 2d 246, 224 N.E.2d 155 (1967); Fordham & Asher,
Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. Lj. 18, 61-62 (1948). Probably
State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940), comes closest to
an exclusive approach because of the court's strong statement concerning the withdrawal of
municipal power. Yet, a state power question of the internal management of an independent
state agency was involved, rather than the question of the power of a municipality to regulate
health matters; and "no conflict" considerations were not entirely absent. Mention of exclu-
sive state power in the health field was made in an early lower court case. Baldwin v. Newark,
65 WEEKLY L BULL. 131 (Newark Mun. Ct. 1920).
470 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940); Bucyrus
v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio Sr. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); State Bd. of Health v. Green-
ville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912); Hickey v. Burke, 78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E.2d
33, appeal dismissed, 147 Ohio St. 217, 70 N.E.2d 274 (1946). Support for this claim is also
found with other theories of state power including preemption in an overly expansive opinion;
Bd. of Health v. State ex rel. O'Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N-. 215 (1931).
471 Security Sewage Equip. Co. v. Beebe, 5 Ohio Misc. 178, 27.4 N.X.2d 853 (C.P. 1965)
(dictum), relying on State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26, appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962); Ferrie v. Sweeney, 34 Ohio Op. 272, 72 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1946),
The last case is not devoid of a "no conflict" approach involving a state designated agency and
presenting an alternative ground for decision. No preemption was found in Davis v. McPher-
son, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 232, 132 N.E.2d 626 (Cr. App.), appeal dismissed, 164 Ohio St. 375, 130
N.E.2d 794 (1955).
472The basic decision of Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E.
370 (1929), spoke of "no conflict" while stressing a state withdrawal power. See also Hocker
v. State ex rel. Cleveland, 111 Ohio St. 168, 144 N.E. 700 (1924) (involving a dispute be-
tween two municipalities in the exercise of state authorized power); Casey v. Youngstown,
9 Ohio App. 2d 246, 224 N.E.2d 155 (1967) (although "plenary" state power was mentioned);
Cleveland v. Mulloff, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 324 (Ct. App. 1938).
4 73 See textual discussion accompanying notes 170-93 supra.
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government, daims" or to note the interference local regulations have
on the total operation of the utilities.47 '
The concern each of these cases evidences over the degree of munici-
pal interference with utility operations which might be tolerated is dearly
present even in Penrysburg v. Ridgway,47' where, in the process of making
an essentially local self-government finding, the majority noted that total
prohibition of intercity utility use of municipal streets was not involved.,
The dissenter, in directing his attention largely in response to what he
feared to be a "walled city" result of a finding of exclusive municipal
power, nevertheless stressed the undue interference with a utility's use of
the streets that results when designation of pickup and discharge stations
for intercity passengers of a motor bus line are subjected to municipal
control.4 78  Yet, he suggested municipal route prescriptions would be
proper.4'' Both acceptable regulation, falling short of material interfer-
ence with the efficiency of the utility's operation,4 80 and unacceptable regu-
lation, violating such a guideline, have been found.45' Although these
cases are subject to different interpretations, they suggest at most a shift
from exclusive municipal power of local self-government' 2 to mutual state-
municipal power to impose police regulations.1 They do not establish
exclusive state power to promulgate regulations with intercity effect, 4s
474 State ex rel. Wear v. Cincinnati & LYR.R. 128 Ohio S. 95, 190 N.E. 224 (1934) (no
loss of state power); Lorain Street 1R. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68, 148 N.E. 577
(1925).
4,- State ex rel. Wear v. Cincinnati & L.E.R.R., 128 Ohio St. 95, 190 N.E. 224 (1934);
Nelsonville v. Ramsey, 113 Ohio St. 217, 148 N.E. 694 (1925); Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 10S
Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923); Eastern Ohio Tranp. Corp. v. Bridgeport, 44 Ohio App.
433, 185 N.E. 891 (1932, appeal dismissed, 126 Ohio St. 238, 184 N.E. 852 (1933).
476 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
477 Id. at 259, 140 N.E. at 599.
478 Id. at 262,140 N.E. at 600 (dissenting opinion).
479Id. at 263, 140 N.E. at 600 (dissenting opinion).
4 8 0 Lorain Street R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68, 148 N.E. 577 (1925);
Eastern Ohio Transp. Corp. v. Bridgeport, 44 Ohio App. 433, 185 N.E. 891 (1932), appcal
dismissed, 126 Ohio St. 238, 184 N.E. 852 (1933). Municipal regulation of intercity truck
routes through the municipality was held reasonable in Niles v. Dean, 25 Ohio St. 2d 284, 263
N.E.2d 275 (1971) and Cincinnati Motor Tranp. Ass'n v. Lincoln Heights, 25 Ohio St.2d
203, 267 N.E.2d 797 (1971).
4 8 1 Nelsonville v. Ramsey, 113 Ohio St. 217, 148 N.E. 694 (1925).
4 8 2 Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
4 8 3 Lorain Street R.R. v. Public Utl. Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68, 148 N.. 577 (1925). See
textual discussion accompanying notes 184-93 supra. Sce also, Fordham & Asher, Home Rule
Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 Omo ST. LJ. 18, 55-57 (1948); Hitchcock, Ohio Ordinan:es
in Conflict with General Laws, 16 U. CuN. L REV. 1, 38 (1942); Duffey, Non.Charicr Afzuni:.
ipalities: Local Self-Government, 21 OHIO ST. LJ. 304, 311 (1960). Municipal regulation
of intercity truck routes was sustained on a police power theory. Niles v. Dean, 25 Ohio St.2d
284, 267 N.E.2d 275 (1971); Cincinnati Motor Transp. Ass'n. v. Lincoln Heights, 25 Ohio
St. 2d 203, 267 N.E.2d 797 (1971).
4 84 A constitutional source of municipal power over motor transportation within the mu-
nicipality was recognized in Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 103 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923);
Lorain Street RR. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 113 Ohio St. 68, 148 N.E. 577 (1925), and Eastern
Ohio Transp. Corp. v. Bridgeport, 44 Ohio App. 433, 185 N.E. 891 (1932), appcal dismisscd,
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nor is some special theory of state control suggested. Rather, taking into
consideration intercity effects, these decisions stand either for invalidat-
ing municipal regulations on the traditional police power grounds of "con-
flict" with state regulations or for transcending the reasonable.
This struggle over the degree of permissible municipal "interference"
with increasingly far-flung utility operations refocuses attention on the
very core problem raised in Painesville-what should be the outer limit
of municipal police power or the inner limits of a "statewide concern"
concept? The practical difficulties in allowing a varied pattern of local
regulations to be applied to the operation of tightly interwoven intercity
businesses are becoming more evident. But in counterbalance must be
placed the local public's well-being and possible alternatives that are avail-
able to a utility to operate within the regulatory scheme without undue
hardship.
In the past the balance was struck so as to cause an evident shift from
municipal exclusiveness of local self-government to mutual efforts of po-
lice power. It might be appropriate to make a new determination that
would consider the ever-expanding scope of utility services and would
justify some greater state control perhaps, as suggested by the court in
Painesvill'e,485 through a "statewide concern" designation or even, as urged
by CEI, through exclusive state power.480  Either would be acceptable as
long as the subject matter is outside municipal corapetency-outside mu-
126 Ohio St. 238, 184 N.E. 852 (1933), and confirmed with respect to regulation of Intercity
truck routes in the recent cases of Niles v. Dean, 25 Ohio St. 2d 284, 267 N.E.2d 275 (1971)
and Cincinnati Motor Transp. Ass'n. v. Lincoln Heights, 25 Ohio St. 203, 267 N.E.2d 797
(1971). However, a statutory source, OHIo GEN. CODE § 614,86, now OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4921.04 (Page 1953), was apparently relied on in Nelsonville v. Ramsey, 113 Ohio St.
217, 148 N.E. 694 (1925) decided the same day as the Lorain case, supra. This variance was
no doubt in part due to the manner in which the 1923 statute was phrased; first it vested the
PUC with power to supervise and regulate motor transportation companies "to the exclusion of
all local authorities" except for later provisions, then it provided that the PUC prescribe rules
"notwithstanding the provisions of any ordinance ... or permit... enacted ... or granted by
any incorporated city or village" and in case of conflict the "regulation of the public utilities
commission shall . . . prevail." Finally, however, it was stated that "local subdivisions may
make reasonable local police regulations within their respective boundaries not inconsistent
with the provisions of this chapter." 110 OHIo LAWS 214-15 (1923). These provisions
were applicable only to intercity lines, as intracity lines were excluded from PUC jurisdiction
at the same time by OHIO GEN. CODE § 614-84, now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4921.02 (Page
Supp. 1970). The question of source of power was reserved in Sylvania Busses, Inc. v. Toledo,
118 Ohio St. 187, 160 N.E. 674 (1928). In the later case of Mayer v. Ames, 133 Ohio St. 458,
14 N.E.2d 617, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 621 (1938), it was thought that no general limitation on
municipal power was to be implied from the creation of the PUC, and in Cleveland v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 130 Ohio St. 503, 512, 200 N.E. 765, 769 (1936), municipal power over motor
transport corporations was found to be "subordinated" to that of the state, in a situation where
municipal consent requirements for intracity lines or lines within continguous municipal cor-
porations now contained in OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4921.05 (Page 1953), were found inap.
plicable.
485 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 129,239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (1968).
480 Brief for Appellee at 25. It is impossible to tell whether the moderation of exclusive
language in OHIo GEN. CODE § 614-86, now OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4921.04 (Page 1953)
was felt necessary or just convenient.
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nicipal interest. But as has been seen, as long as substantial local consider-
ations remain,48 7 greater control could create repercussions extending well
beyond Painesville. Exclusiveness would reintroduce what would still ap-
pear to be a basic error of approach, that of a division of power where a
division is not realistic. Ridgeway, no doubt, suggested too much power
for a municipality; but a full swing of the pendulum to exclusive state
power would result in ignoring local considerations and would thus un-
duly constrict the outer limit of municipal power.
An expansion of state authority, particularly when based on the shift-
ing sands of "statewide concern," is not likely to be an adequate safeguard
against the ultimate loss of local interests. Yet, retention of a mutual
power approach embracing as it does flexible restraints on the use of power,
both from the "no conflict" concept and from the standard of reasonable-
ness, 4 88 lessens the rigors of conceptualism. This adaptability suggests
that the municipality should not be found to lack or to have only dimin-
ished power, but rather suggests that under modern conditions the limits
on the exercise of municipal power ought to be given close judicial scru-
tiny.
h. Recent Authority
Despite the sorting of cases into a variety of categories that has been
used in this general examination of matters of "statewide concern," no
category has really included the decision of State ex rel. McElroy v.
Akron."8 9 This case centered on the state's power to deal directly with
municipalities by prohibiting them from imposing a license fee upon water-
craft on municipally owned waters-a clearcut "general laws" problem.
The court's reference to "statewide concern" raised the question of whether
a "statewide" designation affects the "general laws" concept. At the same
time, the court's approach suggested drawing a new area of regulation into
the orbit of "matters of statewide concern," not as an area of exclusive
state power, but as one of curtailed municipal power. These circumstances
as well as the case's relative recentness underscore its potential importance
to municipal Home Rule. Yet, as previously noted, the McElroy case is
really not a preemption case490 nor is it any more dearly a "statewide con-
cern" case. It seems to gather its greatest support from the state's power
over municipal tax matters. 9 ' But even if it were treated as a key case
for future "statewide concern" decisions, it falls short of delineating dearly
497 See textual discussion accompanying notes 135-43, supra.
4 88 See State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 159
N.E.2d 756 (1959), appeal dismissed, 362 U.S. 457 (1960); Hooley, Compusory Underground
Wiring-A Battle Reioined in Public Utility Law, 5 VTIL. L REv. 80 (1959).
489 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26, appeal dismisscd, 371 U.S. 35 (1962).
490 See textual discussion accompanying notes 226-30 spra.
491 173 Ohio Sr. at 195, 181 N.E.2d at 30.
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the extent of expansion of state power which should result from such a
-finding.492  McElroy could be significant, however, with respect to the de-
velopment of a definition for a matter of "statewide concern." The court
,confirmed previous suggestions that changing times can cause a particular
area of regulation to take on state importance and to shift to a matter of
"statewide concern" when formerly it might not have been one.43  The
mixed blessing of practical flexibility is thus established in a definition
which has not been marked by its concreteness, but the extent of the ex-
traterritorial effect necessary to be "statewide" remains clouded.49
B. Statewide Concern-The Painesville Case
The theory of "statewide concern" was of crucial importance both in
the manner in which the Painesville case was argued49 and in the court's
kiltimate decision.46  Painesville, like McElroy, raised a "general laws"
problem-state exercising of direct control over a municipality in a "state-
wide concern" context. Also like McElroy, it involved an area of regula-
tion previously thought to be within municipal police power, which had
received little "statewide concern" treatment. But unlike that decision,
Painesville was not encumbered with controlling tax considerations.
1. Exclusive or Enhanced State Power
Counsel for CEI squarely faced the issue of using "statewide concern"
as a designation for matters entirely beyond municipal Home Rule. They
urged that in such matters the state was in complete control and that the
only authority a municipality could exercise was that delegated to it by
the state and subject to the state's direction.9 7 Consequently, it mattered
not at all whether § 4905.65 was a "general law," since the state held full
power to grant, modify, or deny power in this area.9 8 Reliance was placed
upon the principal cases already discussed including those which involved
state power over creation of courts, 499 location of state highways and
bridges, r'0 creation of independent subdivisions, 10' and development of de-
402 Preemption is mentioned both with respect to tax, id., and licensing, (syllabus) but "no
conflict" is linked with "statewide concern." Id. at 194, 181 N.E.2d at 30.
493 Id. at 192, 181 N.E.2d at 28; Blume, supra note 456, at 544.
494 The court noted that when the use of an item subject to regulation had become state-
wide and there was a need for uniform standards of regulation, local limitations become a har.
assment, id. 173 Ohio St. at 193, 181 N.E.2d at 29, but it supplied no guidelines for ascertain-
ing the presence of these circumstances.
495 Brief for Appellee at 25-33.
496 15 Ohio St. 2d at 129,239 N.E.2d at 78.
497 Brief for Appellee at 25.
498Id. at 25, 29, 32.
499 State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929); Brief for Appellee
at 29.
500 Lakewood v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960); State ex r.L Ohio
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tachment guidelines502 as well as State ex -el. McElroy v. Akron.t" In
adopting a "statewide" approach in Painesville the court seemed to treat
it as an independent concept within municipal police power, since the
opinion failed to adopt or at least failed to make dear that it relied upon
an exclusive state power rationale;0 and as has been considered before,-' 5
the court found that the state had the authority to remove 00 or exclude-5--
a municipality from this area of regulation and to place local matters with-
in municipal competency.' 8
These two positions present an intriguing intermixture of theories, each
of which in its own way can pose a serious threat to municipal Home
Rule. CEI's contention is solidly based on an outer limit of municipal
police power approach because it concludes that municipal Home Rule
power is "local" and that which is not local is beyond Home Rule. Yet it
suffers from a paucity of judicial precedent. "Statewide concern" has been
infrequently used to denote a total lack of municipal power.0r Areas
where exclusive state authority has been recognized have generally been char-
acterized by minimal municipal interest and delineated by grants of spe-
cific constitutional authority to the state."' The court, on the other hand,
seems to presuppose municipal power, which the state "excludes." This
suggests an independent "statewide concern" concept, since it is difficult to
explain the source of this municipal power if "statewide concern" is essen-
tially a state area.5"' Yet, in recognizing a state exclusionary power the
Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345, cert. dcsekd, 344 U.S. 865
(1952); State ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 157 N.E. 330 (1927); Brief for Ap-
pellee at 30-31.
501 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940); Brief for
Appellee at 27.
502 Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958); Brief for Ap-
pellee at 26-27.
503 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962); Brief for Ap-
pellee at 31.
5o4 But again at the request of CEI, the court did in Walton Hills v. Cleveland Ele. Illumi-
nating Co., No. 884,475 (Cuyahoga County C.P. Oct. 29, 1970), affd, No. 30,869 (Cr. App.
1971), appeal dismissed, No. 71-621, Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. Oct. 18, 1971), finding municipal
power to regulate intercity transmission lines was statutory and not part of Home Rule (at 10).
505 See textual discussion accompanying notes 273-90 s:upra
556 15 Ohio St 2d at 130, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
507 Id. at 131, 239 N.E.2d at 79.
508 Id. at 130, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
509 See textual discussion accompanying notes 373-80 supra; Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections,
167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
5 10 See textual discussion accompanying notes 373-74 supra.
511 Although the court made reference to statutory authority of a municipality in this area
in State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St 476, 159 N.E.2d 756
(1959), appeal dismissed, 362 U.S. 457 (19(0), and in Cambridge v. Public Util. Comm'n,
159 Ohio St. 88, 111 N.E.2d 1 (1953), the source of authority was nor in issue and it could
hardly be solely statutory, see note 181 supra. Judge Williams in State ca rd. Arey v. Sherrill,
142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944) (concurring opinion), had suggested that the "neces-
sity" of the situation provided the source.
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court failed to offer any explanation to clarify the puzzling problem of
what are the constitutional moorings for an independent "statewide concern"
concept.
Nor would the theoretical basis of the decision be any clearer if a state
exclusionary power were based upon the presence of changing circum-
stances5 2 which would transform a matter from one of local to one of
state concern. Such state action would serve to identify a transition, but
would leave unresolved the question of whether legislative exclusion
would be necessary to effect a transition. Moreover, the possibility that
such a power would be permitted to expand beyond its confirming role to
one of initiating a transition is evident. Even so, a finding of state auth-
ority to exclude or withdraw municipal power follows precedent more
closely than does the position advocated by CEI.113
2. Scope of the "Statewide Concern" Concept
CEI's brief also suggested a method of determiing the scope of ap-
plication of the doctrine it urged be adopted. A matter of "statewide con-
cern" would be one whose regulation is of "direct and immediate" con-
cern outside the boundaries of the municipality. 14 It was not urged that
a municipal regulation having any effects on nonresidents be struck down 1'
and it was noted that § 4905.65 carefully protects "local" regulatory power
while it removes "extraterritorial" power.5 81 This, of course, recreates the
dilemma of Ridgeway517 and in substance that of all "statewide concern"
cases. This test does not define "statewide concern" in terms of the appli-
cation of regulations or by the nature of the subject matter, but rather in
terms of the effect of the regulations. Thus, municipal regulations fail,
although they apply only within the municipality, iE they have "direct ef-
fects outside it." A contrary result is reached even though an intercity
business is regulated if the effects outside are indirect or remote. The
search for what is "state" and what is "local" takes on little more clarity
when turned into an exploration for what is a "direct" or an "indirect"
12A fact noted by the court, 15 Ohio St. 2d at 129, 239 N5.2d at 78, in its reliance on
State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26, appeal dimissed, 371 U.S.
35 (1962).
5 1 See textual discussion accompanying notes 354-80, supra.
514 Brief for Appellee at 25. The additional argument that the matter was of "statewide
concern" because the state found it necessary to regulate it, id. at 32, can be given no more
credence than deference to legislative judgment permits.
515 Although omitted from appellee's brief for the supreme court, CEI in its brief for the
court of appeals also conceded that a matter was not of "statewide concern" simply because It
would affect non-residents physically present or present through the ownership of property in
the regulating municipality. Brief for Appellee at 58, Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. V.
Painesville, 10 Ohio App. 2d 85,226 N.B.2d 145 (1967).
516 Brief for Appellee at 32-33, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
517 Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
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effect on outsiders5 18 The outer limit of autonomous municipal police
power is thus made dependent upon uncertainty, but more significantly,
an uncertainty which results in the denial of municipal power as is shown
both by the expression of the test itself and by judicial precedent in the
utility field. 19
The Painesville court evidenced more respect for the presence of mu-
nicipal power; but in response to the problem of defining what constitutes
a "statewide concern," it developed a formula for restraining this power
which, because of its breadth of statement, presents an even graver source
of potential danger to the future of Home Rule in Ohio. The court relied
upon the precedent of Beachwood v. Board of Elections of Cuyahoga
County.200 If the results of the legislation affect only the municipal corpo-
ration with "no extraterritorial effects," the matter is for municipal control.
If the results are not so confined the matter is for the General Assembly.52-
Taken literally this approach would mean the end of Home Rule in
the police power area, for few if any regulations have no outside effects.
Yet, if based on the precedent of Beachwood, why should this approach
cause concern? Regardless of the validity of this test in Beachwood, it is
submitted that the circumstances of that case are clearly distinguishable
from those found in Painesville. The Beachwood decision involved es-
sentially an exclusive state area and could have been based on the limited
issue of the territorial application of the municipal regulation. Annexa-
tion and detachment in a very real sense have extraterritorial application
and not just effects. To rule out all extraterritorial application is fully
consistent with Home Rule as it is generally understood, but to rule out
all internal regulation if it has "any" outside effects is quite another mat-
ter. The result is that autonomous municipal police power again is held
at the discretion of the state. This conclusion goes beyond what was
urged by CEI, even though Beachwood was cited in its brief.'
The court apparently sought to modify some of the harshness of the
application of Beachwood by stating that even though a matter is of local
concern, if it affects those outside of the municipality more than it does
those within, in this case as a consequence of changing circumstances, it
is then a matter of statewide concern.52 This statement cannot be har-
518 For example, the extraterritorial effects on an intercity business resulting from munid-
pal regulation of transient vendors, upheld in West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St.2d 113,
205 N.E.2d 382 (1965), were distinguished from the Paineivillo facts. Brief for Appellee
at 58, 10 Ohio App. 2d 85, 226 N.E.2d 145 (1967). Suggested as a "local" matter in Note,
Regulation of Door to Door Solicitation by Enactmcnt of a Grccn Riher Ordinance: Application
and Validity in Ohio, 32 U. CIN. L. REV. 92, 107 (1963).
519 See textual discussion accompanying notes 473-84 supra.
520 167 Ohio S. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
521 15 Ohio St. 2d at 129,239 N.E.2d at 78.
52 Brief for Appellee at 25-26.
523 15 Ohio St. 2d at 129, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
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monized with the previous one, which places a regulation with any outside
effect within the province of the General Assembly. Certainly the ap-
pearance of both of these statements in the same opinion cannot clarify an
already confused situation. Even if this still restrictive modification be-
comes accepted as the intended version, 2 4 it is little more workable than
CEI's suggested "direct" effects approach. How is the court's balance
between outside and inside effects to be struck? The judicial process in-
volves making judgments, but the Painesville approach creates a highly
subjective test or at least one easily susceptible of being so applied. Both
legislators and councilmen are left without clear guidelines and Home
Rule hangs in the balance. To return to an even more basic criticism, the
court's formula forces a choice between state power and local power with
respect to a matter which is defined in terms of both state and local inter-
est.5 25  Since the state interest has become "more" than the local interest
in the modern setting, the state can entirely "exclude" the local. Expand-
ing state needs hardly justify so stolid a resort to conceptualism.
Having expressed concern over the breadth of the court's statements
in Painesville it is appropriate to recall the context in which they were
made-the facts of the case itself. Only intercity power lines were in-
volved.528 Section 4905.65 is tailored to fit this circumstance and to serve
as a limit on municipal regulations only if these intercity lines are con-
structed according to safety standards and pose no unreasonable threat to
the welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality. 12 These limitations
serve as a tempering influence on the opinion, create an inner limit on the
scope of "statewide concern," and preserve much initial local power over
important local effects of the construction of such lines including, as noted
by the court, some local planning commission control.8 28 Yet, § 4905.65
524 Both statements appear in the quotation included in Walton Hills v. Cleveland lee.
Illuminating Co., No. 884,475 (Cuyahoga County C. P. Oct. 29, 1970), a/I'd, No. 30,869 (Ct.
App. 1971), appeal dismissed, No. 71-621, Ohio Bar 1275 (S. Ct. Oct. 18, 1971). But no refer-
ence was made to either statement when the shifting of truck traffic from one community to protect
residential interests to the congested and more heavily populated anea of another was sustained
in Cincinnati Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Lincoln Heights, 25 Ohio St. 2d 203, 267 N.X.2d 797
(1971).
52See 15 W. REs. L. REV. 812 (1964).
526 15 Ohio St. 2d at 131, 239 N.E.2d at 79.
527 (B) To the extent permitted by existing law a local regulation may reasonably re-
strict the construction, location, or use of a public utility facility, unless the public util-
ity facility: (1) Is necessary for the service, convenience, or welfare of the public served
by the public utility in one or more political subdivisions other than the political sub-
division adopting the local regulation; and (2) Is to be constructed in accordance with
generally accepted safety standards; and (3) Does not unreasonably affect the welfare
of the general public.
OMo REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.65 (Page Supp. 1970).
5-28 15 Ohio St. 2d at 131-32, 239 N.E.2d at 79. Compliance with overall plans might
be sought and a utility proposal rejected if the standards of secton 4905.65, Revised Code,
were not met. For the position of CEI on the applicability of planning ordinances, ice note
167 supra. For "statewide concern" decisions in which state authority exercised through publk
bodies was found superior to local planning and zoning regulations, see State cx tel. Ohio
[Vol, 3
STATE-MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
has removed from municipal councils the power to make the basic deci-
sion to search for ways to reconcile community and utility interests within
the framework of reasonableness. Accommodating an essentially progres-
sive step for the welfare of the community with the interference it might
cause public utility operations is foreclosed. Even the vitality of specific
facts and restrained legislative action as mitigating factors depends upon
the care with which future legislatures and courts observe their importance.
C. State's Need for Enhanced Power
1. In Painesville
It seems evident that the state could readily have dealt with the prob-
lem of underground high voltage transmission lines without need to resort
to any denial of municipal power or to the use of statutory provisions
which are dearly susceptible of that interpretation. A uniform treatment
of the problem geared to the engineering and economic facts of life could
have been achieved through authorizations to electric companies upon
stated conditions or with the establishment of guidelines for such construc-
tion or with a combination of approaches. Local regulations reflecting
local interests would not have been precluded. Restrained by the require-
ments of reasonableness and "no conflict" with general state guidelines,
it is not likely that these local regulations would become burdensome.
An acceptable accommodation of interests could have resulted.
2. In General
These considerations raise the more general issue of how imperative
it is for the state to have even a limited power to deny municipal authority.
How important is it for the state to achieve either uniformity of regula-
tion or to create a vacuum from regulation by clearing a field of municipal
regulation?
State preemption or denial of power is not unknown in the field of
municipal government in this country.-9 In theory the need to have the
power to deal with a matter completely unencumbered by municipal ac-
tions, as distinguished from the ability to exercise superior authority, may
be postulated; but as in Painesville, the practical necessities for such a
power have not been dearly established. It would seem that the state
should ordinarily be able to accomplish what it wants through the present
state-municipal corporation power structure-through constitutionally pro-
Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.d 345, crt. denid, 344 U.S. 865
(1952); State ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio Sr. 650, 157 N.E. 330 (1927); Heath v.
Licking County Regional Airport Authority, 16 Ohio Misc. 69, 237 N.E.2d 173 (C.P. 1967);
State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 69S (C.P.), af'd,
83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E2d 694, appeal dismisscd, 149 Ohio Sr. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911 (1948).
29 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNIClPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.06, at 109-111 (1968).
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
vided "no conflict" provisions. Without imposing a complete bar to mu-
nicipal regulation or appreciable limitations upon citizens, a considerable
curtailment of local regulations can be achieved by affirmative state grants
,of authority and, to a lesser extent, by broad licensing measures. 3 0 Uni-
'formity of state regulation can be advanced substantially by comprehen-
,sive treatment of a subject either directly through legislative enactment "1
or by means of state regulatory agencies operating under broad jurisdic-
tional grants,0 2 even without the aid of the "conflict by implication" the-
ory which broadens the effect of the prohibitory regulations.183 Analogous
municipal regulations are likely to be conflicting or superfluous. Should
these legislative capabilities themselves be thought too injurious to munici-
-pal interests, provision can be made for full consideration of these interests
through the vehicle of public hearings or some similar procedure.63
The cost of those limited instances when the "no conflict" approach
would not permit the state to achieve its purpose fully must be measured
against the positive advantages of shared power. Aside from preserving
local autonomy, of not minor significance is avoidance of the difficulties
of drawing lines of demarcation between municipal power and the new
state power to deny. An examination of the facts of a "conflict," con-
cretely presented in a case, is not replaced by a theoretical exploration into
the nature of an area of regulation. Such a search raises the problem of
reaching beyond the circumstances of the case to examine hypothetical
conditions which might delimit the area. On the other hand, if such lines
were drawn and an unrealistic conclusion were reached, the unsettling pros-
pect of future frictions and countershifts arises. Legislative lobbying, rem-
iniscent of pre-Home Rule days, involving tests of the relative strengths
of municipalities and those they seek to regulate, is an almost necessary
consequence. A redress of the inequities of a decision validating a statu-
tory denial and further denials of power will be sought of the legislature.
How content will those regulated be if a new fortun of appeal is opened
to them, and how comfortable will a municipality be with a division line
which leaves substantial local interests in the hands of the state?
D. Conclusions
1. Effects of Painesville
In the final analysis the Painesville decision has given new impetus to
"statewide concern" as an independent concept within police power. The
530 Anderson v. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 2d 53, 233 N.X.2d 584 (19(8).
5s1B.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 4511: Traffic Laws--Operation of Motor Vehicles.
532 E.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.03 (Page 1965) which places the power to adopt
rules and regulations in the liquor control commission of the state.
53 Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
534 E.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5511.01 (Page 1970) which provides for public hearings




area of exclusive state power was not advanced despite the urgings of CEI.
However, direct state control over a municipal exercise of the police power
was sustained. The only restraint imposed was that municipal action
must have some external or perhaps more external than internal effects.
This did not occur as a result of an effort to forestall claims of exclusive
municipal power, nor as a consequence of a state desire to regulate through
conferral of jurisdiction upon a state agency, but as a reflection of legisla-
tive concern to prevent a type of local regulation. A new area of continu-
ing municipal concern was thereby opened to "statewide" treatment by the
Painesville decision, since prior cases recognizing a municipal interest in
the regulation of public utilities failed to establish a basis for such a find-
ing. Support for its rationale is available primarily from decisions in the
health field, while those cases involving areas of special state concern
should not be considered of direct precedential value for this broader ap-
plication.
The extent of the expansion of state power is limited by the specific
facts of Painesville and by the detailed provisions of § 4905.65. Given
this restrained statute, the disruptive effect of the local ordinance upon
the utility, and previous indications of broadened state power, the Paines-
ville result should not come completely unexpected. Yet, the court's re-
liance upon the expansive implications of the McElroy and Beachwood
decisions suggests, if it does not compel, the further lessening of municipal
autonomy in the future.
2. Effects of the "Statewide Concern" Concept
Viewed in its larger perspective, "statewide concern" has proved to be
an illusive concept. Aside from meaning that the state has exclusive power
in areas of special state interest, it is also suggestive of exclusive state
power as an outer limit to municipal police power. Logically sound, but
potentially dangerous to municipal Home Rule if restrictively applied, this
role has been largely ignored by the courts.
As a theory of expanded state power "statewide concern" still struggles
for existence-for a constitutional base, for definition and scope or identity,
and even for purpose. The need to use the "statewide concern" concept
to fill state requirements for enhanced power over what is given by the
"no conflict" approach is not established. State denial of constitutionally
granted power is deservedly suspect, even if of limited application. But
lines separating the theory of enhanced state power from municipal au-
thority on the one hand and presumably from exclusive state power on
the other are woefully faint, although they are essential as limits to and
for the very identification of the concept. Over the years precedent has
given little aid in determining where these lines should be traced. Prac-
tical difficulties abound if territorial application of a municipal regulation
1972]
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approach is discarded and they reach the point of seriously questioning the
basic premise that matters of modern concern lend themselves to divi-
sion.
As a consequence, it is difficult to consider "statewide concern" as an
acceptable theory for the denial of municipal power-filling the inter-
mediate role both of preserving as much municipal autonomy as possible
and of securing needed state power. With the very nature of the concept
still clouded and controversial, it must be said that "statewide concern"
remains a cluster of results devoid of a unifying rationale.
IX. WHAT EFFECT DOES THIS APPARENT INCREASE OF STATE
POWER HAVE UPON THE SOLUTION OF METROPOLITAN AREA,
As DISTINGUISHED FROM MUNICIPAL, PROBLEMS?
A. Dimensions of Enhanced Power
Taken literally the Painesville decision enables the state to exclude"
municipal corporations from the regulation of any matter which has be-
come of "statewide concern" because its regulation affects people outside the
municipality more than it does those within.13  Within this test the state
can create a vacuum to meet metropolitan area regulatory needs, rang-
ing from air and water pollution and mass transportation problems to es-
tablishing crime detection and planning programs. Moreover, the expan-
siveness of the decision tends to confirm the broader implications of earlier
decisions, which would otherwise properly be restricted to a particular
subject of regulation, a particular form of regulation, or a less compre-
hensive degree of state interference. As a consequence of these impli-
cations, it can be contended that the state can withdraw such power from
a municipality 37 and vest it in a special district 38 or some other agency of
the state's choosing,539 including perhaps some form of multifunction area
government unit. The municipality might be compelled to contribute to
the expense of operation of such units.540  The state could also achieve
an area objective by ordering a municipality to curtail its actions"41 or to
undertake some function r42 under the direction and supervision of state
officials, 43 This most expansive interpretation of Painesville represents a
535 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 131,239 N.E.2d 75, 79 (1968).
536 Id. at 129, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
53 7 Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
538 State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940).
530 State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (C.P.),
affd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694 (Ct. App.), appeal dhrli4scd, 149 Ohio St. 583,
79 N.E.2d 911 (1948).
040 State ex rel. Cuyahoga Heights v. Zangerle, 103 Ohio St. 566, 134 N.E. 686 (1921).
541 Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
542 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941).
543 State exrel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203,34 N.E.2d 219 (1941).
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considerable enhancement of state power and a commensurate reduction
of municipal power, if not in specific holding, certainly in the confirming
role the decision might be felt to occupy by some future court.
The justification or wisdom for making such an adjustment of state-
municipal power, primarily from the standpoint of its affect on municipal
power, has been considered in the development of this article. If not con-
sidered a change in the constitutional distribution of power, as it certainly
seems to be, it is at least a shift in emphasis in the approach that has been
developed through the years. Such modifications open up the possibility
for both the legislature and the courts to make further adjustments unin-
hibited by prior conceptions of constitutional restraints. This freedom of
action is enhanced by the difficulty in developing sharp lines of distinc-
tion when applying the rule of Painesville and affords the state greater
power if in the examination of the effects of a municipal regulation it is
found to affect those outside "more" than those within the municipality.
This section will present a consideration of the justification the Paines-
ville decision might find and the use to which enhanced state power might
be put in the solution of metropolitan area problems on an area basis.
B. Additional or Enhanced Units of Government
Reduced to its most fundamental terms the conclusion to be garnered
from the potentialities of Painesville is one of increased or at least con-
firmed state power vis-i-vis municipalities. This in turn supports the
conclusion that solutions to metropolitan area problems have been made
easier insofar as such solutions are dependent upon the scope of state
power." 4  Certainly the creation by the state of a separate viable unit of
government to govern a metropolitan area545 would be facilitated by the
Painesville decision; the state could withdraw function from municipalities
and bestow them upon such a government free from municipal inter-
ference through not just conflicting regulations but supplemental ones as
well. Creation of special purpose districts would be similarly advanced, 0
even though this might not prove to be all to the good. By definition
such districts are usually limited to carrying out a single or at most a few
54 See generally N. ITTILEFIELD, fEROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEtS AND MUNIcIPAL
HOME RULE (1962).
54 Created whether or not with popular vote confirmation, in a unitarian or federal form,
and presumably within constitutional restrictions that "laws, of a general nature, shall have a
uniform operation throughout the state," OHIo CONST. am II, § 26, that "[¢]orporations...
be formed under general laws," OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 2, that no new county be created re-
quiring the vote of "the electors of the several counties to be affected,' OHIo CoNSr., art. II, §
30, and that the resulting unit of government would be distinguishable from a "municipal cor-
poration" and would not enjoy the Home Rule protections of Article XVIII of the Ohio Coustitu-
tion. See generally J. WINTERS, STATE CONSTITUIONAL IMITATIONS ON SOLUTION OF
MROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS (1961).
546 These range from mosquito control districts, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6115.24
(Page 1953) to port authorities, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4582.02 (Page Supp. 1970).
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related functions5 7 and, therefore, they tend to increase the problems of
proliferating governmental units"~s more than would a broader multipur-
pose metropolitan government. The ease with which the state might make
use of a municipal corporation as its agent in obtaining areawide objec-
tives might also be enhanced as a consequence of Painesville.
C. Safeguards for Local Decisions?
Every increase of power should be accompanied by thoughts as to the
wisdom of its use. Perhaps the most significant consideration involved
here is that of local autonomy. State withdrawal of authority from mu-
nicipalities or the direction of them amounts to state imposed solutions to
problems. Accepting the presence of area problems in need of solution and,
at least for the purposes of argument, the need to limit municipal power
in order to arrive at solutions, it does not follow that the solutions ought
to be left completely in the hands of the state. If state actions is to be the
only available approach, today's area citizens are in much the same position
as municipal citizens prior to 1912. They would be without voice in meet-
ing the difficulties which beset them. Some form of area control over area
problems is needed-Area Home Rule, if you please. It is beyond the
scope of this article to explore all the difficulties besetting such an approach,
and they are many." ' Not the least of these is the spector of the increased
complexities which would result from a possible three levels of govern-
ment, or four, if the ever-expanding role of the federal government is taken
into account. Yet, despite these difficulties a sufficient case can be made for
autonomous area government to cause hesitation in accepting as adequate
a simple increase of state power which, at the expense of municipal au-
tonomy, bears no inherent limits for the preservation of area autonomy.
The creation of special districts is usually marked by the failure to pro-
vide for effective popular control. "5 ° The use of the municipality as a state
547 E.g., Sanitary districts may be established for any of the following purposes:
(A) correct the pollution streams;(B) clean.. . stream channels for sanitary purposes;
(C) regulate the flow of streams for sanitary purposes;
(D) provide for the collection and disposal of sewage ...
(E) provide a water supply for domestic, municipal, and public use ...
(F) exterminate or prevent mosquitoes ... and abate their breeding places..
(G) collect and dispose of garbage;
(H) collect and dispose of any other refuse that may become a menace to health.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 6115.04 (Page 1953).
5 4 8 J. BOLLENS & H. ScHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS 172-75 (1965). See generally M.
POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROB-
LEMS (1962).
5 49 See J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, supra note 548, at 439-90.
55 Id. at 173. E.g., a petition of 500 or a majority of freeholders in a proposed district to
the common pleas court of the county to establish a sanitary district initiates the procedure.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6115.05 (Page 1953). A director of the district is to be appointed
by the judge of the common pleas court of each county having territory within the sanitary
district. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 6115.10 (Page 1953). A somewhat more acceptable situ.
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agent in area matters also suffers from an absence of local autonomy. The
municipality, although gaining extraterritorial power, would ordinarily
be under state direction as to how to use it; while the inhabitants of the
area affected would be under state control, even though indirect. If mu-
nicipal power were to be enhanced by the authorization of the exercise
of discretion it would result in a commensurate loss of influence by area
inhabitants.- Instead of a state-imposed solution concerning which area
inhabitants would have some, albeit miniscule, voice, there would be a
state-initiated solution involving municipal action concerning which the
area inhabitants would have no voiceY5t
Creation of metropolitan area governments by the state does not insure
local autonomy either, since they might merely be constituted as admin-
istrative armns of the state. On the other hand, being sensitive to political
pressure or for other reasons, the state might very well vest them with a
substantial degree of autonomy. But even then self-sufficiency would not
be complete, since it would be subject to the hazards of subsequent legis-
lative alteration or abrogation. This is legislative Home Rule, which is
the formula adopted through constitutional provision by a number of
states552 with respect to state-municipal relations and in its broadest as-
'pects could be the ultimate result of the Painesville decision for such re-
lations in Ohio. Is it an acceptable approach to state-area relations? This
is the crux of a vital policy question.
How much Home Rule is desirable? Legislative Home Rule leaves
the ultimate answer to this question up to legislative determination and
thereby gains flexibility of approach. Constitutional Home Rulel m by
contrast loses this flexibility by denying this legislative discretion but pro-
vides instead a greater safeguard for, if not greater, local autonomy. This
conflict of thinking arose with respect to providing for municipal Home
Rule at the turn of the century"4 and remains with us with respect to es-
tablishing Home Rule for area citizens even in the modern setting. In
resolving the conflict, note must be taken of the history of struggle for
the maintenance of local autonomy, " the frequent disregard by the state
ation exists with respect to port authorities. A munidipal corporation by ordinance, or a town-
ship or a county by resolution, is authorized to establish a port authority, O-O REv. CODE
A&& § 4582.02 (Page Supp. 1970), appoint directors, OHIo REV. CODS ANN. § 4582.03
(Page 1965), and dissolve the authority, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4582.023 (Page 1965).
55 1 See generally F. SENGOCK, EXTRATMuTORIAL POWFM IN THE IMTROPOLITAN
AREA (1962).
552 1 C. ANTIEAu, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LUw § 3.08 (1968).
5 53 Or "self-executing" Home Rule, where constitutional provisions are thought to be the
source of municipal power without the need or opportunity for intervening legislative action.
Id. at § 3.01-.04.
554 Witness the two approaches adopted in constitutional provisions, 1 C. ANTMAU, mupra
notes 552, 553.
5 55 Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powerr in Thcory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. LJ. 18
(1948); Blume, funicipal Home Rule in Ohio: The New Look, 11 CAsE NV. RES L Rr. 538
(1960).
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of local interests,"" and the seemingly endless trend throughout the nation
toward centralization of authority. Nor should the case for legislative
Home Rule be ignored, given the number of states that have adopted it." T
Considerations of simplicity and symmetry suggest, though, that whichever
Home Rule approach is favored, thought should be given to applying the
same approach to both municipal and area units of government.
Neither Painesville nor any judicial decision can guarantee even limited
Home Rule for metropolitan areas when such Home Rule depends, as it
does, on legislative discretion rather than on constitutional provision for
alteration and abrogation as well as for its initial vesting. Consequently,
the implications of Painesville and, to a lesser extent, the decision itself
stand for an increase in state power, power that could be used to expedite
the solution of metropolitan area problems on an area basis, and a con-
striction of municipal autonomy without insuring area autonomy. It thus
remains a state power decision.
D. The Future?
A comprehensive, forward-looking reconciliation of all competing in-
terests is needed. Neither the Painesville decision nor judicial action in
general can serve such an objective. It can be satisfactorily accomplished
only by resort to the more standardized method of amending the Ohio
Constitution. Although a constitutional provision is clearly not a panacea,
in the interest of all concerned the future of both municipal autonomy
and area autonomy ought to be hammered out in the free exchange of
popular views that comes in a constitutional convention. A carefully
drawn constitutional provision delineating the modern roles of each-mu-
nicipality, metropolitan area, and state, in relationship with each other
as well as with the federal government-would equip the people of the
state to meet the needs of the future." 8 The opportunity to seek such a
solution is before the voters of Ohio in 1972.t; 0
X. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Ohio in the Painesville decision sustained the
provisions of § 4905.65 of the Revised Code as a state-directed reduction
of the reasonable exercise of police power by municipal corporations in an
5 56 Supra note 292.
5 7 Apparently not with uniformly high success, however. Duffey, Non-Charter Munici'
palities.: Local Self-Government, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 304, 306 n.7 (1960).
558 A call for similar action was made 23 years ago, Fordham & Asher, Home Rule
Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHio ST. L.J. 18, 71 (1948).
559 "At the general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty.
two, and in each twentieth year thereafter, the question: 'Shall there be a convention to revise,
alter, or amend the constitution,' shall be submitted to the electors of the state ...... Oiio
CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
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area of regulation where the extraterritorial effects of its exercise were
thought to be greater than the interests internal to the corporation. This
holding must be considered to be a "statewide concern" decision. By
rendering it the court gave renewed, but limited, impetus to an amorphous
concept which fell short of the clarity needed to ensure its continued exis-
tence. At the same time, the decision marked still another instance of ju-
dicial confirmation of legislative disfavor of municipal Home Rule but did
so without providing the means of dearly forecasting the future role of
Home Rule of either increasing disfavor or possible regained acceptance.
Painesville is not a clarion call and will not likely receive the response
that such a call would warrant. It is nonetheless an important decision.
For it is not only from what was said in the context in which it was
said, but also through its unspoken implications that one can discern the
weakening of past principles which marks the erosion of municipal Home
Rule.
As the cases suggest, there has been no development of a single "state-
wide concern" theory. References to it have been fitful. Its most frequent
use has been to confirm existing state power or to announce a result little
different from the traditional one of state superiority in the police power
field. The overall scope of its application has not been made clear nor
have the effects upon state-municipal relations which are to be derived
from it. Yet, without a firm confirmation of municipal power based on
intraterritorial application of municipal regulations, a municipality stands
vulnerable. The history of "statewide concern" suggests that it can pro-
vide a vehicle, no matter how haphazardly equipped, for the expansion
of state power either by a definitional limiting of the outer scope of mu-
nicipal police power or by the development of a theory without constitu-
tional support of state power to exclude or supplant municipal regulation
under certain circumstances. It can, in short, be made the instrument of
curtailing municipal police power.
The court in Painesv'ille chose to use this vehicle apparently not to con-
strict the scope of municipal police power but to find a state power "to
exclude" previously recognized municipal authority to regulate intercity
public utilities. In this way the court answered in the affrmative the issue
presented of whether state authority in the police power field was sufficient
not merely to overturn contradictory municipal regulations but to exclude
them entirely without the state itself regulating-to create a regulatory
vacuum.
The net effect of such a result, at least with respect to matters of
"statewide concern," was to discard the concept of "general laws" as it
has been developed in case law. Although § 4905.65 might be considered
a general law through a careful process of fitting its provisions into the
pattern of right-conferring and regulatory statutes, the court failed to fol-
19721
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[
low this process and its acceptance of the state's power to exclude munici-
pal authority cannot be squared with that approach. Unfortunately, the
court by its decision in Painesville brought little clarity to the confusion
over the scope of an independent "statewide concern" theory. What little
was gained by the court's apparent invitation to the broadest of interpreta-
tions, through its reliance upon the widest precedential base and by includ-
ing all matters which had any extraterritorial effects, was fortunately lost
by its own modifying expressions and the limiting facts of the case itself.
The facts of Painesville and the provisions of § 4905.65 do serve to
limit the state's encroachment upon municipal authority, since only inter-
city electric transmission lines were involved. Municipal power is limited
by § 4905.65 only if such lines are constructed according to accepted safety
standards and do not pose an unreasonable threat to the welfare of the in-
habitants of the municipality. Yet, from another viewpoint, rather than
making the decision more acceptable, these factors serve to underscore the
decision's real effect. As a consequence of admittedly restrained legisla-
tion, the state's judgment of what is reasonable for the protection of local
interests has been accepted as a replacement for judicially-confirmed mu-
nicipal judgment, not in accommodation one with the other, but in the cre-
ation of a stifling vacuum of no regulation. Where the reconciliation of
interests was possible on the basis of reasonableness, an insensitively uni-
form solution was accepted instead. It is in this result that the true sig-
nificance of the Painesville decision lies. Rather than furthering inter-
governmental cooperation, its acceptance of a state exclusionary power
marks a departure from an accommodation of state-municipal power al-
ready established through the "no conflict" and "general laws" concepts.
The blending panorama of mutual power which forbids denial of munici.
pal authority either expressly or impliedly at one end, but overturns mu-
nicipal regulations because of "head-on" conflict at the other, with ac-
commodating theories of "conflict by implication" or with felony statutes
in between, is disturbed and distorted by this decision.
Thus, even without a clear-cut reappraisal of state-municipal relations,
Painesville suggests a reordering, not just an updating, of a constitutional
distribution of power made nearly 60 years ago. A court brings inherent
limitations to such a task including a piecemeal, rather than a comprehen-
sive, approach that does not accommodate itself readily to anticipating the
need for adjustments nor to the creation of broad safeguards. But aside
from this consideration, the ultimate test of any reordering is the balance
to be struck between the practical difficulties in the present allocation of
power that can be overcome by change and the new problems which are
likely to adhere to a different system; a distribution of governmental power
has little significance other than its workability.
First the new vistas opened by a reordering may not be so new at all
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because they may well involve answers to old problems which were re-
jected earlier. In establishing municipal Home Rule the writers of the
1912 amendments felt that in areas of mutual interest state superiority
should be recognized, yet each level of government should be able to act.
This has produced a reasonably workable system geared to the practical-
ities of the situation. Was this conclusion wrong, or have circumstances
changed so that more state power is needed to the disregard of local de-
termination?"' It is not intended here to venture into a comprehensive
treatment of the extent to which state authority should be enhanced, if
at all, or what the new order of state-municipal relations should be, if
there is to be a new order. It would seem dear, nonetheless, that the
need for a state denial power and the use of "statewide concern' as a
means of providing it are questionable in light of the authority the state
already possesses and the difficulties a denial power is likely to create, even
aside from those accompanying a curtailment of local autonomy. Dili-
gence in drafting regulations to define their purpose dearly and to accom-
modate them to the interests of the other governmental level will likely
obviate the need for a denial power by forestalling any substantial loss
of legitimate purpose-be it municipal or state. Certainly a reordering
which includes increased state power would give recognition to a wide
range of considerations pressuring toward centralization of authority with-
in the state. It would create a greater flexibility of state power over the
present system which could be used through superior level direction to
advance the solution of metropolitan area problems on an area basis. But
as has been suggested, this, without constitutional protection, is not an
unmixed blessing if local control over local matters has any validity.
Forecasters of doom are usually wrong, as are those who settle upon
the most reprehensible features of a decision as the factors which are
likely to provide the most lasting consequences. It well may be that the
full implications of Painesville will never be reached. Yet, one need not
fall into these errors and still assess the Painesville decision as at the very
least a sizable contribution to the developing pattern of current, if not
permanent, Home Rule erosion. It represents a much greater danger than
the McElroy decision from which it gained strength, cluttered as that deci-
sion was with alleviating rationales. Still, the broadest aspects of the
McElroy case have made their impression in judicial circles. The court's
acceptance in Painesville of a direct prohibition of the use of municipal
police power can have no less effect.
560 Despite a testing of the basic motivations for municipal Home Rule, which is a recog-
nized periodic necessity, it should not be conduded that the spark for Home Rule has gone out
of the modem world. Notice the not too unserious proposals for the independence not only
of Home Rule but for statehood itself which have been made with respect to New York City.
Time, June 21, 1971, at 13; National Observer, July 19, 1971, at coL 1; Straus, Seriously, Why
Not Statehood for the City?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1971, at 41, coL 3.
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To repeat, the Painesville decision is not a clarion call for a new state-
municipal power division line. But it does suggest such a line, one
which plays the role of an intruder within the boundaries of Ohio munici-
palities.
